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Foreword
Migration is one of the most divisive policy topics in today’s Europe. 
Emotions run high when citizens across our continent discuss the 
refugee ‘crisis’ of 2015, intra-EU migration, posted workers, border 
control, Schengen and so on. Perceptions often differ vastly from reali-
ties on the ground. That is why we decided to provide a comprehensive 
and data-driven book on the current state of affairs of immigration in 
Europe, which I am very happy to introduce. 
The book offers numerous insights. On overall immigration num-
bers and their relationship to Europe’s demographics, it is fascinating 
to note that only 30 years ago, in the mid-1980s, Europe became a net 
immigration continent – after 400 years of populating many parts of 
the world. More recently, it is important to note that net immigration 
has become distinctively more important for population change than 
the natural change. In 2015, the natural rate of population change 
turned negative.
Another issue is perceptions of migration. This volume shows the 
relatively high support for intra-EU migration as opposed to immigra-
tion from outside the EU, and documents how emigration away from 
central and eastern Europe has created labour shortages in that part of 
the world and has also affected its demographics. 
The book also surveys research on the economic impact of migra-
tion and analyses the importance of education for integration of 
immigrants into the labour market. It finds that in many EU countries, 
second- and third-generation descendants of immigrants are much 
less well integrated into the labour market and have worse educational 
outcomes than natives. 
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This volume also documents the vastly different ways in which EU 
countries assess asylum applications. In some countries, large per-
centages of applicants get granted asylum status while in others the 
percentages are very low.
The authors conducted a novel survey of banks and concluded that 
the tightening of financial regulation that has been necessary to tackle 
money laundering and terrorist financing has made it more difficult to 
offer financial services to refugees. The solution to this problem is not 
to ease regulation, but to tailor it to the specific needs of refugees, offer 
clear guidelines to banks and improve refugee identification.   
The authors make a number of important policy recommendations, 
highlighting the importance of effective EU border control, consistent 
implementation of EU decisions and of practical measures such as 
creating an EU database and ID for refugee identification.
I would like to thank the authors for a very comprehensive and 
thorough work which I am sure will inform many stakeholders and 
help improve the fact base that underpins important debates. My grat-
itude also goes to the Mastercard Center for Inclusive Growth, which 
funded this study.
Guntram Wolff, Director of Bruegel
Brussels, January 2018
Executive summary
Immigration tops the list of challenges of greatest concern to 
European Union citizens. While in some years immigration has 
been primarily driven by economic motives and family reunifica-
tion, in the last few years Europe has experienced a major surge of 
refugees fleeing wars and conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and 
other countries. The arrival of a large number of asylum seekers 
in a short period has created huge administrative, border-protec-
tion and financial difficulties in several EU countries, and even 
led to a partial suspension of the border-free intra-EU travel area. 
The public perception of refugees and other immigrants has been 
shaped by the devastating conflicts in a number of EU neigh-
bourhood countries and the tragic deaths of migrants seeking to 
cross the Mediterranean Sea. Concerns are also voiced frequently 
about the difficulties of integrating people with different cultural 
backgrounds.
At the same time, there are economic and political reasons to allow 
the immigration of workers, students and family members, while the 
provision of humanitarian assistance to refugees is a key value of the 
European Union. Meanwhile, the public understanding of simple facts 
about migration is sometimes far removed from reality.
We assess the immigration challenge that the EU faces. We 
analyse public perceptions, extensively map migration patterns in 
the EU, review the literature on the economic impact of immigra-
tion and analyse the integration experiences of immigrants to the 
EU. We also reflect on immigration policies and the role of private 
institutions in fostering integration. 
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Chapter 1 provides an overview of the EU’s demographics:
• Population growth due to natural change (the balance between live 
births and deaths) has declined from 0.8 percent in the 1960s to 
essentially zero. In 2015, the EU saw a natural population decline 
for the first time at least since 1960.
• Net immigration into the EU was close to zero from the 1960s to the 
early 1980s, when it started to increase. Since 1992, net immigra-
tion has been a more important source of population increase than 
natural change.
• The large inflow of refugees in 2015-16 was not historically unprec-
edented. However, the circumstances of immigration, the compo-
sition of flows of immigrants and the uneven distribution of asylum 
seekers across EU countries were unprecedented. 
Chapter 2 uses a range of surveys to analyse the public perception 
of immigration:
• EU citizens have become relatively less concerned about economic 
issues and more concerned about immigration and terrorism. 
Surveys show that citizens tend to associate terrorism with 
immigration. 
• Europeans are more negative about immigration than people on 
other continents.
• On average – though there are major differences between countries – 
EU citizens perceive that immigrants take more jobs than they create, 
and take out more fiscal resources than they put in. 
• There is a major difference between public perceptions of migration 
from other EU countries and immigration from outside the EU. Sup-
port for intra-EU mobility has increased and exceeds two-thirds of the 
EU population. Support for extra-EU immigration is generally lower.
• We do not find support for the hypothesis that the high share of for-
eign citizens in a population, or a rapid increase in their share, fuels 
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anti-immigrant sentiment. In fact, we find some evidence for the 
opposite. It seems that the perception that immigration could be a 
problem, rather than the actual presence of immigrants, has greater 
influence over public support for immigration.
• There is a huge gap between perceived and actual stocks of immi-
grants, with most people over-estimating the proportion of for-
eign-born people in their countries. 
• EU citizens generally disapprove of the way the refugee crisis was 
handled in Europe. Nevertheless, a large majority of Europeans is 
in favour of a common European asylum policy and increased EU 
efforts to fight illegal immigration.
Chapter 3 analyses immigration into and emigration from EU 
countries in terms of source and destination countries and educational 
levels. It also considers the movements of posted workers within the EU.
• Annual emigration of EU citizens (to both EU and non-EU coun-
tries) was relatively stable at about 0.29 percent of population from 
2009-15. The highest levels of emigration were from the central and 
eastern European EU countries, and the lowest levels were from 
southern Europe, where recently increased emigration rates have 
not yet reached the EU average. The cross-border mobility of EU 
citizens remains well below intra-country mobility within the Unit-
ed States and other large countries.
• Posted workers from central and eastern European countries 
account for a mere 0.15 percent of the population in north-west 
EU countries, which makes it surprising that the revision of the EU 
Posted Workers Directive (96/71/EC) has received such prominent 
attention in EU policy debates.
• In 25 countries, the return of citizens who previously emigrated 
does not compensate for overall emigration; the exceptions are 
Cyprus, Denmark and Malta.
• Emigration from central and eastern European countries has creat-
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ed major labour shortages. However, the immigration of these cen-
tral Europeans to north-west EU countries did not take away jobs 
from local workers at a significant scale; labour shortages in various 
industries increased in north-west EU countries in parallel to the 
arrival of central and eastern European workers. The labour short-
age problem was already significant before 2008, but has become 
even more severe in recent years and requires urgent attention.
• In earlier years, non-EU citizens immigrated into the EU primarily 
for work, but in recent years, humanitarian reasons have become 
dominant with about 1.2 million asylum applications in both 2015 
and 2016. The expected number for 2017 is 640,000.
• European countries assess asylum applications very differently. 
The acceptance rate in EU countries varies from 15 percent to 85 
percent. It is rather unlikely that the composition of flows of asylum 
seekers explains these large differences. A more likely explanation 
is differences between countries in the implementation of the EU’s 
asylum rules.
• The disproportionate distribution of refugees between EU countries 
entails excessive burdens for some EU member states. Fair burden 
sharing is essential.
Chapter 4 reviews the literature on the economic impact of migra-
tion, particularly in relation to fiscal policy and labour markets, and 
considers the economic impact of sudden inflows of refugees and 
asylum seekers.
• There is a lack of conclusive evidence that immigrants take jobs 
from, or depress wages for, natives. Instead, the impact on the host 
country depends on migrant characteristics and the host country’s 
economic and institutional factors.
• The fiscal impact of migrants is generally found to be small and 
depends on migrant characteristics. Migrants make a greater 
fiscal contribution the younger and better integrated into the 
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labour market they are, while family and elderly migrants as well 
as refugees tend to be a fiscal burden. The literature results on 
whether migrants might cluster in countries with generous welfare 
systems and make a smaller contribution to public finances are 
mixed. The initial fiscal impact might also change in time, for 
example, labour migrants with a positive fiscal contribution might 
bring family members later and they might retire, when their fiscal 
contribution turns negative. Or the initial fiscal burden of refugees 
might turn to positive fiscal contribution when they integrate into 
the labour market. 
• Studies on sudden inflows of refugees suggest that restricting refu-
gees’ access to the labour market leads some to enter the informal 
economy, limiting the evaluation of their economic impact. 
• There is consensus that the economic impact of migration on 
receiving countries is largely influenced by the composition of mi-
grant flows. Migrants who come for work reasons or for the short-
term are associated with better economic outcomes for receiving 
countries.
• The swiftness of integration also plays a non-negligible role; the 
faster migrants are integrated into the labour market, the sooner 
they actively contribute, through taxes and social contributions.
Chapter 5 examines how Europe integrates migrants. Given that 
integration is time consuming, we focus on the experiences of earlier 
waves of immigrants.
• Effective integration would imply that first-generation migrants do 
not perform much worse than the native-born population on var-
ious indicators, while second-generation migrants are expected to 
have similar levels of activity and achievement as the native-born 
population.
• With the exception of a few countries, integration has fallen short. 
The labour force participation rates of second-generation immi-
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grants are close to those of native populations, and above those of 
first-generation immigrants, only in the UK, Sweden and France, 
suggesting successful integration processes. In most other EU coun-
tries, second-generation migrants participate less in the labour force 
than first generation migrants, and much less than natives.
• Unemployment rates among second-generation migrants tend to 
be higher than rate among the native population, even in the UK, 
Sweden and France.
• Better educated immigrants are much more likely to be employed 
than poorly-educated immigrants, highlighting the role of educa-
tion in successful integration strategies. The share of people with 
a low level of education is much higher among the non-EU-born 
population than the native-born and other-EU-born populations.
• More immigrants than native workers feel that they are overquali-
fied for their jobs, raising questions about the recognition in the EU 
of the qualifications of migrants.
• Young immigrants are much more likely than native-born youth to 
leave school early (with the notable exception of the UK). 
• The children of immigrants tend to underperform in educational 
terms compared to the native population. However, in Ireland, the 
UK, Portugal, Latvia and Hungary second-generation migrant chil-
dren achieve better scores than the native population.
• Foreign citizens tend to have lower incomes. However, it is difficult 
to disentangle whether lower average incomes are connected to 
the lower average education levels of immigrants, or are because of 
discrimination. 
• EU integration policy scores are rather poor compared to Canada, 
Australia and the US, especially in education.
Chapter 6 studies the financial inclusion of refugees, which poses 
major challenges. Our findings are informed by our own survey on 
the views of financial institutions on the regulatory environment and 
attitudes toward financial inclusion.
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• The necessary tightening of regulation to tackle money laundering 
and terrorist financing has made it more difficult to offer financial 
services to refugees, even though there have been a number of 
European efforts to foster financial inclusion. Most banks regard 
EU know-your-customer requirements as somewhat or overly 
restrictive in terms of offering financial services to refugees.
• Supervisory authorities have issued guidelines on the financial 
integration of refugees only in about half of the EU countries. All EU 
countries should prioritise the issuing of such guidelines. 
• The urgent need refugees have to open a bank account is blocked 
by identification requirements that are not designed to accommo-
date to their situation. A European identity document for refugees 
and a pan-European registry of refugees, to which financial institu-
tions should have access, would greatly foster financial inclusion.
• Financial institutions generally do not provide specialised products 
or are not equipped to deal with the specific needs of refugees, and 
show little interest in doing so. Simplifying existing regulations or 
recommending best practices could facilitate the process of settle-
ment by refugees in their host countries.
• Private-sector initiatives, such as offering micro-credit to refugees, 
offering short-term employment and providing internet access 
would facilitate their inclusion. The private and public sectors 
should work together on the integration of refugees.
• Public-private partnerships, on issues such the establishment of 
common and robust principles for financial inclusion, private 
sector support for the set-up of national and pan-European refugee 
registries, cooperation on training of refugees and social inclusion, 
should be explored.
We offer in chapter 7 twelve policy recommendations related to 
public dialogue (1), refugees (2-7), integration of immigrants (8-11) 
and labour shortages (12):
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1. Address negative perceptions of migrants: public understanding of 
immigration is often far from reality, making it important to dissem-
inate accurate information about various aspects of immigration.
2. Protect the EU’s borders and fight illegal immigration: while various 
measures have been introduced, 85-90 percent of the EU popula-
tion would like to see additional measures.
3. Continue to build partnerships with neighbourhood countries, 
which can help to contain refugee and immigration inflows into the 
EU, facilitate the successful and safe return of ineligible migrants 
and provide information about eligible migrants.
4. Provide additional funding for border protection, neighbourhood 
partnerships and immigrant integration: a small percentage of the 
EU budget is spent on these areas, which we find insufficient given 
that immigration is a priority concern of citizens.
5. Ensure the consistent implementation of the EU’s asylum rules: the 
widely different rates of acceptance of asylum seekers in different 
EU countries suggest different implementation of the EU’s asylum 
rules. Clear guidelines are needed for the evaluation of asylum 
applications and their consistent implementation.
6. Address the very uneven distribution of refugees among EU coun-
tries: relocation of refugees from, and financial support to, heavily 
impacted countries is essential. Countries that resist accepting 
refugees for political and ideological reasons should make large 
enough financial contributions instead of being forced to accept 
refugees.
7. Improve identification of refugees by issuing a European ID to each 
refugee and creating of a pan-European registry of refugees, linked 
to national central registries: such instruments, established with 
European financing, would greatly facilitate the identification and 
integration of refugees.
8. Learn from the best integration practices: only a few European 
countries can be regarded as successful in terms of integration of 
immigrants. Cooperation with the private sector and social part-
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ners should also play a role in improving integration systems. 
9. Combat educational and spatial segregation: early childhood 
education, language and professional training for recently arrived 
immigrants, and better access to higher education for young and 
second-generation migrants, are essential for their integration and 
to limit spatial segregation.
10. Ensure the EU strategy for integration is well articulated with 
national governments and other institutions: the EU’s 2016 Action 
Plan on the integration of third country nationals (COM (2016) 377) 
includes several useful initiatives which should be better imple-
mented by member states.
11. Review financial regulation to promote the financial inclusion 
of refugees: regulation should strike a balance between the fight 
against money-laundering/financing of terrorism and the econom-
ic integration of refugees. At the minimum, all supervisory authori-
ties should issue guidelines on financial inclusion of refugees.
12. Address labour shortages in EU member states by fostering labour 
force participation, increasing the pool of labour for the private 
sector through reduced public-sector employment, education and 
specific training programmes and by overhauling the tax/social 
security contribution system to promote higher net wages, while 
keeping gross wage costs and fiscal revenues unchanged.
1 Introduction
The demographics of the 28 countries that, at the time of writing, 
make up the European Union have changed dramatically in the past 
half century. While in the first half of the 1960s natural change (the 
balance of live births and deaths) increased the population by 0.8 per-
cent a year, the contribution of natural change to population growth 
has since declined steadily and fell close to zero in the late 1990s 
(Figure 1). The increase in longevity did not compensate for the fall 
in fertility. Although there was a slight increase in the rate of natural 
change in the late 2000s, it started to fall again and 2015 was the first 
year (at least since 1960) with a natural population decline in the EU.
Net immigration from outside the EU shows an opposite trend. 
It was close to zero from the 1960s to the mid-1980s, when it started 
to increase. Since 1992, net immigration to the EU has become a 
more significant source of population growth than natural change.
The composition of the flows of immigrants entering the EU is 
changing. While in some years immigration has been primarily driven 
by economic motives and family reunification, in the last few years 
Europe has experienced an overwhelming wave of refugees fleeing wars 
and conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and other countries. In both 
2015 and 2016, about 1.2 million first-time asylum applications were 
registered in the EU. The average number of applications from January-
September 2017 suggests an expected total annual volume of 640,000 in 
2017, still well above the 2008-11 average of 265,000 per year1.
1 Extra-EU asylum applications, annual data from Eurostat (dataset name: migr_
asyappctza).
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Figure 1: Components of population change in the EU, 1960-2016 (percent of 
population)
Source: Bruegel using Eurostat’s ‘Population change - Demographic balance and 
crude rates at national level [demo_gind]’ and ‘Persons subject of asylum applications 
pending at the end of the month by citizenship, age and sex Monthly data (rounded) 
[migr_asypenctzm]’ datasets. Note: immigration (non-adjusted) indicates the data as 
included in the population statistics. Immigration (asylum-adjusted) also considers 
the change in the pending number of asylum seekers, who are not included in popula-
tion statistics. Both net immigration times series are based on the ‘net migration plus 
statistical adjustment’ indicator of Eurostat, which may cover, besides the difference 
between inward and outward migration, other changes observed in the population 
which cannot be attributed to births, deaths, immigration and emigration. OECD data 
suggests large statistical adjustments for Italy in 2012-13 and for Spain in 2002-2011, 
with which we modified the ‘net migration plus statistical adjustment’ indicator to 
reflect only net immigration. Other countries had either zero or rather small statistical 
adjustments. Data covers the 28 members of the EU as of end 2017 for the full period of 
1960-2016.
However, despite increasing numbers of asylum applications, 
Figure 1 has a very clear message: total net immigration into the EU 
in 2015-16 was not historically unprecedented. In several years in the 
mid-2000s, total net immigration into the EU (including refugees and 
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immigrants arriving for other reasons) relative to population was quite 
similar to the 2015-16 values.
Therefore, while the magnitude of recent inflows of non-EU nation-
als was not unprecedented, the circumstances were. The arrival of a 
large number of asylum seekers in a short period created huge admin-
istrative difficulties in many EU countries, necessitated the mobilisa-
tion of significant financial resources and required increased border 
protection measures. It even led to a partial and temporary suspension 
of the border-free intra-EU Schengen travel area. There were many 
incidents of deaths of irregular migrants in the Mediterranean Sea. 
These problems, and the atrocities that a few asylum seekers commit-
ted and the crime of smugglers, were widely reported in the media. 
In addition, the number of terrorist attacks has increased through-
out Europe, which is sometimes associated with immigration (Wike, 
Strokes and Simmons, 2016). As a consequence, immigration, along 
with terrorist concerns, top the list of challenges EU citizens are most 
concerned about according to Eurobarometer opinion surveys.
In parallel with the increase in refugee-status applications, emi-
gration out of southern European countries to other EU countries has 
increased somewhat, while there has been major emigration out of 
Latvia and Lithuania. Still, intra-EU mobility remains below levels of 
internal mobility in large countries like the US2. The recent increase in 
intra-EU mobility was partly driven by the long-lasting euro-area crisis 
after 2008, which led to diverging unemployment rates in different EU 
countries. Unemployment increased to high levels mostly in southern 
euro-area countries and the three Baltic states, while unemployment 
has fallen to historically low levels in the two largest EU economies, 
Germany and the United Kingdom. These differences in labour market 
situations led an increasing number of workers to take advantage of 
2 According to Ester and Krieger (2008), intra-US mobility was much larger than 
intra-EU mobility in the early 2000s. The minor increase in intra-EU mobility, and 
the reported decline in intra-US mobility, are unlikely to have changed the differ-
ence between the EU and the US significantly.
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their rights to work in another EU country, freedom of movement being 
one of the four fundamental economic freedoms of the European Union.
There has also been an increase in so-called ‘posted workers’, or 
workers temporarily posted to another EU country where their employer 
provides a certain service, such as construction or financial services. 
European Commission president Jean Claude Juncker made the reform 
of the EU directive on posted workers a main priority of his presidency. 
The European Commission proposed the revision of the directive in 
spring 2016; the reform is, at time of writing, in negotiation between the 
European Parliament and the Council.
Immigration from both inside and outside the EU has been a major 
issue in domestic political debates in a number of EU member states. 
For example, it was one of the main issues in the campaign preceding 
the UK’s referendum on European Union membership in June 2016, 
and was a hot topic in the campaigns preceding the 2017 elections in the 
Netherlands, France and Germany, in which anti-immigration parties 
had a high profile.
Meanwhile, Eurobarometer also shows that most Europeans trust the 
EU more than they trust their national governments and 69 percent of 
respondents say that they are in favour of a common European policy on 
migration (November 2017 Eurobarometer survey). These views high-
light the importance of a unified European approach.
In this Blueprint, we assess the immigration challenge that the 
European Union faces. We begin with an analysis of public perceptions of 
immigration (chapter 2), then map immigration into the EU and intra-EU 
mobility (chapter 3). Chapter 4 analyses the economic impact of immi-
gration using a comprehensive literature survey. Chapter 5 examines the 
integration record of immigrants in the EU. Chapter 6 is devoted to a spe-
cial topic in integration: financial inclusion of refugees, based on our own 
survey of financial institutions. Finally, chapter 7 looks at the EU’s policy 
response to immigration in general, and to the refugee crisis in particular. 
We then formulate twelve policy recommendations.
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Box 1: Defining immigrants and refugees
There are various definitions of immigrants and migrants. According to the 
United Nations definition3, migrants are those who change their residence 
from one place to another for a given amount of time, not including business 
people or tourists. Seasonal workers are included in the ‘short-term migrant’ 
category. 
According to the International Organisation for Migration, there were 1 
billion migrants in 2015, including 244 million international migrants. The 
remainder are internal migrants (according to the International Organisation 
for Migration definition), a large number of whom – 150 million – are 
Chinese migrants moving from rural to urban areas4. 
In the EU context, Eurostat defines immigration as the action by which 
a person establishes his or her usual residence in the territory of a member 
state for a period of at least 12 months, having previously been a resident 
of another member state or a third country. Conversely, emigrants are those 
who have been a usual resident in a member state and cease to have their 
usual residence in that member state for at least 12 months5.
Refugees are those who, owing to fear of persecution on the grounds 
of race, religion, nationality or membership of a particular social or political 
group, are outside of their country of nationality and cannot seek protec-
tion in that country or, owing to fear, are unwilling to return to it (Geneva 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Art. 1). From a legal perspec-
tive, obtaining refugee status has two stages: asylum seekers are those 
who have submitted their application to seek asylum in a country other than 
their own. If the application (including possibly the subsequent appeal) is 
successful, this person acquires the right to be recognised as a refugee.
3 http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/interna-
tional-migration/glossary/migrant/. 
4 International Organisation for Migration (2015) Global migration trends, 2015, 
available at http://gmdac.iom.int/global-migration-trends-factsheet. 
5 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/migr_immi_esms.htm. 
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While the above-listed definitions apply to newcomers, it is much 
more challenging to define and measure people who have an immigrant 
background in the resident population. Statistical data is only available for 
two categories of such people: foreign citizens and foreign-born people. 
These are useful statistics that we will report, but these definitions do not 
include all people with an immigrant background. Unfortunately, statistics 
are not available for second (people born from immigrant parents) or third 
generation migrants, or for people born to mixed couples (children of an 
immigrant and a local citizen). However, native citizens might regard people 
with an immigrant background as still being an ‘immigrant’, even if they have 
obtained the citizenship of the host country and their family has lived in the 
host country for decades.
2 Public perception
Public opinion is crucial for policy design. While opinion surveys often 
have shortcomings, they can provide valuable information about the 
views of citizens. In this chapter we scrutinise various surveys con-
ducted by Eurobarometer, the European Social Survey, Gallup, IPSOS 
and Pew Research Center to better understand public perceptions of 
immigration in Europe and on other continents. We consider whether 
immigrants are viewed as making an economic contribution, or 
whether they are seen as an economic burden; if there are differences 
in perceptions of immigrants from the EU and from outside the EU; 
and if the EU’s response to the refugee crisis since 2015 and attempts 
to build a common European migration policy have met with public 
approval.
European immigration concerns
Since May 2011, the EU’s Eurobarometer opinion survey has included 
a question about the most important issues facing the European 
Union. Between 2011 and 2014, EU citizens were most worried about 
the economic situation, unemployment and the state of member 
states’ public finances (Figure 2). These concerns gradually became 
less pressing as the economic situation improved. Since the spring 
of 2015, in parallel with the refugee surge, the share of people iden-
tifying immigration as the most important issue facing the EU has 
sharply increased. The identification of terrorism as a key issue has 
also increased since 2015, following several deadly attacks in Europe. 
Immigration concerns tracked by Eurobarometer peaked in November 
2015, since when there has been some decline. 
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Nevertheless, according to the November 2017 survey, immigration 
continues to be the most important challenge for 39 percent of EU 
citizens.
Figure 2: Most important issues facing the European Union, share of 
respondents
Source: Eurobarometer surveys. Question QA5 “What do you think are the two most 
important issues facing the EU at the moment?” Maximum of two answers possible.
Migration was one of the main issues of the campaign preceding 
the UK’s referendum on European Union membership in June 20166. 
6 However, high immigration does not necessarily mean more negative attitudes 
towards immigration among local populations. In the United Kingdom’s Brexit ref-
erendum, areas with more migrants tended to vote remain, while areas with fewer 
migrants tended to vote leave. Areas with more immigrants are typically econom-
ically more dynamic areas with larger shares of young and educated inhabitants, 
who also tended to vote remain. When controlling for various socio-economic 
factors, the share of foreign-born citizens in the population was not a statistically 
significant determinant of the leave votes (annex of Darvas and Wolff, 2016). 
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The 2017 elections in the Netherlands, France and Germany again put 
immigration into the spotlight, with anti-immigration parties promi-
nent in the elections. 
Global perceptions of immigration
Anti-immigration rhetoric might be more prominent in Europe than 
in the rest of the world. According to a 2015 International Organisation 
for Migration poll (IOM, 2015), people in the EU have the most neg-
ative views worldwide on migration, with 48 percent responding that 
migration levels should be reduced (Figure 3).
Figure 3: Attitudes towards immigration globally, share of respondents
Source: IOM (2015), Figure 1.2 and Table 5.1. Note: responses to the question: “In 
your view, should immigration in this country be kept at the present level, increased or 
decreased?” Groups are weighted by population size.
Moreover, the survey findings indicate that in countries with unem-
ployment rates above 15 percent, almost half of the respondents said 
that immigration should be reduced. Adults with a university degree, 
and people aged under 54, are more likely to say that immigration 
should be kept at the present level or increased. 
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Figure 4: Europeans’ perceptions of immigrants’ net fiscal and net job impact, 
percent of respondents, 2014
Source: European Social Survey, 2014. Note: respondents were asked to provide their 
views on a scale 0 to 10, 0 representing ‘immigrants receive more than they contribute’ and 
‘immigrants take away jobs in the country’ and 10 representing ‘immigrants contribute 
more than they receive’ and ‘immigrants create more jobs’. The ‘take out more’ and ‘take 
jobs’ categories include respondents answering 3 or less. The ‘put in more’ and ‘create jobs’ 
categories represent respondents answering 7 or above. Balanced: scores between 4-6.
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Lastly, citizens of high-income countries are more likely to respond 
that immigrants take jobs that natives do not want (58 percent), 
whereas 35 percent of low-income country respondents say that 
immigrants take jobs that the natives want. The differences in opinions 
can be largely explained by respondents’ socio-economic situations 
(household income, education level, employment status and age) and 
countries’ economic situations (unemployment rate, views on the 
country’s general economic situation, with a worsening economic situ-
ation leading to low support for increased immigration and vice versa).
Intra-EU differences in perceptions
There are major differences between people in different EU coun-
tries in terms of their attitudes towards immigration into the EU. In 
the 2014 European Social Survey special module on immigration, EU 
citizens were asked whether immigrants are net fiscal contributors or 
recipients, and whether they are net job creators or job takers (Figure 
4). On average, most EU citizens think immigrants take more jobs (27 
percent) than create jobs (22 percent) and take out more in benefits 
(32.5 percent) than contribute in taxes (16.5 percent). Attitudes in dif-
ferent countries are very different, however, with Hungary, the Czech 
Republic and Spain at one end of the spectrum with more negative 
views and Sweden, Germany and Estonia at the other with more posi-
tive views.
Perceptions of immigration differ widely depending on whether 
immigrants come from another EU country or from outside the EU. 
Since May 2015, the first time the Eurobarometer survey included a 
related question, support for intra-EU immigration has been much 
higher than support for immigration from outside the EU (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5: EU citizens, support for immigration from inside the EU and from 
outside the EU, percent of responses, 2015-17
Source: Eurobarometer surveys. Note: the survey asked: “Please tell me whether each 
of the following statements evokes a positive or negative feeling for you – immigration of 
people from other EU member states; immigration of people from outside the EU”.
Furthermore, support for intra-EU immigration has risen since May 
2015 to the point that the share of respondents with a positive view 
exceeds two-thirds, while support for immigration from outside the EU 
remained at the same level until May 2016 and has risen slightly since.
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Figure 6: Support for immigration from inside the EU vs. immigration from 
outside the EU, percent of respondents, 2017
Source: Eurobarometer, fall 2017. Note: respondents were asked: “Please tell me wheth-
er each of the following statements evokes a positive or negative feeling for you – immigra-
tion of people from other EU member states; immigration of people from outside the EU”. 
Share of respondents responding ‘very positive’ and ‘fairly positive’ are added together 
and shown as a share of those who responded to this question.
Therefore, while the level of support for immigration from outside 
the EU is well below the level of support for intra-EU immigration, the 
refugee crisis that started in 2015 has not led to a further deterioration 
in support for immigration from outside the EU, and there has even 
been a slight increase in support. 
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Though the more positive view of intra-EU migration compared to 
immigration from outside the EU is found in each EU country, there 
are also substantial differences (Figure 6). People in Luxembourg, 
Ireland and Sweden are most supportive of intra-EU migration. 
Only in Cyprus does support for intra-EU migration fall below 50 
percent of citizens. It is notable that in the United Kingdom, where 
intra-EU immigration was one of the main topics of the 2016 Brexit 
referendum campaign, support for intra-EU immigration was 66 
percent and support for extra-EU immigration was 56 percent in 
November 2017, according to Eurobarometer. Support for extra-EU 
immigration was very low – down to just 15 percent – in a number 
of central and eastern European countries (the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Latvia, Hungary and Estonia).
Are perceptions of immigration driven by the number of 
immigrants?
There is no negative relationship between the level of support in 
a country for immigration and the share of foreign citizens in the 
resident population. If anything, the relationship either does not 
exist or is even positive, for the three categories covered by Figure 7. 
If we disregard the outliers of Cyprus and Luxembourg on panel A, 
and Estonia and Lithuania on panel B, it seems that there is an even 
a positive correlation between the two variables: citizens in coun-
tries hosting more foreign citizens tend to support migration more. 
In Estonia and Latvia, the large share of non-EU citizens is related 
to a large Russian minority, and the very negative views of extra-EU 
immigration are likely fuelled by insecurity related to the Russian 
Federation. Panel C for foreign-born people also suggests a weak 
positive relationship between the share of foreign-born residents 
and support for migration.
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Figure 7: Immigration support vs. the share of immigrants in resident population
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Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat ‘Population on 1 January by age group, sex and 
citizenship’ dataset , code: migr_pop1ctz and OECD International Migration Database. 
For the foreign-born panel, support was computed as the weighted average of support 
for intra-EU and extra-EU immigration, using weights proportional to the share of 
other-EU and non-EU citizens in population.
Another hypothesis would be that support for immigration 
decreases in countries that have experienced a recent surge in immi-
gration. For intra-EU migration (Figure 8), this does not seem to be the 
case: the correlation is close to zero7.
Overall, using cross-country data we do not find support for the 
hypothesis that the high share of foreign citizens in a population, or a 
rapid increase in their share, fuels anti-immigrant sentiment. On the 
contrary, when outliers are discounted (for good reasons), the data 
suggests that countries that host more foreign citizens tend to have 
more favourable views about them. 
7 Unfortunately, data constraints do not allow us to analyse the case of extra-EU 
foreign citizens.
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Figure 8: Support for immigration vs the change in the share of other EU citizens 
and foreign-born people in resident population
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat ‘Population on 1 January by age group, sex and 
citizenship [migr_pop1ctz]’ dataset, OECD International Migration Database and 
Eurobarometer surveys.
A) Foreign citizens
B) Foreign-born
ATBE
CZ
DE
DK
EE
GR
ES
FI
FR
HU
IE
IT
LU
NL
PL
PT
SE
SI
SK
UK
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
-10 -5 0 5 10 15 20
% 
re
sp
on
de
nt
s s
up
po
rti
ng
 m
ig
ra
tio
n
Δ Share of foreign-born in total population 2013-2007 (p.p)
AT
CZ
DE
DK
ES FI
HU
IE
IT
LU
LV
NL
PLPT
SE
SI
SK
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
-0.5 0.5 1.5 2.5 3.5 4.5
% 
of
 re
sp
on
de
nt
s s
up
po
rti
ng
 in
tra
-E
U 
m
ig
ra
tio
n
Δ Share of other EU citizens in Total population 2016-2007 (p.p)
34 | BRUEGEL BLUEPRINT 28
Our analysis thus arrives at the same conclusion as Mourlon-Druol 
(2016) and Darvas (2016) about the role of immigration in the United 
Kingdom’s 2016 referendum on EU membership and the decision to 
leave the EU: the actual presence of immigrants did not have a signif-
icant effect on the results, supporting the conjecture that it was rather 
the perception of immigration as a problem that influenced the vote.
Perception versus reality
The perception of immigration is often far from reality. An IPSOS 
survey found that in all countries where the question was asked, people 
perceived that there were many more migrants than there actually 
were (Figure 9). This is not an EU-specific issue; the same perception 
is found around the world. Among the EU countries, the largest gaps 
between perceived and actual shares of immigrants in the total popula-
tion are found in Italy, Belgium, France, the UK, Hungary and Poland.
Figure 9: Perceived and actual stocks of immigrants in resident populations, 
2014 (percent of population)
Sources: IPSOS - survey conducted in 2014, OECD. Note: the question asked was: 
“What percentage of the [Country] population do you think are immigrants to this country 
(i.e. not born in [Country])?” OECD data for Canada, Poland from 2011.
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Disapproval of the EU asylum response
At the same time, the composition of immigrants from outside the EU 
is changing. While in some years immigration is primarily driven by 
economic motives and family reunification, in the last few years Europe 
experienced an overwhelming wave of refugees fleeing wars and con-
flicts in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and other countries (see chapter 3).
The refugee crisis and the response to it are quickly feeding through 
into public opinion in the EU. The common public fears are that 
the refugee crisis is linked to insecurity and the threat of terrorism, 
and that the inflow of refugees will ultimately mean fewer economic 
opportunities for the natives. These fears are shown, for example, in 
the survey results reported by Wike, Stokes and Simmons (2016). 
Figure 10: The EU’s responses to refugee crises, public approval rating, selected 
countries, percent of respondents, 2017
Source: Pew Research Center, Spring 2017 Global Attitudes Survey. Note: the question 
asked was: “Do you approve/disapprove of the way the European Union is dealing with 
the refugee crisis?”
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According to a 2017 Pew Research Center survey, almost 90 percent 
of Greek citizens Greece and around 80 percent in Italy and Sweden, 
broadly disapprove of the way the refugee crisis was dealt with, while 
the median disapproval rate for the nine surveyed EU countries was 66 
percent (Figure 10). However, we cannot isolate from the data whether 
the public rejection of the EU’s response results from the actual prob-
lems, for example on the shores of Greece and Italy, or the general 
anti-immigrant bias in some other European countries.
Call for a European approach and greater efforts to fight illegal 
immigration from outside the EU
With the general rejection of the EU’s policy response to the refugee 
crisis, it is not surprising that the overwhelming majority (about 85-90 
percent) of EU citizens would prefer additional measures to be taken 
to fight illegal immigration from outside the EU (Figure 11). 
Figure 11: The need to introduce additional measures to fight illegal immigration 
from outside the EU, percent of respondents, 2015-17
Source: Eurobarometer surveys. Note: the question asked was: “In your opinion, should 
additional measures be taken to fight illegal immigration of people from outside the EU?”
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Moreover, public opinion favours the involvement of the EU in 
these additional measures, even though the share of people looking 
for a purely national solution increased somewhat from 19 percent 
in spring 2015 to 26 percent in November 2017. The countries mostly 
in favour of a national solution are Slovakia (42 percent), Austria (40 
percent) and the Czech Republic (39 percent), while the least enthu-
siastic countries about a purely national approach are Luxembourg 
(11 percent), Germany (13 percent), Spain (16 percent), Estonia (18 
percent), Netherlands (16 percent), Denmark (17 percent), Sweden (17 
percent) and Malta (17 percent).
Figure 12: Support for a common European policy on migration, EU, percent of 
respondents, 2015-17
Source: Eurobarometer surveys. Note: the question asked was: “What is your opinion 
on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for 
it or against it. – a common European policy on migration”.
The Eurobarometer surveys also show that most Europeans trust 
the EU more than they trust their national governments, and that the 
levels of trust in the EU and in national governments are picking up 
for all countries after a long period of decline (Batsaikhan and Darvas, 
2017). Moreover, more than two-thirds of respondents say they are in 
favour of a common European policy on migration, a level of support 
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that has hardly changed in recent years (Figure 12)8. These views high-
light the importance of a unified European approach.
Arguably, as Europe rebuilds in the wake of the long-lasting finan-
cial and economic crisis after 2008, and the existential risks to the 
euro recede, the support for intra-EU immigration is increasing, while 
immigration from third countries, and better protection of the EU’s 
border, will become key topics in the next few years.
8 There are again differences within the EU: in several central and eastern EU 
countries, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia and Poland, the share 
of people against a common European policy on migration is rather high in the 
range of 43-55 percent, while the rejection rate is much lower in Spain (8 percent), 
Germany (13 percent), the Netherlands (15 percent) and Luxembourg (15 percent) 
, according to the November 2017 Eurobarometer survey.
3 Mapping migration in the    
European Union
In this chapter, we take a closer look at the amount, composition and 
dynamics of immigration into and within the EU, considering the 
source countries and other characteristics, such as education level, age 
and gender. We start with total immigration into, and emigration from, 
EU member states. We then look specifically at intra-EU mobility, 
including so-called ‘posted workers’, and at immigration from outside 
the EU, including the recent wave of asylum seekers. We also present 
data on the share of foreign citizens and foreign-born people in EU 
countries and their origins.
3.1 Annual immigration and emigration trends
Figure 13 shows trends in the movement of people from 2009-15 for 
the aggregate of 27 EU countries and three groups of EU countries9. We 
separate home-country citizens and foreign citizens – the foreign-cit-
izens category includes people from other EU countries and non-EU 
countries (including refugees).
Annual emigration of home citizens (to both EU and non-EU 
destination countries) has been relatively stable at about 0.28 percent 
of population on average across the countries considered in Figure 
13, with a minor increase recently. This minor increase is entirely due 
to increased emigration from southern EU countries from a very low 
9 Unfortunately, breaks in the data and missing values do not allow us to report data 
from before 2009. Bulgaria is excluded because of missing values.
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level of 0.09 percent in 2009 to 0.23 percent in 2015. High unemploy-
ment in southern EU countries was the main driver of the increase, yet 
it is notable that even after the increase, the annual emigration flow 
remains below the EU average. The highest levels of emigration rates 
are from the central and eastern EU members, with a relatively stable 
emigration rate of about 0.53 percent of population per year, more 
than the double than rate in north-west and southern EU countries.
Return migration – the immigration of home citizens – is also 
highest in central and eastern European countries, though returns 
do not compensate for emigration. On average, central and eastern 
European countries had the largest net emigration rates of 0.23 percent 
of population in 2015, followed by the four southern EU countries at 
0.13 percent and the 10 north-west EU countries at 0.08 percent. Net 
emigration of home-country citizens was recorded by 25 of the 28 EU 
countries in 2015 (Figure 14). The largest net outflows of home citi-
zens were from Lithuania (-0.64 percent of population), Latvia (-0.58 
percent) and Croatia (-0.52 percent), while the only three countries 
where citizens returned on a net basis were Cyprus (0.25 percent), 
Malta (0.12 percent) and Denmark (0.10 percent). Figure 14 also shows 
that emigration of home citizens from Italy and Spain remained rather 
low compared to other EU countries, even if there was some increase 
in the preceding years.
A clear message from Figure 13 is that immigration of foreign 
citizens increased significantly from 2009-15, primarily because of 
refugee inflows to north-west EU countries. In 2015, the largest inflow 
of foreign-citizens as a share of population was to Luxembourg (4.02 
percent of population), followed by Malta (2.61 percent), Austria (1.83 
percent) and Germany (1.79 percent). In terms of number of people, 
Germany received the bulk of asylum seekers, as we discuss later in 
this chapter.
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Figure 13: Trends in immigration and emigration: home and foreign citizens, 
2009-15 (percent of population per year)
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat ‘Emigration by age group, sex and citizenship [migr_
emi1ctz]’, ‘Immigration by age group, sex and citizenship [migr_imm1ctz]’ and ‘Population 
on 1 January by age and sex [demo_pjan]’ datasets. Note: EU27: current EU members except 
Bulgaria. North-West 11: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom. CEE 10: Croatia, Czech Republic, Es-
tonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. South 4: Greece, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain. Belgian data is not available for 2009: we assumed that the growth 
rate (in terms of number of people) from 2009 to 2010 was the same as in the Netherlands. 
For Latvia, total flows are available for the full period of 2009-15, but the home citizen/for-
eign citizen breakdown only from 2011-15. For 2009-10, was assumed that the annual growth 
rate (in terms of number of people) of foreign citizens was the same as in Lithuania.
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Some of immigrants go home: the emigration of foreign citizens 
from the EU has been relatively stable at about 0.25 percent of EU pop-
ulation annually. Net immigration of non-EU citizens has increased 
from about 0.25 percent of EU population in 2009 to about 0.5 percent 
in 2015, while EU citizens are leaving the EU at a rate of about 0.1 per-
cent of population on average.
Figure 14: Emigration and immigration of home-country citizens in 2015 
(percent of population)
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat ‘Emigration by age group, sex and citizenship 
[migr_emi1ctz]’, ‘Immigration by age group, sex and citizenship [migr_imm1ctz]’ and 
‘Population on 1 January by age and sex [demo_pjan]’ datasets.
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3.2 Intra-EU mobility
The central and eastern EU member states have the most mobile 
populations. Citizens of these countries primarily moved to the west, 
including Italy and Spain. 
East-west mobility
The eastern enlargements of the European Union in 2004 (10 coun-
tries), in 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania) and in 2013 (Croatia) increased 
the potential for east-west mobility within the EU, given that labour 
mobility is one of the fundamental freedoms of the EU.
However, the accession treaties with new EU member states 
allowed the older countries to impose transition periods of up to seven 
years, during which immigration restrictions on the citizens of newer 
member states could be maintained. The older member countries 
also had the option to introduce such controls during the seven-year 
transition period, even if they had abolished the restrictions earlier, 
provided that there was a serious disturbance of their labour markets.
In 2004, twelve of the fifteen older EU members used this option 
and adopted temporary immigration controls, but the UK, Ireland 
and Sweden opened their labour markets directly from 1 May 2004 for 
nationals of the eight central European countries (EU8) that joined the 
EU on 1 May 2004. When Bulgaria and Romania joined, ten countries 
opened their labour markets already from 2007, while the other 15 
countries imposed restrictions on free movement (usually requiring 
a work permit). These temporary restrictions were gradually removed 
during the seven-year transition periods. It is notable that among all 
older EU members, there was only one instance of new restrictions 
being introduced after a complete abolition of restrictions: Spain intro-
duced new controls on immigrants from Romania in August 2011, after 
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having removed all controls in 200910.
The right of movement from central and eastern European coun-
tries to western Europe was rapidly taken up. For the 2004 entrants, the 
peak was in 2006. However, the peak of migration from Romania and 
Bulgaria was also in 2006 – one year before they entered the EU (Figure 
15). 
In terms of the impact on destination countries, the United 
Kingdom and Ireland received disproportionally large inflows after 
2004. The non-introduction of temporary controls by these two coun-
tries likely diverted immigration to them.
The big surge in migration from Bulgaria and Romania in 2006 is 
largely attributable to migration from Romania to Italy and Spain. 
The big surge suggests there was a pent-up desire to move to west-
ern Europe before these countries entered the EU. However, it is also 
noteworthy that the net inflow from Bulgaria and Romania in 2003-
05 – before these countries entered the EU – was practically the same 
(even slightly higher) than migration in 2008-12, after the enlarge-
ment-related surge abated. Evidently, many people from Bulgaria and 
Romania were able to find ways to move to western Europe well before 
these countries entered the EU, while the subdued 2008-12 flows could 
be explained by the temporary mobility restrictions that were imposed 
by receiving countries, and the increase in unemployment in the two 
main destinations countries, Spain and Italy.
10 In August 2011, Spain imposed a requirement for Romanian citizens who wanted 
to take up a job in Spain to ask for permission in advance, based on the existence 
of a work contract. The restrictions applied all sectors and regions of Spain, but 
did not affect Romanian nationals already working in Spain. The imposition of this 
requirement was made possible by Romania’s accession treaty, which specified a 
seven-year transition period: two plus three plus two years, with different options 
to impose restrictions in each phase. Spain abolished transitory restrictions in 
2009, but re-introduced them in August 2011 “due to serious disturbances on its la-
bour market” and maintained them until the end of the seven-year transition peri-
od, December 2013. See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1440_en.htm.
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Figure 15: EU8 and Bulgarian/Romanian (EU2) citizens living in subgroups of 
older EU members, 2000-15 (in thousands)
Source: Eurostat ‘Population on 1 January by age group, sex and citizenship’ dataset, 
code: migr_pop1ctz, and UK Office for National Statistics ‘Population of the UK by coun-
try of birth and nationality’ dataset. Note: the top panel shows 1 January data of a given 
year as 31 December data of the previous year, so that the difference in year-end data 
shows the annual net flows, as reported in the bottom panel. EU8 countries: Czech Re-
public, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia, Slovakia. EU2 countries: 
Romania and Bulgaria. The destination countries for EU8 includes 12 older EU member 
states, not including France, Greece and Spain, while the destination countries for EU2 
includes 13 older EU member states, not including France and Greece. Therefore, EU8 
and EU2 data are not comparable because Spain is not included among the destination 
countries for EU8 but included for EU2. There are a few missing values in the Eurostat 
database, which we approximated in order to have constant country-composition ag-
gregates. Missing UK data was approximated using data from the UK Office for National 
Statistics data. Irish data is missing for 2000-06: we assumed that the growth rate of 
immigrants from EU8 and EU2 was the same as in the UK. The 2004-07 missing data for 
Belgium was approximated by using the growth rate for the Netherlands. Similarly, miss-
ing data points for Luxembourg were approximated using Dutch growth rates.
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Country-specific mobility numbers show that Germany and the 
UK are main destination countries for migrants from the central and 
eastern EU members (Table 1), but there are notable exceptions. 
Romanians preferred to move to Italy and Spain: almost three times 
as many Romanians moved to Italy and Spain combined than to 
Germany and the UK combined. Estonians primarily move to Finland 
because of geographical closeness and cultural similarity. Austria 
is the second most important destination country for neighbouring 
Croatia and Slovenia, and the third most important destination coun-
try for Hungary.
Finally, the minor role of France is noticeable. The number of 
central and eastern European citizens in France is just about one-tenth 
of the German figure. Distance is unlikely to be a main reason for this, 
because Spain – further than France – is a more popular destination 
country for migrants from Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland and Romania 
(countries for which Spanish residency data is available). 
The crisis had an influence on east-west migration patterns, 
because of diminished labour market opportunities in some key 
destination countries, such as Italy and Spain. This was reflected in a 
slowdown in mobility from the east to the west (Figure 15). However, 
economic and labour market developments in certain central and 
eastern European countries also had a major influence on migra-
tion patterns. There was a massive exodus from hard-hit Latvia and 
Lithuania, where GDP and employment fell by 10-20 percent (Darvas, 
2013). The population declined by more than 10 percent in these coun-
tries from 2008-12.
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In Latvia and Lithuania, most of the population decline in 2008-12 was 
a result of the emigration of young cohorts and the resident population of 
younger people declined by about 20-25 percent, causing major losses to 
these countries. Large-scale emigration from Latvia and Lithuania contin-
ued in 2013-16.
Since about 2013, emigration from central and eastern European 
countries has started to increase again (Figure 15), most likely because 
of better labour market opportunities in the main destination coun-
tries. Croatia, which entered the European Union in 2013, has also 
seen increased emigration.
Even during the crisis, there was no mass return migration, as noted 
by Zaiceva and Zimmerman (2012). Instead, the rate of return migra-
tion to the central and eastern European countries has proved to be 
relatively stable (Figure 13). However, there are country-specific dif-
ferences (Table 2). For example, by 2016 return migration to Bulgaria, 
Hungary and the three Baltic countries had increased, while to the 
Czech Republic, Poland and Romania it declined.
Table 2: Return migration flows (thousands)
2009 2011 2015
Bulgaria - 4.9 10.7
Czech R. 21.7 8.1 4.5
Estonia 1.7 2 8
Croatia - 4.7 6.5
Hungary 2.3 5.5 32.6
Latvia 0.5 1.5 5
Lithuania 4.8 14 18.4
Poland 142.3 102 84.8
Romania 124.9 138.4 115.5
Slovakia 1.2 1.1 3.2
Slovenia 2.9 3.3 2.8
Source: Eurostat ‘Immigration by age group, sex and citizenship’ dataset, code: migr_imm1ctz. 
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Even though return migration flows are not large, it is useful to look 
at the profile of returnees to central and eastern European countries. 
They are mostly 25-44 year olds – the most mobile age bracket (Figure 
16). For the Czech Republic, almost two-thirds of returnees are in the 
24-45 age bracket; for Slovenia, the same age group makes up one 
third of returnees. A typical returnee to a central and eastern European 
country is below the age of 45, single, male and employed in a low-
er-skilled job abroad despite having attained a tertiary degree, which 
suggests that individuals who are returning are overqualified and 
could signal a brain-waste (Zaiceva and  Zimmermann, 2012). 
Figure 16: Age profile of return migrants, 2015
Source: Eurostat ‘Immigration by age group, sex and citizenship’ dataset, code: migr_
imm1ctz. Note: data for Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania is for 2013.
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European countries, with the exception of Slovenia where students 
constitute the biggest group) were employed abroad prior to returning. 
Romania, Bulgaria and Latvia reported the largest shares of returnees 
who were unemployed while abroad. 
Moreover, with the gradual return of post-enlargement migrants, 
which might accelerate as they start to retire, cross-border pension 
transfers and social remittances might become major issues (Duszczyk 
and Matuszczyk, 2016).
Figure 17: Southern EU citizens living in eight north-west EU countries, 
thousands, 2000-15
Source: Eurostat ‘Population on 1 January by age group, sex and citizenship’ dataset, 
dataset code: migr_pop1ctz. Note: southern Europe: Greece, Italy Portugal and Spain. 
North-west EU-8: other older EU countries not including France, Luxembourg and 
Ireland. End-2015 data is available also for these three countries: 1.04 million southern 
EU citizens were living in France, Luxembourg and Ireland altogether, so the omission 
of these three countries from the chart is major.
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South-north mobility
Migration from southern (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) to north-
ern and western EU countries is also of interest. From 2000 to 2012, 
there was a decline in the number of southern European citizens living 
in northern EU countries (Figure 17). That is, even though labour 
markets in southern Europe were hit hard in 2008-12, there was still 
net return migration to southern Europe, which is puzzling. However, 
since 2013, an increasingly large number of southern European citi-
zens have decided to move to northern EU countries. 
Table 3: The main EU destination countries for migrants from southern Europe, 
stocks of migrants as of January 2016 (thousand people)
Destination countries
Source 
countries G
er
m
an
y
Fr
an
ce
U
K
Sp
ai
n
B
el
gi
u
m
Lu
xe
m
b
ou
rg
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
A
u
st
ri
a
It
al
y
Sw
ed
en
D
en
m
ar
k
P
or
tu
ga
l
Ir
el
an
d
G
re
ec
e
Fi
n
la
n
d
Greece 314.6 8.1 56.9 n.a. 16.7 2.6 14.1 5.5 7.0 8.4 2.4 0.2 0.4  0.9
Italy 557.4 192.8 195.1 191.6 156.8 20.3 29.5 25.1 - 8.6 8.1 6.1 4.8 5.2 2.4
Portugal 124.0 553.9 222.3 101.8 44.2 93.1 19.4 3.2 5.8 2.3 2.8 - 1.8 0.3 0.6
Spain 148.1 156.7 133.8 - 61.7 5.5 26.8 6.6 22.6 8.8 6.0 10.0 4.2 1.0 2.4
All 
countries
1144.1 911.5 608.0 293.4* 279.3 121.5 89.7 40.4 35.4 28.1 19.3 16.4 11.1 6.5 6.4
Source: Eurostat ‘Population on 1 January by age group, sex and citizenship’ dataset, 
dataset code: migr_pop1ctz. Note: blue = main destination country, red = second main 
destination country. * The total for Spain as a destination country does not include 
Greek citizens.
Some studies have reported a shift from east-west to south-north 
mobility (Fries-Tersch and Mabilia, 2015, and Barslung and Busse, 
2014), as emigration from crisis-hit countries increased. However, 
while Figure 17 indicates a rapid increase in south-north mobility 
(even though the omission of France as a destination country is highly 
significant), the east-west flows (the sum of EU8 and EU2 net flows, 
52 | BRUEGEL BLUEPRINT 28
Figure 15, right panel) continue to be much larger in terms of number 
of people, and even larger as a share of source-country population, 
because the combined population of Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal 
is greater than the combined population of central and eastern 
European EU members. 
Mobility within the north-west of the EU
We also look at intra-region mobility within north-west countries of 
the EU, such as Germans living in France and French people living in 
Germany. The top panel of Figure 18 shows that the level of north-west 
EU nationals living in other north-west EU countries increased after 
2000, reaching 2.7 million in 2015. However, the flows have been rather 
modest (bottom panel of Figure 18), even in 2006, when the largest 
change during the 2000-15 period was recorded. The approximate 
140,000 increase in 2006 was much lower than annual outflows from 
central and eastern Europe during the whole period (see the bottom 
panel of Figure 15), and more recently from southern Europe (see the 
bottom panel of Figure 17), even though the total population of north-
west EU countries is more than twice that of the central and eastern 
European countries or the southern European countries.
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Figure 18: North-west EU citizens living in another north-west EU country, 
thousands, 2000-15
Source: Eurostat ‘Population on 1 January by age group, sex and citizenship’ dataset, 
dataset code: migr_pop1ctz and UK Office for National Statistics ‘Population by coun-
try of birth and nationality underlying datasets’ dataset. Note: countries included: Bel-
gium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. Some missing data was interpolated: Belgium: Lux-
embourgish growth rates applied where necessary; Ireland: UK growth rates applied 
where necessary; Luxembourg: Belgian growth rates applied where necessary.
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Table 4: The main EU destination countries for migrants from north-western 
Europe, stock of migrants as of January 2016 (thousands) 
Destination countries
Source 
countries U
K
Sp
ai
n
G
er
m
an
y 
Fr
an
ce
B
el
gi
u
m
A
u
st
ri
a
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
Sw
ed
en
Ir
el
an
d
It
al
y
Lu
xe
m
b
ou
rg
D
en
m
ar
k
P
or
tu
ga
l
G
re
ec
e
Fi
n
la
n
d
Austria 14.2 n.a. 166.3 4.6 2.8 - 4.1 3.3 0.4 6.1 0.9 1.4 0.6 1.3 0.5
Belgium 26.0 32.4 24.5 96.3 - 2.2 30.6 1.5 0.8 5.5 19.4 1.1 2.4 1.2 0.4
Denmark 30.9 11.7 19.6 5.4 2.7 1.1 3.0 37.1 0.5 2.0 2.0 - 0.6 0.7 0.7
Finland 9.6 12.3 12.9 2.7 2.8 1.5 2.8 57.6 0.5 1.6 1.2 2.8 0.8 0.5 -
France 167.6 100.7 116.6 - 161.8 7.8 20.9 7.6 6.1 28.6 41.7 6.1 8.4 4.4 2.0
Germany 136.5 142.1 - 88.2 39.3 176.4 72.3 28.2 7.7 36.7 12.8 23.7 9.0 11.2 4.1
Ireland 336.0 15.6 12.4 8.5 4.1 1.4 5.3 2.4 - 2.7 1.7 1.8 0.9 0.5 0.6
Luxembourg 0.1 n.a. 16.3 6.3 4.3 0.8 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.2 - 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Netherlands 81.7 46.5 134.5 37.9 151.7 8.5 - 9.9 3.0 8.1 4.0 7.5 5.9 2.7 1.3
Sweden 34.4 21.0 17.6 8.2 3.8 2.9 4.2 - 1.1 3.0 1.9 14.9 2.0 1.2 8.2
UK - 296.4 97.0 148.8 23.5 10.0 44.2 19.8 121.2 26.6 6.1 16.7 17.2 16.0 4.4
All countries 1144.1 911.5 608.0 293.4* 279.3 121.5 89.7 40.4 35.4 28.1 19.3 16.4 11.1 6.5 6.4
Source: Eurostat ‘Population on 1 January by age group, sex and citizenship’ dataset, 
dataset code: migr_pop1ctz. Note: blue = main destination country, red = second main 
destination country.  * The total for Spain as a destination country does not include 
Luxembourgish citizens.
Posted workers
In EU terminology, posted workers are EU citizens with an employ-
ment contract in their home country, who are temporarily posted to 
a host EU country by their employer when their employer provides a 
certain service. For example, if a Polish construction company builds a 
house in Germany it might post workers from Poland who have Polish 
contracts. Posted workers are different from labour migrants, who 
reside and are employed in the host country.
Posted workers receive a great deal of attention in EU policy 
discussions (Darvas and Vaccarino, 2016). The revision of the EU 
directive setting the rules for posted workers is at time of writing 
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under negotiation between the European Parliament and the Council. 
In 2015, there were about 2 million work postings in the European 
Economic Area (EEA) and Switzerland, representing a small share of 
total employment (0.65 percent of the labour force and 0.9 percent of 
total employed people in the EU). These numbers are small compared 
to the 11.3 million long-term migrants. Furthermore, the average 
duration of a posting is only 98 days, so in full-time-equivalent terms, 
the share of posted workers in total employment is only 0.4 percent 
(Darvas, 2017b, and De Wispelaere and Pacolet, 2016)11. 
Posting is concentrated in three countries, on both the sending 
and receiving ends. Poland (22.8 percent), Germany (11.7 percent) 
and France (6.9 percent) are the largest sending countries in absolute 
terms, while the main destination countries are Germany (28 percent), 
France (11.9 percent) and Belgium (10.5 percent). When analysing 
posted workers as a share of domestic employment, however, the pic-
ture is quite different. For instance, Poland sends out almost a quarter 
of all posted workers, yet these account for only 2.5 percent of domes-
tic employment. On the other hand, Luxembourg (24.7 percent) and 
Slovenia (14.2 percent) have the highest shares of sent posted workers 
as a share of domestic employment. From the receiving countries’ per-
spective, Luxembourg (9 percent), Belgium (3.8 percent) and Austria 
(2.5 percent) have the highest shares of posted workers relative to 
domestic employment (European Commission, 2016d).
The dominant sector for posted workers is construction, which accounts 
for about 42 percent of total postings, but there are major differences 
between EU countries (Figure 21). Non-construction industry, finance, and 
education and social work also account for relatively large shares.
11 Darvas and Vaccarino (2016) highlight that the numbers and potential impact of 
undeclared workers are much greater, given that there are 100 times more unde-
clared workers in high-wage EU countries than posted workers from low-wage EU 
countries.
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Figure 19: Posted workers by sending member state, 2010 and 2015
Source: De Wispelaere and Pacolet (2017) Note: for Croatia and Switzerland data is 
from 2013 instead of 2010, for Bulgaria data is from 2012 instead of 2010, and for Swe-
den data is from 2011 instead of 2010. The data for Norway for 2015 is from 2014.
Figure 20: Posted workers by receiving member state, 2010 and 2015
Source: De Wispelaere and Pacolet (2017) Note: Because of a lack of data, these numbers 
do not include posted workers active in two or more member states; as such the numbers 
given are an underestimate. For Croatia, 2013 data is substituted for 2010 data.
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Figure 21: Sector of posted workers in receiving member states, 2015
Source: European Commission (2017) ‘Posting of workers - Report on A1 portable doc-
uments issued in 2015’, http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=738&langId=en&pu-
bId=7980&furtherPubs=yes.
De Wispelaere and Pacolet (2015) argue that there are several 
reasons to favour posting over permanent migration. For example, 
because posted workers pay tax in their countries of origin (if the 
posting does not exceed half a year), the posting mechanism can 
potentially serve as a stabilisation tool, somewhat serving as a form 
of fiscal transfer, when the country of origin experiences an asym-
metric shock. However, the specific conditions under which posted 
workers are employed in host countries, their relatively small 
number and the limited durations of postings mean the labour 
market impact and/or local displacement effects are likely to be 
very small.
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Human capital flight
Human capital flight, or brain drain, is the emigration of skilled 
individuals. The literature has extensively examined the brain-drain 
hypothesis and its detrimental effects on sending countries, mainly 
focusing on movements from developing countries to the OECD 
(Docquier, 2014). For the EU, two avenues can be analysed. The first is 
the EU as a whole and the movement of people from the EU to other 
economies, such as the United States or Canada (Choi and Veugelers, 
2015). Second, movements within the EU can be examined, mainly 
the outflows of skilled migrants from central and eastern Europe and 
southern Europe to the northern and western EU countries. 
While the academic literature focuses on highly skilled people, such 
as those who completed tertiary education, in the European context 
other skilled professions, such as construction and other industrial 
workers, are similarly important. 
Brain drain can result from push and pull factors. Low wages and 
GDP per capita in home countries, combined with the prospect of 
better living standards in other countries, lead people to move. High 
rates of youth unemployment and the EU rights of free movement have 
also been highlighted as push factors (Andor, 2014). 
On the economic impact of brain drain, as expected, declining 
productivity, the lack of innovation and increasing inequality are 
mentioned as consequences for income, welfare and employment in 
sending countries (Grubel and Scott, 1966; Bhagwati and Hamada, 
1974), However, the effects depend on the “magnitude, the speed, the 
intensity and the structure of immigration flows with regard to age and 
qualification”, and on “the business cycle of the receiving economy” 
(Straubhaar, 2000). 
Figure 22 shows that on average, about 10 percent of the EU’s 
high-skilled people are living abroad, but there are huge differences 
between countries. About half of Malta’s high-skilled people were 
abroad from the 1980s to the 2010s. 
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Figure 22: Share of high-skilled nationals living abroad relative to total high-
skilled nationals, 1980-2010
Source: Brücker et al (2013) dataset. Note: for each skill level and year, emigration rates are 
computed as the proportion of the stock of migrants over the stock of pre-migration popu-
lation (defined as the sum of residents and migrants in each source country). Age group: 25 
years and older. The database is built merging national census and population data for 20 
OECD destination countries concerning 195 origin countries. For details, see methodological 
note, available at: http://doku.iab.de/daten/brain-drain/iabbd_8010_v1_methodology.pdf.
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The share of high skilled workers from in Austria, Cyprus and 
Ireland working abroad was similar to the Maltese share in the 1980s, 
but these shares have reduced more recently. In contrast, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Estonia, Portugal and Romania are now sending significantly 
more of their high-skilled people to other countries.
Figure 23 reports shares of low, medium and high-skilled nationals 
living abroad for the three main EU country groups. Clearly, emigra-
tion of high-skilled individuals is highest from the group of central 
and eastern European countries (14.5 percent in 2010). The shares are 
lower for the group of north-west European countries (9.6 percent) 
and southern Europe (6 percent). It is notable that, for the central and 
eastern European and the north-west European country groups, much 
larger shares of high-skilled people have left compared to medium and 
low-skilled people, but for southern Europe the emigration rates of all 
three skill classes are rather similar.
Figure 24 shows that labour shortages in central and eastern 
European countries increased significantly after the 2004 EU enlarge-
ment, but there was also an increased shortage of labour in north-west 
EU countries in this period. These finding have two implications. First, 
emigration after EU enlargement had a negative impact on central and 
eastern European labour markets and created labour shortages12. 
Human capital flight can harm source countries by creating labour 
shortages (Docquier and Bhargava, 2007). Figure 24 shows the share 
of respondents to the European Commission’s Business Survey that 
mentioned labour shortages as a factor impeding production for the 
industry, services and construction sectors. 
12 See Kaczmarczyk et al (2008) for an analysis of the labour and skill shortages faced 
in central and eastern European countries after EU enlargement.
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Figure 23: Share of low, medium and high-skilled nationals living abroad as a 
percentage of total number of nationals with the same skill level, 2005-10
Source: Bruegel based on Brücker et al (2013) dataset and Eurostat ‘Population by ed-
ucational attainment level, sex and age’ dataset, code: [edat_lfs_9901]. Note: the figure 
shows data for people aged above 25. See the note to Figure 22 for further details.
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Figure 24: Labour shortages as a factor impeding production
Source: European Commission, European Business and Consumer Surveys: Joint 
harmonised EU industry survey (Question 8 Answer F3S – ‘Factors limiting the pro-
duction: labour’), Joint Harmonised EU Construction Survey (Question 2 Answer F4S 
– ‘Main factors currently limiting your building activity: shortage of labour force’) and 
Joint harmonised EU services survey (Question 7 Answer F3S – ‘Factors limiting the 
business: labour forces’). Note: CEE10 = 10 central and eastern European countries; 
NW11: 11 north-west EU countries; SE4: 4 southern European countries.
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Second, the immigration of these central Europeans to north-west 
EU countries did not take jobs from local workers at any significant 
rate (at least in the construction, other industry and services sectors 
for which data is available), because labour shortages in those coun-
tries were on the rise in parallel to the arrival of central and eastern 
European workers.
Figure 25: Countries’ capacity to retain and attract talent, 2017
Source: World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Index, 2017-2018 Edition. 
Indicator codes [EOSQ399] and [EOSQ400]. Note: the indicators are presented as a 
weighted average between 2016 and 2017. The indicators measure to what extent the 
country retains/attracts talented people domestically/from abroad, respectively. Both 
indicators are scaled from 1 to 7, with 1 indicating not at all and 7 = to a great extent. 
A low score in the country’s capacity to retain talent, therefore, indicates that the best 
and brightest might leave to pursue opportunities abroad; a low score in the country’s 
capacity to attract talent indicates that the country is not able to attract the best and 
brightest from around the world. For details on the computation methodology see: 
‘Technical Notes and Sources’ from the Global Competitiveness Report 2017-2018.
With the recession and increased unemployment after 2008, labour 
shortages became a minor factor. But with the recovery after 2012, 
labour shortages began to appear again. More recently the severity of 
this problem even exceeded its pre-crisis peak, especially in central 
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and eastern European countries, and also in north-west European 
countries. Therefore, the conclusions reached for the pre-crisis period 
continue to apply: emigration from central and eastern European 
countries had a major negative impact on their labour markets 
and created labour shortages, while the migration of these central 
Europeans to north-west EU countries did not take jobs from local 
workers.
It is also noticeable that in the four southern European countries, 
labour shortages have not posed a major problem, either before the 
crisis or more recently.
The ability of a country to attract and retain talent is an important 
factor that can influence human capital flight and brain drain. World 
Economic Forum indicators (2017-18) show that countries’ capacities 
to retain and attract talent are similar (Figure 25). For instance, the 
United Kingdom has a high capacity to both retain and attract talent, 
whereas Romania has a small capacity in both areas.
Figure 26: Change in countries’ capacities to retain and attract talent, 2014-17
Source: Bruegel based on World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Index, 
2017-2018 and 2014-2015 Editions. Note: the variation is computed by taking the differ-
ence between the scores attained in 2017-2018 and the scores attained in 2014-2015. 
See Figure 25 for infomation about the indicators.
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From 2014-17, the central and eastern European countries that 
suffer the most from labour shortages experienced mixed fortunes 
in terms of their ability to retain and attract talent. Bulgaria, Poland, 
Estonia and the Czech Republic became more attractive to talent from 
2014-17 (though their scores remain below the scores of the main 
north-west EU destination countries), while Hungary, Romania and 
Latvia became less attractive to talent.
More recently, some studies have posited that the effects of remit-
tances and returning migrants could overcome the negative impacts of 
emigration – according to the brain-gain hypothesis, sending countries 
could also benefit from the exit of the brightest, either because it creates 
incentives for them to invest more in human capital (see Poutvaara, 2004; 
Mayr et al, 2009; Beine et al, 2003) or through positive diaspora externali-
ties on foreign direct investment (Docquier and Lodigiani, 2006).
3.3 Immigration from outside the EU
Economic, social, political, historical and cultural factors explain the 
large numbers of extra-EU migrants in some member states. Migali 
and Natale (2017) find that the existence of a previous colonial link, a 
common legal system and a common official language are all signif-
icant determinants of total first residence permits, regardless of the 
form of migration. Commonwealth citizens who are either married 
to, or are the children of, someone with the right of abode might 
also have the same right to reside in the UK for an unlimited time. 
Commonwealth citizens are also eligible for a UK ancestry visa, which 
allows them to stay in the UK for five years. In some cases, bilateral 
agreements can influence migration flows. Germany and Turkey, for 
instance, have a strong migration link that dates back to a bilateral 
labour agreement signed in 1961. Following an initial influx and set-
tlement in Germany of contracted workers from Turkey, immigration 
flows during the 1970s were linked to family reunification. In the 1980s 
migration from Turkey to Germany had political motivations, with 
migrants seeking asylum (Aydin, 2016).
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Figure 27: EU country residence permits by main sending countries and reason 
for issuance, 2008 and 2016, thousands
Source: Eurostat ‘First permits by reason, length of validity and citizenship’ dataset, code: 
migr_resfirst. Note: country names indicated on the horizontal axis are source countries 
from where immigrants arrived in the EU. China includes Hong Kong. Other reasons 
include refugee status, humanitarian reasons, residence only permits without the intention 
to work, study or reunite with family (eg residence permits issued to pensioners). 
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Figure 28: First residence permits issued by EU countries, type and duration of 
the permit (share of total permits for a particular duration), 2008 and 2016
Source: Eurostat ‘First permits by reason, length of validity and citizenship’ dataset, 
code: migr_resfirst. Note: the category ‘Others’ includes permits issued to refugees and 
beneficiaries of various other protection schemes (subsidiary protection, international 
protection, humanitarian reasons, unaccompanied minors, victims of trafficking in 
human beings), but also for unspecified reasons and residency-only permits. Eurostat’s 
metadata file notes that there have been improvements in statistics collected, but 
problems of missing and incomplete data occur: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/
metadata/en/migr_res_esms.htm.
Migrants’ motives
The type of residence permit issued varies with the length of the stay 
(Figure 28). Immigrants who come for less than a year arrive predom-
inantly for work: 63 percent of short-term residence permits in 2008 
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and 44 percent in 2016 were issued for this reason. In contrast, in 2008, 
24 percent of migrants staying more than one year received a work 
permit, declining to 13 percent in 2016. People migrating for education 
accounted for about a quarter of both short and long-term residence 
permits. This share did not change much between 2008 and 2016. 
Family reasons are less important for short-term migrants (10 per-
cent of residence permits issued), but about one-third of longer-term 
residence permits are issued to migrants for this reason. Residence 
permits issued in the category ‘others’, which includes refugees, ben-
eficiaries of other protection schemes and residence permits issued 
for unspecified reasons (which also could include granting of refugees 
status), saw a significant increase both in terms of short-term and 
longer-term permits. In terms of absolute numbers, 345,000 short-
term and 684,000 long-term permits issued to immigrants for ‘other’ 
reasons in 2016, altogether slightly over than one million people.
High-skilled migration into the EU
Between 2010 and 2011, 28 percent of migrants into the EU were ter-
tiary-educated. High-skilled migrants (HSM) can be broadly defined 
as being tertiary educated, but the OECD provides three definitions 
(Chaloff et al, 2009) of HSM based on education, occupation or wage 
level: ‘highskilled’ is considered to “include post-secondary education 
that is university-level but that may involve a vocational, technical or 
professional qualification of shorter duration than a bachelor’s degree”, 
corresponding approximately to tertiary education. From an occupa-
tional standpoint, “occupations including managers, professionals and 
associate professionals” are included in the definition. The wage-level 
is used in some countries as a proxy for skill level.
High-skilled migration offers added value to recipient coun-
tries. Benefits range from increasing the entrepreneurial profile of 
the country to filling the skills gap in host countries. Desiderio and 
Mestres-Domènech (2011) note that “the proportion of new migrant 
entrepreneurs in the labour force is much higher than among natives”, 
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a significant share of migrant entrepreneurs (30-40 percent) have 
tertiary education and a “higher average educational level than their 
native counterparts”. An influx of high-skilled migrants is also useful 
in filling specialist shortages. HSM “complement physical capital and 
technology and the human capital of both low- and high-skilled native 
workers” (Constant, 2014) and can be an incentive for technological 
progress (Kerr and Lincoln, 2011). 
In the EU, the main common mechanism to attract HSM is the 
European Blue Card, which is regulated by Council Directive 2009/50/
EC of 25 May 2009. This directive defines highly qualified employment 
as the “employment of a person who in the Member State concerned, 
is protected as an employee under national employment law and/or 
in accordance with national practice, irrespective of the legal relation-
ship, for the purpose of exercising genuine and effective work”, “is paid” 
and “has the required adequate and specific competence, as proven by 
higher professional qualifications”.  
However, there is a general consensus that the EU needs to improve 
its policies toward high-skilled migrants (European Commission, 
2016a). The Blue Card has not appealed enough to either employers or 
high-skilled workers themselves and – with the exception of Germany 
– has been severely underused by EU countries. This means that the 
EU issues fewer permits to highly-skilled workers than other compet-
itors for HSM. In 2015, 17,104 visas were issued in Europe to high-
skilled workers, compared to the US total of 275,317. 
Discussions are underway on reform to improve the Blue Card 
system and address some of its major shortcomings (see González et 
al, 2013, and Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2011). To begin with, the 
EU Blue Card sets a rather high salary requirement threshold. The 
thresholds vary in different EU countries but are still higher than HSM 
scheme thresholds in other countries. It is therefore difficult for a HSM 
to meet the minimum salary requirement in order to apply for the card 
in the first place; only one in three highly-educated migrants meet 
the salary requirements. The system also greatly restricts mobility: 
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in-country status changes are not allowed and Blue Card holders cannot 
move from one member state to another without applying for a new EU 
Blue Card. Intra-EU mobility under the current directive is considered 
relatively unattractive for migrants. More importantly, many employers 
are reluctant to request Blue Cards for potential employees, seeing the 
process as too problematic. Offering incentives, such as the possibility 
for cardholders to apply for a permanence residence permit, would 
improve the attractiveness of the Blue Card scheme.
In the face of an increasing skills shortage13, it is crucial for the EU 
to begin to take more of a lead in the global race for talent. According 
to a Gallup survey (cited in European Commission 2016a), 33 per-
cent of highly-educated workers worldwide who intended to migrate 
preferred the EU (or European Economic Area) as a destination, 
compared to 19 percent who preferred the United States. However, 
in the United States, 37 percent of working age migrants have at least 
a college degree against 26 percent in the EU. This could suggest that 
while the EU might seem attractive to a potential migrant, its system 
does not facilitate high-skilled migration in the same way that those of 
other OECD countries do.
Inflows of asylum seekers into the EU
Both in 2015 and 2016, about 1.2 million to 1.3 million first-time 
asylum applications were registered in the EU with changing with-
in-year intensity (Figure 29). In all EU countries, asylum applications 
from asylum seekers peaked in the autumn of 2015. In addition to the 
notable case of Germany, high numbers of applications were filed 
in Hungary, Sweden and, to a lesser extent, Austria and Italy. From 
the end of 2015 to the autumn of 2016, Germany received the over-
whelming share of applications; thereafter, the number of applications 
abruptly fell. Since the beginning of 2017, the asylum application wave 
13 Charloff et al (2009) say that “Most OECD countries expect growing shortages of high-
ly-skilled labour in the coming two decades, and immigration is viewed as one way of 
addressing these”.
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has abated considerably, with the notable exception of Italy, where the 
number continues to rise at time of writing. 
Figure 29: First-time asylum applications in the EU, by country of application, 
January 2008 – September 2017
Source: Eurostat ‘Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex 
Annual aggregated data (rounded)’ dataset, code: migr_asyappctza. Note: for some 
countries, data on first-time asylum applications is not available for certain periods 
at the beginning or our sample period, but data on total applications is available. We 
approximate the missing first-time applications data by assuming that the ratio of first 
time to total applications was the same in the missing periods as the actual value of 
this ratio in the first full year when both indicators are available.
The large inflow of asylum seekers posed immense difficulties in 
dealing with their applications, which is also reflected in the number 
of pending applications. The number of applicants waiting for a deci-
sion increased from approximately 300,000 in 2010-13 to 1.2 million by 
September 2016 (Figure 30). Since then, along with the decline in appli-
cations (Figure 29), the number of persons with pending applications 
has declined. Nevertheless, as of September 2017, there were almost one 
million asylum seekers awaiting decisions, a rather large number.
Large numbers of asylum applications do not translate into equally 
large acceptance rates. In the EU as a whole, the acceptance rate was 
about 50 percent, but there are very significant differences between 
member states (Figure 31). In Hungary, Poland and Croatia, the 
  0
  20
  40
  60
  80
  100
  120
  140
  160
  180
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
Germany Sweden Austria
Hungary Italy Greece
France United Kingdom Rest of the EU
72 | BRUEGEL BLUEPRINT 28
acceptance rate is only about 20 percent or even lower, while Malta 
accepted about 80 percent of asylum applications and Slovakia more 
than 60 percent. 
Figure 30: Asylum seekers with applications pending at the end of the month, 
January 2008 – September 2017
Source: Eurostat ‘Persons subject of asylum applications pending at the end of the month 
by citizenship, age and sex Monthly data (rounded) [migr_asypenctzm]’ dataset. Note: Data 
for some countries was missing for 2014 (Austria and Netherlands), 2013 (Netherlands and 
Cyprus), 2011-12 (Cyprus and Croatia), and some months in 2010 for Belgium, the United 
Kingdom, Cyprus and Croatia. Whenever it was possible, we approximated these missing 
values by interpolating available data, eg for Austria we assumed a constant growth rate 
between December 2013 and January 2015. For the UK, we used the percent growth rate 
observed in Sweden to approximate the missing UK values in January-May 2010.
There have been large swings in the acceptance rate through the years. 
For example, in Latvia it increased from 9 percent in 2015 to 78 percent in 
2017, while in Bulgaria it declined from 91 percent in 2015 to 31 percent in 
2017. In contrast, acceptance rates remained fairly stable in, for example, 
France, Italy and the UK.
The composition of flows of asylum seekers (eg whether they have 
risked their lives or migrated for economic reasons but used the current 
inflow of refugees as an opportunity to enter the EU) might explain some 
of the differences in acceptance rates, but is unlikely to be the only factor. 
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Figure 31: Positive first instance decisions on asylum applications, % of 
applications, 2015-17
Source: Eurostat’s ‘First instance decisions on applications by citizenship, age and sex 
Quarterly data (rounded) [migr_asydcfstq]’ dataset. Note: the first half 2017 is reported 
for 2017.
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 Leerkes (2015) analyses the composition of flows of asylum seekers 
by country of citizenship, age and gender and finds that some differ-
ences in acceptance rates are explained by these compositional fac-
tors, but nevertheless substantial differences persist. Drawing on the 
literature, he concludes that the differences in composition-adjusted 
acceptance rates are likely explained by differences in the willingness 
to admit asylum seekers, which is in turn can be related to differ-
ences in unemployment or differences in the popularity and political 
influence of anti-immigration parties. Therefore, it seems that variable 
implementation of the EU’s asylum rules also explains the differences 
between countries’ acceptance rates.
There is a huge difference within the EU in terms of where asylum 
applications are made, where the asylum applications are accepted 
and GDP (Figure 32). Disproportionate distribution of asylum seekers 
and refugees within the EU relative to the distribution of GDP entails 
disproportionate burdens and socio-economic implications for EU 
member states.
• Germany received disproportionally more applications and had a 
higher positive decision rate relative to its share of EU GDP, in all 
three years of 2015, 2016 and 2017. 
• Sweden’s shares of applications and of positive decisions were also 
disproportionally high in 2015, but by 2017 its asylum seeker and 
refugee shares became more similar to its GDP share. 
• Greece has received a disproportionately high share of applica-
tions, but because it ultimately accepts fewer asylum seekers than 
the EU average, its share of positive decisions remained close to its 
GDP share.
• Hungary received 14 percent of applications in 2015, a huge share 
compared to Hungary’s 1 percent share of EU GDP. But because of 
a very low acceptance rate (Figure 31), Hungary’s share of positive 
decisions was a mere 0.2 percent. After building a fence along its 
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southern border, Hungary’s share of applications declined to very 
close to zero. 
• Italy’s share of applications was lower than its share of EU GDP in 
2015, but this relationship had reversed by 2017. However, because 
of a lower than the EU average acceptance rate, Italy’s share of posi-
tive decision remains well below its share of EU GDP.
• For many other countries, including Poland, the Netherlands, 
Spain, France and the United Kingdom, the shares of asylum ap-
plications and positive decisions remained well below their GDP 
shares.
The EU has financial instruments dedicated to supporting the 
management of migration flows and safeguarding the Schengen area, 
including the Asylum Migration and Integration Fund for 2014-20, 
with a total budget of €3.137 billion, and the Internal Security Fund, for 
which €3.8 billion was allocated in the 2014-20 multi-annual financial 
framework. We discuss these instruments, along with the various other 
initiatives to manage the refugee crisis, in chapter 7.
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Figure 32: Total asylum applications, positive first instance decisions, and GDP, 
% of EU totals, 2015, 2016 and 2017
Source: Eurostat’s ‘Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex 
Monthly data (rounded) [migr_asyappctzm]’ and ‘First instance decisions on applica-
tions by citizenship, age and sex Quarterly data (rounded) [migr_asydcfstq]’ datasets, 
and the November 2017 AMECO dataset. Note: the 2017 distributions were calculated 
using the following data: January-August 2017 for first time applications, January-June 
2017 for positive decisions, and the whole of 2017 for GDP.
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Figure 33: Asylum applicants by age and gender, 2014-16
Source: Eurostat ‘Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex’ 
dataset, code: [migr_asyappctza].
3.4 The share of foreign citizens and foreign-born people resident 
in the population
While defining an immigrant is relatively straightforward in relation 
to flows of people, defining immigrants within the resident popula-
tion is much more complicated (see Box 1 in chapter 1). There are 
two standard indicators of stocks of immigrants in the resident pop-
ulation of a host country: the share of foreign citizens and the share 
of foreign-born people. Foreign citizens are people who retain the 
citizenship of their home countries. This category might include 
people born in the host country. Foreign-born persons were born 
outside of the country of their usual residence, regardless of their 
citizenship. This category might include home-country citizens 
who were born to home-country parents abroad. There is some but 
imperfect overlap between the two categories, because some for-
eign-born people obtain the citizenship of their host country, while 
some foreign citizens were born their host country.
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While these two alternative indicators of immigrants in resident 
population are straightforward, they might not coincide with the 
perceptions of the native population. For example, native people 
might still consider a naturalised former immigrant as an ‘immi-
grant’, even if this person has obtained the citizenship of the host 
country. 
Foreign citizens
We calculate the share of foreign citizens in each EU country at the 
end of 2015. We make two adjustments to population statistics. 
First, at the end of 2015 there were 1 million asylum seekers in the 
EU who had submitted their asylum applications and were waiting 
for decisions. These people were in EU member states, but were not 
included in population statistics. Second, we also consider posted 
workers. Most posted workers are not included in the resident 
population of the host country, when the duration of the posting is 
short.
Therefore, we calculate an adjusted population for each EU 
country at the end of 2015. We start with the reported population 
number, add the number of asylum seekers waiting for decisions on 
their applications, add the posted workers received from other EU 
countries and subtract the posted workers sent to other EU coun-
tries. Since no data is available on the number of posted workers at 
the end of 2015, we had to approximate their number (Box 2). 
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Box 2: Calculation of the number of posted workers at the end of 2015
The calculation of posted workers present in each EU country at the end of 
2015 necessitates some approximations, for three reasons. 
First, data is not available on the number of posted workers at the end of 
2015, only on the total number of people involved in posting in 2015. Most 
of them, for example those people who go for a posting period for one month 
between January and November, are not present in the host member state 
at the end of the year. We therefore calculate the average number of posted 
workers for each day in 2015, which is the same indicator as the ‘full time 
equivalent job indicator’. We calculate this indicator from the perspectives 
of both sending and receiving countries14. To do that, we need information 
on the average duration of postings. This information is available for 13 
sending countries. For the other 15 EU countries, we used approximations 
by considering neighbouring countries or countries with similar characteris-
tics, as indicated in Table 5. For example, the average duration of postings by 
Belgian companies is 33 days, while it is 29 days for French companies. We 
used the average of these two numbers, 31 days, for neighbouring coun-
tries and other western European countries that might have similar char-
acteristics, such as Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands 
and Sweden. Table 5 shows that the duration of postings is typically much 
longer for workers posted from central and eastern European countries than 
from western European countries. We assume that the duration of postings 
from a particular source country to all destinations countries is the same, 
given that duration data is not available on a bilateral basis. For example, we 
assume that Belgian posted workers spend on average 33 days in Germany, 
the same 33 days in the Netherlands, and the same 33 days in all other EU 
countries.
Second, while all people holding the A1 document are considered 
‘posted workers’ in policy discussions (their total number was 2.05 million 
14 For example, if the average duration of postings is three months, then four posted 
workers account for a full-time job and one posted workers accounts for one-
fourth of a full-time job.
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for the European Economic Area (EEA) plus Switzerland in 2015), in fact 
slightly less than 1.5 million people are actually posted workers, while the 
remaining half a million are either ‘active in two or more member states’ or 
‘others’, such as civil servants, sailors or flight crew. Still, we consider people 
belonging to all three categories as ‘posted workers’, similarly to the use of 
this term in policy dialogues15. The detailed bilateral matrix for source and 
destination countries is available only for the 1.5 million actual posted work-
ers: for all others, we assumed that the composition of destination countries 
(from a given source country) is the same as the composition of actual 
posted workers. Furthermore, we only consider EU members, but not non-EU 
EEA members or Switzerland, and thus we do not consider people who are 
posted from or to Norway, Iceland, Lichtenstein and Switzerland.
Third, the detailed decomposition of destination countries is available for 
all EU member states except the United Kingdom. For the UK, we assumed 
that the share of Ireland in destination countries is 15 percent (this is an 
ad-hoc assumption, based on an overview of the shares of posted workers 
of other EU countries in their neighbouring countries), while the share of 
all other EU countries is proportional to the average share of each country 
in total EU postings. Given that the UK posts relatively few workers, less 
than 32,000, who account for about 12,000 full-time equivalent jobs, this 
approximation hardly distorts our final results.
15  Even the European Commission’s factsheet talks about 2.05 million posted workers.
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Table 5: Average duration of postings of workers by sending countries, actual 
data (white box) and our approximations (gray box), 2015 (days)
Average duration per posting 
by sending member states
Countries used for 
approximation
Austria 31 Belgium, France
Belgium 33
Bulgaria 188 Croatia, Hungary, Slovenia
Croatia 225
Cyprus 298
Czech Rep. 148
Denmark 31 Belgium, France
Estonia 227
Finland 31 Belgium, France
France 29
Germany 31 Belgium, France
Greece 195 Cyprus, Italy
Hungary 198
Ireland 240
Italy 92
Latvia 266
Lithuania 266 Latvia
Luxembourg 16
Malta 61 France, Italy
Netherlands 31 Belgium, France
Poland 173 Czech Republic, Hungary
Portugal 61 France, Italy
Romania 188 Croatia, Hungary, Slovenia
Slovenia 142
Slovakia 173 Czech Republic, Hungary
Spain 61 France, Italy
Sweden 31 Belgium, France
UK 135 France, Ireland
Source:  Bruegel based on De Wispelaere and Pacolet (2017).
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Our results (Table 6) show that intra-EU mobility has not reached 
very high levels as a percentage of host country population, with the 
exception of Luxembourg. For example, central and eastern European 
citizens account for only 1.88 percent of the population of north-west 
EU countries, while posted workers add a mere additional 0.15 per-
cent16. Six southern EU members account for 1.18 percent of the pop-
ulation of north-west EU countries, while citizens of other north-west 
countries account for an additional 1.13 percent (eg Germans who live 
in Belgium and Belgians who live in Germany). Altogether, other EU 
citizens account for 4.4 percent of the population of north-west EU 
countries. Central and eastern European countries host very few other 
EU citizens, while in the South 6 countries, the share of central and 
eastern European citizens is almost 2 percent of population.
The share of central and eastern European citizens in the resident 
population of host countries is highest in Austria and Ireland (over 4 
percent). Their share at about 2.5 percent in Germany and the United 
Kingdom is also above average, while their share is especially low in 
France at 0.3 percent. Luxembourg is really special: 41 percent of the 
population is citizen of another EU country, mostly from north-west 
and southern European countries. With 13 percent of population from 
other EU countries, Cyprus hosts the second largest share of other 
EU citizens, while Belgium and Ireland are in third place with shares 
slightly higher than 8 percent.
The shares of foreign citizens in the population are rather low, 
below 2 percent, in a number of central European countries: Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. These 
low shares are not surprising because wage levels are much lower in 
these countries than in western European countries and wages are 
key drivers of migration decisions. In two other central European 
16 We note that we only consider posted workers per se, but do not consider possibly 
accompanying family members for which data is not available. Most likely, for 
short-term postings family members do not accompany the posted worker, but for 
longer duration family members might join.
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countries, Estonia and Latvia, the rather high share of about 15 percent 
is explained by historical reasons related to their former inclusion in 
the Soviet Union – Russian nationals continue to live in these countries 
(see chapter 2). However, the share of other-EU nationals is extremely 
low even in Estonia and Latvia, highlighting again the major role of 
wages in migration flows. 
Table 6 also shows that posted workers account for an especially 
minor share of population. For example, the shares of posted workers 
from central and eastern European countries in the populations of 
France, the Netherlands and Belgium (three countries that have been 
especially vocal in the posted workers debate) are 0.05 percent, 0.13 
percent and 0.32 percent, respectively – very low shares. Therefore, it is 
surprising that the revision of the posted workers directive has been so 
prominent in EU policy debates (see chapter 7).
The share of non-EU citizens in resident populations varies from 
half percent in Lithuania to 14 percent in Estonia and Latvia. The EU 
average is slightly above 4 percent. Pending asylum applicants add a 
further 0.2 percent, which, as we note, is distributed rather unevenly 
between EU countries, with Sweden and Austria having the largest 
shares relative to population.
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Table 6: Composition of EU country populations according to citizenship,  
end-2015 (percent of adjusted population)
Non-EU citizens Citizens of other EU countries
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Austria 0.91 7.28 4.11 0.41 0.46 0.03 2.42 0.09 7.51 84.30 
Belgium 0.32 4.01 1.74 0.32 2.46 0.04 3.48 0.27 8.32 87.35 
Bulgaria 0.13 0.91 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.20 98.76 
Croatia 0.00 0.71 0.14 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.39 98.89 
Cyprus 0.24 4.49 n.a. 0.01 n.a. 0.01 n.a. 0.02 12.89 82.37 
Czech R. 0.01 2.66 1.41 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.37 0.01 1.94 95.39 
Denmark 0.26 4.79 1.64 0.06 0.34 0.01 1.33 0.04 3.42 91.53 
Estonia 0.01 13.97 0.49 0.07 0.11 0.00 0.57 0.03 1.27 84.76 
Finland 0.50 2.45 1.18 0.24 0.12 0.01 0.40 0.03 1.98 95.06 
France 0.05 4.31 0.31 0.05 1.36 0.03 0.61 0.03 2.40 93.24 
Germany 0.51 5.86 2.46 0.27 1.38 0.01 0.75 0.03 4.91 88.72 
Greece 0.24 5.47 1.34 0.01 0.20 0.01 0.37 0.01 1.95 92.34 
Hungary 0.37 0.73 0.45 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.36 0.01 0.90 98.00 
Ireland 0.10 4.29 4.89 0.02 0.24 0.01 2.99 0.07 8.21 87.40 
Italy 0.10 5.78 2.24 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.20 0.01 2.54 91.59 
Latvia 0.01 14.39 0.22 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.35 85.25 
Lithuania 0.00 0.48 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.22 99.29 
Lux’bourg 0.43 6.88 2.77 0.25 21.15 0.04 15.91 0.75 40.87 51.82 
Malta 0.19 3.54 n.a. 0.01 n.a. 0.05 n.a. 0.04 3.66 92.61 
N’lands 0.17 2.60 1.06 0.13 0.53 0.01 1.10 0.07 2.91 94.31 
Poland 0.01 0.35 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.08 99.56 
Portugal 0.00 2.74 0.39 0.00 0.16 0.03 0.46 0.01 1.07 96.19 
Romania 0.00 0.30 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.27 99.43 
Slovakia 0.01 0.29 0.67 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.20 0.01 1.02 98.69 
Slovenia 0.01 4.47 0.66 0.12 0.10 0.01 0.12 0.02 1.02 94.51 
Spain 0.04 5.35 2.03 0.01 0.64 0.01 1.49 0.02 4.20 90.42 
Sweden 1.56 4.77 1.08 0.19 0.28 0.01 1.67 0.07 3.29 90.37 
UK 0.05 3.79 2.66 0.01 0.96 0.01 1.28 0.01 4.93 91.23 
Total EU 0.20 4.11 1.58 0.09 0.73 0.01 0.0.83 0.0.03 0.3.27 0.92.42 
North-west 11 0.3 4.62 1.88 0.15 1.18 0.02 1.13 0.04 4.4 90.68
CEE 11 0.05 1.19 0.27 0.03 0.05 0 0.14 0.01 0.5 98.26
South 6 0.08 5.34 1.99 0.02 0.3 0.01 0.71 0.01 3.04 91.54
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Source: Bruegel. Note: North-West 11: first 15 EU members without Italy, Greece, 
Portugal and Spain. South 6: Cyprus, Italy, Malta, Greece, Portugal and Spain. CEE 11: 
the central and eastern European members that joined the EU in 2004-13. Adjusted 
population: population as reported in population statistics plus pending asylum seek-
ers plus posted workers received minus posted workers sent.
Foreign-born people
Since some immigrants obtain the citizenship of their host country, 
the number of foreign citizens within a population might not corre-
spond with all people who are viewed as ‘immigrants’. Foreign-born 
people might not correspond either to people who are viewed as 
‘immigrants’, because the category of foreign-born people does not 
include people whose parents or grandparents were immigrants but 
who were born in the host country – quite often, such people are 
also considered ‘immigrants’. Moreover, the foreign-born population 
includes those people who were born to native parents abroad but 
moved to the home country of their parents. 
EU countries generally have higher shares of foreign-born residents 
than foreign citizens, with the exceptions of Luxembourg, Estonia and 
Greece (Figure 34). Switzerland, Australia, New Zealand and Canada 
host much larger shares of foreign-born people than EU countries 
with the exception of Luxembourg. Nevertheless in almost half the EU 
countries (for which OECD data is available), the share of foreign-born 
residents is similar or even higher than in the United States. However, 
the way intra-EU mobility is taken into account has a major bear-
ing on the comparison with the US. For the US, we do not consider 
intra-US mobility, but only mobility from other countries. But for the 
EU, foreign-born people and foreign citizens also include people from 
other EU countries. If we view the EU as a single entity, the share of 
non-EU people in the EU is much lower than non-US people in the 
United States. But if people from other EU countries are considered to 
belong to the same category as non-EU immigrants, then in about half 
of the EU countries, the share of ‘immigrants’ has reached the share 
observed in the United States.
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Neither the share of foreign-born, nor the share of foreign citizens, 
is high in the United Kingdom relative to other EU countries, and the 
UK shares are well below the shares in Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand. Therefore, it is notable that even though an international 
comparison does not suggest unusually high share of foreigners in the 
UK, immigration was a key topic in the campaign ahead of the UK’s 
referendum on EU membership in June 2016. 
Figure 34: Foreign-born and foreign citizen population in 2013 (percent of total 
population)
Source: OECD International migration database. Note: 2012 for Ireland, France and 
Greece; 2011 for Poland and Canada. Data on foreign citizens is not available for Aus-
tralia and New Zealand, while data on foreign born residents is not available for Japan.
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4 The economic impact of 
immigration
This chapter reviews the literature on the economic impact of migra-
tion, particularly in relation to aggregate output, fiscal policy and 
labour markets. The chapter also reviews the particular case of the 
economic impact of sudden inflows of refugees and asylum seekers. 
The literature is extremely voluminous and there are no clear-cut 
conclusions: some works find generally positive impacts, while others 
find negative or neutral impacts. The general lesson is that the impact 
depends on the characteristics of flows of incoming migrants, the 
institutional and economic characteristics of receiving countries and 
the swiftness of integration. 
4.1 Impact on output
Migration could impact GDP in three main ways, through an increase 
in the working age population, greater demand for goods and services 
and an increase in the productivity of the average worker. The impact 
on aggregate output is generally positive, because some immigrants 
start working shortly after arrival, thereby directly contributing to 
output, while consumption by immigrants increases demand in the 
host country, which stimulates output at least in the short term. A key 
question, however, is the impact on productivity.
Ortega and Peri (2014) find that openness to trade and migration 
increases a country’s per-capita income, with migration having a 
much greater impact than trade. This effect of migration on per-cap-
ita income operates through an increase in total factor productivity, 
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including diversity of productive skills and greater innovation. Alesina 
et al (2016) find a similar result when controlling for a number of fac-
tors, including trade openness, trade diversity and education. Jaumotte 
et al (2016) find that a 1 percentage point increase in the share of 
migrants raises the receiving country’s GDP per capita by 2 percent. 
The mechanisms through which immigration increases labour pro-
ductivity could be different for high-skilled and low-skilled workers. 
High-skilled migration increases innovation in the host economy 
(Alesina et al, 2016; Ortega and Peri, 2014; Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle, 
2010), while low-skilled migrants increases productivity by making the 
natives take up higher skilled jobs (Peri and Sparber, 2009; Cattaneo et 
al, 2015; D’Amuri and Peri, 2014).
The productivity channel is also key in Portes et al (2016), who 
assess the impact on the UK economy of reductions in migration aris-
ing from Brexit. Portes et al (2016) estimate a fall in UK GDP ranging 
from 0.63 percent to 1.19 percent. Di Giovanni et al (2014) consider 
the aforementioned mechanisms and find large and positive long-run 
impacts on welfare for the origin and destination countries. 
Another possible route to productivity growth is the positive impact 
high-skilled migration could have on innovation in the receiving 
country. This is especially relevant for Europe, where growth and 
investment have been anaemic. Fassio et al (2015) find that a 1 percent 
increase in the number of highly-educated migrants has a positive, 
though small, effect on innovation (an increase in citations of around 
0.1 percent). This effect varies in different sectors, with high-tech 
sectors experiencing a positive effect. However, the effect of low-skilled 
migrants on innovation is found to be negative in both high and low-
tech sectors. 
Immigration has a redistributive impact on the native economy. 
While it is true that immigration expands economic activity, most of 
the gains accruing to natives are small at around 0.1 percent of GDP, 
since most of the gains made by immigrants – 98 percent of the $1.6 
trillion annually in the US – goes back to the migrants themselves as 
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wages and benefits (Borjas, 2013). Atoyan et al (2016) find a negative 
impact of large-scale emigration from central, eastern and southeast-
ern Europe on the sending countries’ potential growth, with annual 
growth rate losses amounting to between 0.6-0.9 percentage points in 
some countries from 1999 to 2014 (Albania, Montenegro, Romania, 
Latvia and Lithuania).
Migrants in the host country contribute to aggregate demand 
through consumption of goods and services. While migrants remit a 
certain share of their income to their home countries, depending on 
their financial position, ties to the home country and other factors, 
with time and integration they tend to remit less as their needs in the 
host countries increase (Straubhaar and Vãdean, 2005; Lianos and 
Cavounidis, 2006). Echazarra (2011) finds that remittances peak at 10 
years and decline afterwards for migrants in Spain, for reasons includ-
ing naturalisation, family re-unification, declining ties to the home 
country and formation of new families.
4.2 Labour market impact
The notion that “immigrants are taking our jobs” is often cited in 
various news outlets and was especially prominent during the 2016 US 
presidential race, the Brexit referendum and during elections cam-
paigns in France and the Netherlands in 2017. Alongside security and 
terrorism concerns, the majority of Europeans are worried about the 
impact of refugee inflows on labour market outcomes for natives.
There are also common portrayals in popular culture of the immi-
grant who was a doctor in his home country but drives a cab in New 
York, or the engineer waiting tables in London because of lack of 
recognition of her qualifications, and language, institutional and other 
barriers. In this section we analyse the literature on the impact of 
migrants on the host country labour market.
Given the wealth of literature on the labour market and the fiscal 
impact of immigration, especially in the last few decades, it is possi-
ble to examine the effect of immigration on native employment and 
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wages. Even though such studies are non-exhaustive, there is consen-
sus on the lack of conclusive evidence that immigrants systematically 
take jobs from natives or depress wages for the natives. Instead, the 
impact of immigration on the host country’s labour market seems to 
largely depend on two interconnected factors: migrant characteristics 
and the host country’s economic and institutional factors.
Migrant characteristics typically considered in the literature include 
gender, origin, and length of stay in the host country, educational 
attainment and skill level. Immigrant characteristics in turn determine 
the labour-market assimilation process; that is, to what extent the 
education and skills of immigrants are substitutes for, or complements 
to, those of the natives. This determines wage setting for immigrants 
and of natives. 
The second set of factors – the host country’s institutional and mac-
roeconomic setting – includes the unemployment level, strength of 
unions, wage rigidities and the size of the informal economy. The host 
country’s past experience of, and effectiveness in terms of, integration 
also play a role. Spain’s institutional experience of migration would be 
more extensive from that of Greece, for example.
As the work experience of immigrants in host countries increases, 
labour market outcomes of immigrants converge to those of natives, 
after controlling for origin and destination-specific effects. Aleksynska 
and Tritah (2013) examine the education and occupation (mis)
match of immigrants and of natives in 22 European countries and 
find that the share of correctly-matched immigrants increases grad-
ually as immigrants live in the host country longer – this increase of 
match is mainly driven by integration of over-educated immigrants. 
Overall, 22 percent of immigrants to Europe are over-educated for 
the jobs they do, compared to 13 percent of natives. The incidence 
of over-education among migrants is as high as 35 percent in the UK 
and 47 percent in Portugal (Aleksynska and Trihah, 2013; Akresh, 
2008). Higher incidence of over-education and higher skills among 
immigrants (even though these are not completely complementary) 
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could be due to selection bias in a country’s immigration policy. In 
this respect, in countries such as the United States, Canada, United 
Kingdom, Australia or New Zealand, the share of high-skilled immi-
grants is reflected in their skill-based immigration policies (Czaika and 
Parsons, 2015). In the US, for instance, almost half of the immigrants 
who arrived between 2011 and 2014 were college educated, and immi-
grants were better educated than natives in 26 US states (Economist, 
2017).
Moreover, a good majority of immigrants (eg 53 percent for the 
US) obtained their degree prior to immigration, meaning that in 
most cases the host country is benefiting from the education paid 
for by others (Batalova et al, 2008). However, because of institutional 
and administrative barriers, it might be difficult for migrants to have 
their degrees recognised in the host country. This largely depends 
on institutional factors in host countries. Beyer (2016), after studying 
the labour market outcomes for immigrants in Germany, shows that 
highly-skilled immigrants face a sizable skill downgrading and rela-
tively large and persistent wage gaps. While immigrants make sub-
stantial contributions to the economy, they face more obstacles in the 
labour market than native workers, and these obstacles are overcome 
only gradually and never fully (Beyer, 2016). However, studies tend 
to converge on the fact that more advanced German language skills 
reduce wage penalties for immigrants, underlining the need for early 
training in the host country language as part of the integration process 
(Dustmann and van Soest, 2001, 2002; Aldashev et al, 2009; Zibrowius, 
2012).
Earlier studies for the US and Canada did not find persistent wage 
differentials that are not fully overcome. Instead, while it is true that 
US immigrants start with much lower wages than natives with similar 
characteristics, they catch up over time (Chiswick, 1978) and even 
overtake natives after 10-15 years in the US and Canada, possibly 
because of self-selection with potentially greater ability to meet the 
labour market’s demands (Meng, 1978; Chiswick, 1978).
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National and local conditions matter for the long-term employment 
and labour-market impact of immigrants. After studying the entry 
into the labour market of immigrants in Sweden who arrived between 
1989 and 1991, Aslund and Rooth (2003) concluded that individuals 
entering before recession were 7-9 percent more likely to be employed 
and have 12-18 percent higher earnings than the cohorts entering the 
labour market during recession. The authors conclude that successful 
labour market integration should start with provision of support to 
those regions with better labour market conditions and higher shares 
of immigration (Aslund and Rooth, 2003). It is no surprise that immi-
grants, similarly to natives, tend to move to parts of the host country 
with better labour market conditions. In the US, for instance, half the 
college-educated immigrants are concentrated in a handful of loca-
tions: California, New York, Florida and Texas (Batalova and Zong, 
2016).
Economic theory posits that an increase in labour supply leads to 
a fall in wages. The effect of highly educated immigrants on natives’ 
wages, however, is not straightforward. There are several factors that 
might mean wages do not decrease, such as immigrants and natives 
having different education and skill levels, meaning they are not per-
fect substitutes. Immigrants and natives might have similar education 
levels but complementary skills. If immigration is concentrated in 
one region and natives move out of that region, wages might adjust. 
Institutional factors and wage rigidities are other possible factors (Edo 
and Rapaport, 2017). 
Some empirical works find evidence of a negative impact of 
immigration on native wages (Borjas, 2003; Borjas and Katz, 2013; 
Dustmann, Frattini and Preston, 2013; Dustmann, Schoenberg and 
Stuhler, 2016), while others find no effect (Card, 1990; Ottaviano and 
Peri, 2012; Peri and Sparber, 2009). There is also some evidence of 
increases in wages for select groups of natives (Beerli and Peri, 2015). 
Rowthorn (2015), in an analysis of the impacts of immigration on the 
UK labour market, concludes that competition from immigrants might 
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result in lower wages for low-skilled local workers, including previous 
immigrants. He also emphasises the importance of the state of the 
business cycle, because immigration damages the job prospects of 
low-skilled natives when the labour market is slack.
Internal labour mobility might also be negatively impacted by 
immigration. For instance, by using panel co-integration methods to 
analyse Italy, which is characterised by significant north-south wage 
and unemployment differentials, Brücker, Fachin and Venturini (2011) 
find that, depending on unemployment and wage differentials, the 
presence of foreign workers in the labour forces of the destination 
regions significantly discourages internal labour mobility.
For US states, the impact of immigration on native wages and the 
elasticity of wages to immigration differ. Edo and Rapaport (2017) 
look at the effects of immigration on the employment rates and wages 
of similarly skilled natives in the short-run and find that an immigra-
tion-induced increase of 10 percent in the size of a group representing 
a particular skill level and a particular state reduces natives’ wages by 
-0.2 percent to -0.1 percent. However for low-education, low-wage 
groups the effect is -0.3 percent to -0.4 percent. As such, higher mini-
mum wages make the natives in these states less sensitive to competi-
tion from immigrants in the same skill groups. 
The impact of immigrant’s skills on native labour market outcomes 
is not linear. The impacts of lower-skilled and highly-skilled migrants 
go beyond an effect on the employment rates and wages of natives in 
the same skill groups. 
Switzerland offers a unique case study, because two different parts 
of the country were opened to foreign workers at different times. 
Restrictions on cross-border workers commuting from Italy, France, 
Germany and Austria were gradually eliminated between 1999 and 
2004. These workers were allowed to work only in Switzerland’s border 
regions. Labour market access for other immigrants, who intended to 
work and settle in Switzerland, was also eased between 1999 and 2007, 
but in the same way for all regions. After 2007, the EU’s free movement 
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policy was fully implemented for cross-border workers and for all 
other EU immigrants in Switzerland’s border and non-border regions. 
The different timing of labour market opening allowed Beerli and Peri 
(2015) to analyse the effect of immigration on natives’ employment 
rates and wages in border and non-border regions. Overall, they find 
relatively small aggregate effects, but also find that some groups of 
workers benefited from the liberalisation policy while others suffered 
losses. For example, they find that the wages of natives with college 
degrees and more experience increased, while there was some decline 
in employment of natives with high-school degrees. As immigrants 
entering Switzerland were mostly highly educated, the highly-edu-
cated natives were able to rise to higher positions and increased wages, 
while high-school educated workers moved down or were replaced in 
what can be called ‘middle jobs’ by highly-educated migrants. Beerli 
and Peri (2015) also conclude that low-educated native workers were 
not affected.
Another regional study looks at the large inflow of Czech workers 
into Germany 14 months after the fall of the Berlin Wall and finds a 
moderate decline in wages for younger native workers, but a sharp 
decline in employment for older native workers (Dustmann et al, 
2017). The drop in employment resulted not so much from natives 
leaving employment, but rather from a reduction in hiring of natives.
Chozelas and Tsagloklou (2009) present a more mixed picture of 
the immigration patterns  of mainly Albanians into Greece since the 
early 1990s, when Greece became a net migrant recipient country. 
Low-skilled migration had a positive effect on GDP growth, revitalised 
the agricultural sector and helped smaller companies, dampened 
inflationary pressure and provided a short-term boost to the social 
security system. However, the inflow of migrants also expanded the 
informal sector, exacerbated income inequality, expanded unemploy-
ment and put downward pressure on wage growth for the low-skilled. 
There is some evidence that immigrants did not increase the level of 
unemployment among the natives in Greece because immigrants tend 
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to take jobs that natives turn down (Fakiolas and King, 1996; Fakiolas, 
1999). Immigrants tended to free family members employed in agricul-
ture and in small family businesses, leading to an increase in self-em-
ployment and helping Greece converge to the European standards 
(Cavounidis, 1998). Workers previously employed in the agricultural 
sector were now able to enter the labour market as paid employees.
The labour force participation rate of women has been positively 
impacted by the flow of low-skilled immigrants. The flow of low-skilled 
immigrants has responded to demand for low-wage part-time jobs 
typically occupied by female natives in the form of unpaid domestic 
labour, thereby allowing them to enter the labour market. The results 
hold for Greece (Lianos, 2004), Spain (Farre, Gonzales and Ortega, 
2011) and the US (Cortes and Tessada, 2011). In Norway, job-related 
migration, particularly from eastern Europe, spurred new job creation 
among both male and female natives (Furlanetto and Robstand, 2016). 
A similar finding of a decline in native unemployment in response to 
immigration is found for the US (Peri, 2012) and for Albanian migra-
tion to Greece (Labrianidis and Lyberaki, 2001).
Furthermore, factors such as ethnic identity and the strength of the 
ethnic sentiment also have an impact on the labour market outcomes 
of migrants. Bisin et al, (2011) examine the relationship between 
ethnic identity and labour market outcomes of immigrants in Europe 
and find immigrants with a strong identity (in terms of attachment to 
religion, traditions and language spoken at home) suffer from weaker  
employment prospects, but immigrants without strong ethnic identity 
do not face such weakened prospects. These results show that integra-
tion policies to increase the labour market participation of migrants 
can be successful, but success also depends on strength of ethnic 
identity. Since the fiscal cost of the failure to integrate immigrants into 
the labour market is higher than the cost of integrating them (see next 
section), we can conclude that favourable attitudes towards integra-
tion and active steps to make it happen reduces costs and also leads to 
favourable labour market outcomes for migrants.
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4.3 Fiscal impact 
A growing body of literature examines the fiscal effects of immigration. 
Are migrants net contributors or net beneficiaries? What contributions 
and benefits do first and second generation migrants accrue during 
their lives? How does this compare to the native population? The 
answers to these questions are vital in integration efforts and national 
migration policies, and for projecting general government spending.
Most of the literature finds that the fiscal impact of immigration is 
relatively small, in the magnitude of ±1 percent of GDP. The net fiscal 
impact of migrants can be direct and indirect. The direct impact is 
through taxes paid and benefits received and can be assessed using 
government tax and expenditure records. The indirect fiscal impact is 
felt through the impact on labour market outcomes for natives, which 
are more difficult to measure.
Net fiscal impact is commonly described as the difference between 
the contributions immigrants make to the public finances through 
taxes and other social contributions, and the benefits received. There 
is some debate on whether one should only account for the welfare 
system or also for the use of public services; and whether to include 
only direct cash transfers but not the cost of in-kind benefits. It can 
be argued that public services should be left out of the accounting 
because they are needed regardless of the presence of migrants.
The hypothesis that migrants tend to cluster in countries with the 
most generous welfare systems is called ‘the welfare magnet hypothe-
sis’. The literature assessing the welfare magnet hypothesis is divided, 
with some studies finding that migrants do make decisions based on 
the generosity of a destination country’s welfare system (Meyer, 2000; 
Borjas, 1999). This is particularly the case for vulnerable groups, such 
as mothers with young children (Gelbach, 2004). Others find no evi-
dence for welfare-induced migration, even for vulnerable groups, for 
the US (Levine and Zimmermann, 1999) and for east-west migration in 
post enlargement Europe (Skupnik, 2013).
Furlanetto and Robstand (2016) analyse immigration into Norway 
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and find that there is no evidence of immigrants being a burden on 
public finances. This is because most migrants come to Norway for work 
reasons – in the short-run they increase public revenue through tax and 
social contributions. But in the long-run, public expenditures increase, 
reflecting, for example, family reunifications. As such, the net effect on 
public finances is positive in the short-run and neutral in the long-run.
In OECD countries, immigrants contribute less than the native-
born to taxes and social security but are not more dependent on 
benefits (OECD, 2013). As such, the integration of migrants into the 
labour market is a key step in attaining potentially large and positive 
fiscal gains.
The use by migrants of government services varies depending on 
the origin country. In the US, the share of migrants on means-tested 
benefits, such as food aid and Medicaid, for households headed by 
immigrants from Mexico and Guatemala, is 5-6 times higher than 
for households headed by migrants from Canada and Germany 
(Camarota, 2012).
Naturally, and similarly to what has been discussed for labour 
markets, the magnitude of the fiscal impact and whether it is negative 
or positive differs according to the occupation, education and age 
of migrants. Active working-age adults migrating for work reasons 
are most likely to pay more in taxes than they receive in benefits, 
compared to those coming for family reunification or humanitarian 
reasons. Seasonal workers do not represent a big burden for public 
services because they do not bring their families with them (Lianos et 
al, 1996). Less active migrants – either too young or too old – popula-
tion are likely to incur net costs because they require different govern-
ment services. 
In Greece, where migrants are younger than the native population, 
a survey conducted in public hospitals in Athens showed that only 6.5 
percent of all patients are immigrants, compared to the 7.4 percent 
share in the total population (Maratou-Alipranti and Gazon, 2005). 
Therefore, even though public perception sometimes suggests that 
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immigrants disproportionally use public services, causing natives dif-
ficulties in accessing such services, the data from Athens shows that in 
fact the share of immigrants among patients is lower than their share 
in the total population. Furthermore, it should be noted that because 
of the more hazardous work that low-skilled migrants in particular do, 
they are twice as likely to suffer accidents at work and seek medical 
treatment (Maratou-Alipranti and Gazon, 2005).
Given how individuals’ contributions to, and receipts from, public 
finances vary throughout their lifetimes, it is important to measure not 
only the static impact (ie the fiscal impact of migration at a given point 
in time). Chojnicki (2013) finds that for migrants in France, the fiscal 
impact is negative at 14 years old but positive and peaking at 25 years, 
thereafter decreasing and turning negative after 47 years. Furthermore, 
the lifecycle of the contributions of immigrants in France was negative 
in 2015, but in the long-run with the constant influx of working-age 
migrants the overall impact is slightly positive. 
From the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, immigrants in Sweden 
made a net fiscal contribution as the majority were labour migrants. 
Since the mid-1980s, the net fiscal contribution has become negative 
because of the change in the composition of the immigrant population 
(Ekberg, 2009). Similarly, migrants arriving in the UK since the 2000s 
are younger and better educated than the natives and less likely to 
rely on state benefits; consequently, their net fiscal impact is positive 
(Dustmann and Frattini, 2013, 2014). Moreover, recent immigrants, 
particularly from the European Economic Area (EEA), reduced the 
fiscal burden on the natives and helped reduce the UK’s fiscal deficit. 
However, Rowthorn (2014) notes that that the overall fiscal impact 
of large-scale immigration is normally small relative to GDP, because 
the large positive fiscal contribution of some types of immigrant is 
largely or wholly offset by the negative contributions of others. He 
highlights that specific assumptions about the economic and social 
characteristics of immigrants, which were made in the literature, might 
not hold in practice, making the various calculations about the fiscal 
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impact of immigrants uncertain. He also  highlights that the benefits 
of immigration, insofar as they exist, derive in part from taxpayers and 
families in other countries in the form of investment in human capital 
that was made in those countries before the immigrants arrived in 
their host country. 
4.4 Impact of the sudden flow of migrants
The global refugee crisis and forced displacement is above all a 
humanitarian tragedy and it is a collective responsibility and moral 
imperative that the rest of the world provides support and safety for 
people fleeing wars, conflicts and disasters. By the end of 2015, more 
than 65 million people were forcibly displaced from their homes, of 
which one-third had crossed international borders and two-thirds 
were internally displaced. It marked the largest displacement since the 
second world war (UNCHR, 2015). 
The estimated number of asylum applications in the EU from 
January 2015 to September 2107 was 2.9 million, and the over-
whelming strain on the asylum seekers and the European authorities 
responding to the crisis is equally high. While it is difficult to forecast 
the flow of refugees in the future, one cannot exclude that relatively 
large inflows (as observed even in 2017, see Figure 29) will continue, 
and therefore a large number of refugees will remain in Europe, where 
they will settle and build their livelihoods. A recurrent criticism of 
the response to the crisis was the lack of a coherent and coordinated 
European asylum and refugee policy. In this respect, it is important to 
examine past experiences of the economic, social and cultural integra-
tion of refugees to draw out lessons for better policies.
When assessing the economic integration and impact of refugees, 
it needs to be acknowledged that refugees’ needs and paths to inte-
gration are different from those of labour and family migrants. In the 
short-term, refugees entail high initial costs, such as food, housing and 
language and legal assistance, while in the long-term the costs decline 
as they integrate into the labour market.
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The fiscal costs for the EU have been relatively small. The IMF 
estimates the fiscal cost of asylum seekers from 2014-16 to be around 
0.19 percent of total EU GDP (Aiyar et al, 2016), but the cost varies in 
different EU countries. National fiscal costs have been projected to be 
equal to 0.5 percent of GDP in Germany annually from 2016-17, 0.3 
percent in Austria and 0.9 percent in Sweden for 2016 and 0.8 percent 
in Turkey in 2014 (OECD, 2015). The capacity for investing in longer-
term integration also varies depending on the member state but the 
costs and risks of the failure of integration are even greater than the 
investment in integration policies (European Commission, 2016a). 
Ott (2013) finds that the labour market performance of refugees is 
slightly worse than that of labour migrants even after controlling for 
demographic differences (such as age, educational level and ability to 
speak the host country’s languages), but this gap closes in the long run. 
The fiscal contribution made by refugees tends to be lower than that 
made by economic migrants, reflecting in most cases obstacles that 
inhibit quick absorption of refugees into the labour market. While the 
short-term fiscal cost of receiving incoming refugees can be a burden 
for some countries, the medium and long-term fiscal impact is difficult 
to predict (Aiyar et al, 2016).
The net fiscal impact of refugees over time ultimately depends on 
the characteristics of refugee populations, skill complementarities 
and the efficiency of national institutions in terms of integration. Cully 
(2013) estimates that the net fiscal impact of refugees in Australia starts 
out negative, unlike labour and family migrants who make a positive 
contribution from the first year. But, after a period of 10-15 years, 
refugees have a positive net fiscal impact. In Canada, 80 percent of 
newly-arrived refugees rely on social assistance; this share decreases 
to 25-20 percent after four years (Lu, Frenette and Schellenberg, 2015). 
Similarly, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2011) finds that 75 
percent of the refugees move out of social assistance after 4 years. 
Ruist (2015) estimates for Sweden that the total redistribution of public 
resources to refugees was equal to 1 percent of GDP in 2007, with 80 
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percent due to lower per-capita revenue from refugees while 20 per-
cent was due to higher per-capita public costs. Moreover, while some-
what less than 30 percent of refugees are employed during the first two 
years of arrival in Sweden, compared to a 78-80 percent employment 
rate among labour migrants, after 10 years the refugee employment 
rate rises to 65 percent compared to 80 percent for labour migrants. 
(OECD, 2015).
Evans and Fitzgerald (2017) find that after six years, refugees in the 
US are more likely to be employed than US-born residents of the same 
age. Based on the data from the American Community Survey, the 
authors find that over 20 years, refugees in the US pay $21,000 more 
in taxes than they receive in benefits. Furthermore, longer-resident 
refugees have better economic outcomes and rely less on government 
assistance. Age combined with period of residence is one of the main 
determinants of better adjustment and economic self-sufficiency.  
Various studies have also analysed the impact of sudden flows of 
refugees on the employment and wages of natives. The most signifi-
cant case in terms of the academic debate it has stirred was the Mariel 
Boatlift – a sudden flow of 125,000 mostly low-skilled Cuban refugees 
who arrived in Florida in the mid-1980s, increasing the labour supply 
of the state by 7 percent. Card (1990) concluded that the Mariel Boatlift 
had no effect on the wages or employment rates of native workers; 
a later study by Peri and Yasenov (2016) supported these findings. 
However, Borjas (2015) finds that the sudden flow of refugees caused 
the wages of male natives with less than a high school degree to drop 
dramatically by 10-30 percent, largely as a consequence of matching 
migrant and native workers of the same skill level. Similarly, Borjas 
and Monras (2017) find large negative effects on native wages, but do 
not find an effect on native unemployment. Borjas (2016) finds that 
non-Hispanic workers without high school degrees saw a large and 
robust drop in wages in Miami in the 1980s. But, Clemens and Hunt 
(2017) re-analyse the study and find that the result was rather due to 
the simultaneous arrival alongside the Mariel Boatlift of low-income 
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less-educated Haitians, who could not be separated from the data.
Three other analyses of large sudden refugee waves cover France 
(Hunt, 1992), Israel (Friedberg, 2001) and Europe (Angrist and Kugler, 
2003). Friedberg (2001) studies the influx of Soviet refugees to Israel 
from 1990-94, which raised Israel’s population by 12 percent, and 
finds no negative effect on native outcomes within occupations. But 
Borjas and Monras (2017) analyse the same inflow and find that there 
were detrimental effects on natives’ wages. Hunt (1992) analyses the 
effect of an inflow into France of 900,000 people of European and 
Jewish origin from Algeria, and concludes that native unemployment 
increased by 0.3 percentage points, while no study on the fiscal effect 
has been done. Angrist and Kugler (2003) study the effect on Europe of 
refugees fleeing the Balkan war in the 1990s and find that a 1 percent-
age point increase in refugees raises the native unemployment rate by 
0.83 percentage points.
In certain cases, studies on the impact of refugees on the labour 
market outcomes of natives yield mixed results. The labour market 
impacts of 2.5 million Syrian refugees in Turkey – with Pakistan, the 
country with the largest refugee population –are hard to measure 
because a large majority of refugees are working in the informal sector 
(Del Carpio and Wagner, 2015). Refugees in Turkey were unable to 
work officially until January 2016, as they were treated as foreigners 
under temporary protection. Therefore a large number of refugees 
left the camps and entered the informal economy. According to Del 
Carpio and Wagner (2015), this led to a displacement of Turkish 
workers within the informal economy and pushed them to be formally 
employed, with three native workers entering formal employment per 
10 informally employed refugees. Notwithstanding the employment 
outcomes, public attitudes are a major concern. In a poll conducted in 
2014, 56 percent of Turks said that “Syrians take our jobs”, with num-
bers reaching as high as 69 percent in provinces neighbouring Syria 
(Erdogan, 2014). Public sentiment is crucial for effective integration. 
In addition, employment in the informal economy puts refugees in 
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precarious positions, without proper legal protection or access to 
public services.
Speed and ease of access to the labour market is crucial for the 
integration of refugees. Under certain conditions, there is no waiting 
period in Canada, Greece, Sweden and Norway, while the waiting 
period can be as long as 12 months in the Czech Republic and the UK, 
nine months in France, Hungary, Luxembourg and Slovenia (OECD, 
2015). Targeted labour market policies, language training and effective 
education and skill validation processes make integration more effec-
tive. For instance, Sweden developed an ‘introduction plan’, through 
which the Public Employment Services provide language training, 
employment preparation and basic education on Swedish society. 
The plan comes with a financial benefit for six months after a partici-
pant has found a job; support is gradually phased out with continued 
employment (Aiyar et al, 2016). The Swedish Migration Reform of 2010 
put in place another effective migration strategy, which is a short and 
partially subsidised internship, giving migrants a chance to prove their 
skills to an employer. Although, the internship does not guarantee 
employment, the certificate from the employer can be used to find 
other work. Bevelander and Irastorza (2014) conclude that among all 
immigrants to Sweden, refugees display the biggest gains in employ-
ment, from 16 percent to 64 percent over a 14-year period. Refugees 
also underwent a large shift from unskilled to skilled work. After 10 
years, only one in five working refugees worked in unskilled employ-
ment. Providing initial labour market training, particularly language 
skills, is essential for long-term labour market performance. Beyer 
(2016) finds that immigrants in Germany without German language 
skills earn 30 percent less than the natives, while good language skills 
close the gap by 12 percentage points, and a degree in German by 
further 6 percentage points.
5 Integrating migrants
The integration of migrants is a crucial issue for social development 
and cohesion in host countries. Integration is a broad concept. It 
covers issues such as labour market participation, education, social, 
financial and political inclusion, mixed marriages and the degree of 
friendliness of natives toward migrants. A study by the Open Society 
Foundation (2014) found that when working class or unemployed 
communities rely on social housing and some other form of social 
transfer, the ‘natives’ tend to treat ‘newcomers’ as competition for 
scarce resources. However, the same study showed that more contact 
with migrants through schools, community activities and other forms 
of social engagement led to greater acceptance by natives. Therefore, it 
is crucial to study the degree of integration of newcomers as well as the 
socio-economic dynamics of host communities.
In this chapter, we assess the integration of migrants in terms of:
• Labour market: labour market activity, employment, unemploy-
ment, over-qualification, temporary employment, part-time em-
ployment, long-term unemployment;
• Education: educational attainment, early drop outs, low-achievers, 
language skills;
• Social inclusion: income, at-risk-of-poverty rates, housing rates;
• Active citizenship: Naturalisation rates, political activity, member-
ship of political parties;
Financial inclusion, that is, access to various financial services, is a 
special topic that we study in chapter 6.
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Whenever possible, we compare the various indicators for (a) the 
native-born population, (b) second-generation migrants, and (c) 
first-generation migrants. First-generation migrants are those who 
were born abroad and moved to their new home countries (either 
recently or long time ago), while second-generation migrants are those 
who were born in the host country from first-generation migrant par-
ents. Effective integration would imply that first-generation migrants 
do not perform much worse than that the native-born, while sec-
ond-generation migrants are expected to have similar levels of partici-
pation and achievement as the native-born population.
5.1 Labour market
Employment is a crucial indicator of the degree of integration of 
migrants into a society. In 2014, Eurostat conducted a specific survey 
of immigrant working activity by comparing the native-born popu-
lation to first and second-generation immigrants. Immigrants in this 
context include people from other EU countries and from non-EU 
countries, yet whenever possible, we differentiate in this section 
between these two groups. Based on this data, Figure 35 shows that in 
terms of labour force participation – that is, the sum of employment 
and unemployment – second-generation migrants are close to the 
native-born population and have higher rates than first-generation 
migrants only in the UK, Sweden and France, suggesting successful 
integration processes. By contrast, in Spain, Greece, Poland, Italy, 
Belgium and Germany, second-generation migrants have lower 
labour force participation rates than first-generation migrants, which 
is concerning. While some of the differences between first and sec-
ond-generation migrants could be compositional (if for example 
first-generation migrants have on average a higher level of education 
and they immigrated primarily for work reasons, while the parents 
of most second-generation migrants were refugees with low educa-
tional attainments), the very low labour force participation rates of 
second-generation migrants in these six countries underlines a failure 
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of their integration processes. This dire finding highlights the major 
challenge of migrant integration, and calls for a better understanding 
of the more successful practices in the UK, Sweden and France.
The good news for four of the six poorly performing countries 
(Spain, Greece, Italy and Poland) is that the labour market participa-
tion rate of first-generation migrants is higher than that of the natives, 
thereby helping to increase the average labour force participation rate 
in these countries. 
Another notable observation is both first and second-generation 
migrants tend to face somewhat higher levels of unemployment than 
the native-born population in most countries, even in the UK, Sweden 
and France. 
A further important observation is that that the labour force partic-
ipation rate of better educated immigrants is higher than that of less 
educated immigrants (Panel D of Figure 35; unfortunately data is avail-
able for fewer countries). In Spain and Belgium, tertiary-educated sec-
ond-generation migrants have higher labour force participation rates 
than tertiary-educated first-generation migrants. This finding clearly 
highlights the role of education in successful integration strategies.
On average in the EU, the unemployment rate of the non-EU born 
population was 16.2 percent in 2016, more than double the 7.8 percent 
rate for the native-born population, which shows that immigrants 
face challenges in becoming integrated in their new home countries 
(Figure 36). Moreover, the share of long-term unemployed in total 
unemployed is higher for non-EU born than for native born in two-
thirds of the countries.
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Figure 35: Labour market activity by migrant status, selected countries, 2014
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Source: Bruegel using Eurostat ‘Employment rate by sex, age, migration status, citizenship and 
educational attainment level [lfso_14lempr]’ and ‘Unemployment rate by sex, age, migration 
status, citizenship and educational attainment level [lfso_14luner]’ datasets. Note: we express all 
ratios as a share of total population. Therefore, the unemployment ratio indicated on the chart 
is different from the usual unemployment rate, which is the ratio of the number of unemployed 
to the labour force. We calculate all ratios as a share of total population because the sum of the 
ratio for employed and the ratio for unemployed indicates the labour force participation rate. 
That is, the top of the middle-shaded portion of the bar indicates labour force participation.
(D) Tertiary education (levels 5-8)
(C) Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education (levels 3 and 4)
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Figure 36: Unemployment rate by place of birth for people between 20-65 years 
of age, 2016 (percent)
Source: Eurostat, ‘Unemployment rates by sex, age and country of birth (%) [lfsa_ur-
gacob]’ dataset. Note: the unemployment rate of the non-EU born population is not 
available for Bulgaria, Germany, Romania and Slovakia.
The integration into the labour force of immigrants who arrive 
as refugees or as family members might take decades. Dumont et al 
(2016) reports the employment rate of immigrants who arrived in the 
EU at different times, broken down according to the main reason for 
their immigration (work, study, family reunification, humanitarian) 
(Figure 37). Unfortunately, Figure 37 is not based on longitudinal data 
(following the same immigrants over time), but on data for immigrants 
with different durations of residence in the EU. Since immigrants 
arriving at different times might have different characteristics in terms 
of their qualifications, prior work experience or other factors and the 
integration policies of several EU countries have changed in the past 
decades, no firm conclusion can be drawn about how many years 
it takes for immigrants to reach the employment levels of natives. 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Gr
ee
ce
Sp
ai
n
Fi
nl
an
d
Be
lg
iu
m
Fr
an
ce
Sw
ed
en
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
Ita
ly
Po
rtu
ga
l
Cy
pr
us
Au
st
ria
Cr
oa
tia
De
nm
ar
k
Ne
th
er
la
nd
s
Sl
ov
en
ia
La
tv
ia
Po
la
nd
Es
to
ni
a
Ire
la
nd
Hu
ng
ar
y
Li
th
ua
ni
a
M
al
ta
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
Cz
ec
h 
Re
pu
bl
ic
Reporting country Other EU Non-EU
110 | BRUEGEL BLUEPRINT 28
Nevertheless, Figure 37 shows that more recently arrived refugees 
and family members have a rather low employment rate of about 30 
percent, while the employment rate of refugees and family members 
who arrived 20 years ago or even earlier is about 65 percent. Recently 
arrived immigrants who came to study have a low employment rate 
(since many of them are still at school), while former students who 
arrived more than five years ago have rather high employment rates, 
reflecting the high share of tertiary-educated in that group.
Figure 37: Employment rates of third-country immigrants by reason for 
immigration and years of residence in the EU, 15-64 years old, in 2014
Source: Dumont et al (2016), Figure 14, based on the 2014 EU labour force survey. 
Note: data is based on a one-time sample collected in 2014 and considers immigrants 
who arrived at different times. Data covers 25 EU countries and considers immigrants 
from non-EU countries.
A solution for the data problems associated with Figure 37 would be 
to track the employment rates of immigrants who arrived in a par-
ticular year for a particular reason (work, study, family reunification, 
humanitarian). European Commission (2016f) includes data by the 
year of arrival, but not by the reason for arrival (Figure 38). This figure 
has two main messages: 
• Employment rates of third-country immigrants in the EU tend to 
increase up to about 3-5 years following their arrival, after which 
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their employment rates remain broadly the same. This finding 
suggests that it takes time to integrate immigrants into the labour 
market, but those who are not integrated after about 5 years might 
face continuing diminished employment prospects. 
• More recently arrived third-country immigrants have lower employ-
ment rates than immigrants who arrived earlier. For example, the em-
ployment rate of immigrants who arrived in 2010-11 was 38 percent in 
2012, while for those who arrived in 2004-05 it was 50 percent in 2006 (in 
both cases we look at the employment rate at about 1-2 years after arriv-
al). The lower employment rates of more recently arrived third-country 
immigrants might be a consequence of their different characteristics 
(for example, a larger share of refugees among more recent immigrants), 
and also of the different economic situation in the EU: the EU’s unem-
ployment rate in 2006 was much lower than in 2012-14. 
Figure 38: Employment rates of third-country immigrants in the EU by year of 
arrival in the host country and years of residence
Source: European Commission (2016f ), Chart 5 in Chapter II.2, page 168. Note: 
Germany is excluded. 
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It is unfortunate that European Commission (2016f) does not 
provide employment data according to both the year of arrival and the 
reason for immigration.
5.2 Education
Education is a very important channel through which migrants can 
integrate into the society of their new home-countries. As Figure 39 
shows, the share of people with tertiary education is lowest for the 
native-born population, and thus immigrants help in achieving the 
Europe 2020 strategy’s target of increasing the proportion of people 
with tertiary education.
Figure 39: EU population (15-64) by educational attainment level and country 
of birth, 2016
 Source: Eurostat, ‘Population by educational attainment level, sex, age and country of 
birth (%)’, code: [edat_lfs_9912].
Figure 39 also shows that EU countries attract relatively higher propor-
tions of non-EU-born immigrants with low educational levels. Their share 
(38 percent) is well above the shares of low-educated people among the 
native-born and other EU-born populations (25 percent). Nevertheless, 
as noted in chapter 4, Jaumotte et al (2016) underline that immigration 
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of both high and low-skilled workers, despite being politically controver-
sial, brings benefits to destination countries by raising per-capita income 
through increased labour productivity and general living standards.
Figure 40: Self-declared over-qualified employees as a share of total employees, 2014
Source: Eurostat ‘Migration and labour market’ dataset, code: [lfso_14loq]. Note: Rest 
of EU countries omitted due to missing data.
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While the EU attracts a high proportion of skilled migrants, many 
migrants feel that they are over-qualified for their jobs – more so than 
native-born workers (Figure 40)17. The biggest gaps between migrants 
and natives in terms of perception of over-qualification are observed 
in Italy, Spain, Sweden and Austria, for both middle and high educa-
tion levels, while there are very few countries in which native-born 
workers are more likely to feel over-qualified compared to immigrants. 
It should be underlined that the perception of over-qualification is 
stronger within the group of people with tertiary education. This raises 
questions of the recognition of the qualifications of migrants in EU 
member states, and the efficient use of skills and qualifications within 
EU labour markets.
Information on early school leavers also sheds some light on the 
integration of migrants, helping to assess how early leaving can be 
reduced and which educational practices should be applied. The way 
the educational system is organised and the types of student-teacher 
relationships influence the number of early school leavers (Eivers, 
Ryan and Brinkley, 2000). 
Spain and Italy have the highest shares of early school leavers 
among foreign citizens at about 35 percent (Figure 41). But this share is 
also relatively high at about 20-25 percent considering non-EU citizens 
in Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Greece, Slovenia and Sweden. 
Of the EU countries shown in Figure 4118, only in the UK are non-EU 
nationals less likely than natives to leave the school system early, 
highlighting another aspect of successful integration of immigrants in 
the UK.
17 Unfortunately, this data is not available separately for first and second-generation 
migrants; the data covers first and second-generation migrants as a single 
category, and also does not separate migrants who arrived from another EU 
country from those who arrived from outside the EU.
18 Data on early school leaving by foreign citizens is not available for other EU 
countries.
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Figure 41: Share of 18-24 year olds who left education or training early, relative 
to the total population of the same age group by citizenship, 2015
Source: Eurostat, ‘Early leavers from education and training by sex and citizenship’ 
database, code: [edat_lfse_01]. Note: Early leavers from education and training denotes 
the percentage of the population aged 18 to 24 having attained at most lower second-
ary education and who are not involved in further education or training. Data for non-
EU citizens is missing for Ireland and Luxembourg, while data for other EU citizens is 
missing for Slovenia and Sweden.
Student performance in reading literacy by family origin is a crucial 
indicator for assessing the achievements of students with migrant back-
grounds. Figure 42 shows that  in most EU member states, second-genera-
tion migrant children perform better in reading literacy and mathematics 
than the first generation of students with an immigrant background, sug-
gesting significant progress with their integration. However, second-gen-
eration migrants reach, or even exceed, the level of reading literacy 
among native-born students only in Ireland, the UK, Portugal, Latvia and 
Hungary19, while in other EU countries even second-generation migrant 
students perform worse than native-born students. This result again 
19 The good results for youths with a migrant background in Hungary is likely ex-
plained by the immigration of Hungarian nationals from neighbouring countries 
with large Hungarian minorities, who are native Hungarian speakers.
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highlights the difficulties in properly integrating immigrants so that at 
least second-generation migrants attain results similar to those of natives 
– with the key exceptions of the five countries listed. As for mathemat-
ics, second-generation migrants perform better than natives in Canada, 
Australia, Hungary, Israel and Chile.
Figure 42: Student performance by family origin, 2015
Source: OECD PISA 2015 Database. 
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5.3 Income and poverty
In most EU countries, native citizens have higher income than non-na-
tive EU citizens, who in turn have higher income than non-EU citizens. 
Unfortunately, data is not available on incomes broken down by educa-
tion level, which is surely factor behind the low average income of non-EU 
citizens. As Figure 39 indicated, the share of low-educated people is 
much higher among the non-EU born citizens than among native-born 
or other-EU born citizens, and low-educated people tend to have lower 
incomes than better educated people. There are only two countries, the 
Czech Republic and the United Kingdom, in which non-EU citizens earn 
more than home citizens, which is likely explained by the low share of 
low-educated people among non-EU citizens living in these countries. 
While Figure 39   indicated that on average in EU countries, 38 percent on 
non-EU citizens have a low level of education, in the Czech Republic their 
share is only 14 percent, while in the UK it is 18 percent.
Figure 43: Mean equivalised net income (in purchasing power standard) by 
citizenship, 2015
Source: Eurostat, ‘Mean and median income by broad group of citizenship (population 
aged 18 and over)’ dataset, code: [ilc_di15]. Note: Romania omitted due to missing data. 
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The lower average income of non-EU citizens is also reflected 
in higher poverty rates. As argued by Darvas (2017a), the so-called 
‘severe material deprivation rate’ is the most suitable available poverty 
indicator in the EU. This indicator measures the share of people unable 
to afford at least four of nine items20. Figure 44 shows that non-EU 
citizens face a much higher severe material deprivation rate than 
home-country citizens or other EU citizens. 
But there are some exceptions, similarly to average incomes. For 
example, in the Czech Republic the severe material deprivation rate for 
non-EU citizens was 7.5 percent in 2015 and in the UK it was 8.2 percent, 
in contrast to the EU average of 17.9 percent (Figure 44). This is again in 
line with the different educational composition of non-EU citizens in the 
Czech Republic and the UK, compared to other EU countries.
Figure 44: Poverty: Severe material deprivation rate by citizenship in the EU, 
2009-2015
Source: Eurostat ‘Severe material deprivation rate by broad group of citizenship (popu-
lation aged 18 and over) [ilc_mddd15]’ dataset.
20 Rent, mortgage or utility bills; adequate home heating; a reserve against unex-
pected expenses; regular meat or proteins; a holiday; a television set; a washing 
machine; a car; and a telephone.
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There is another indicator that is frequently associated with ‘pov-
erty’: the so-called ‘at risk of poverty’ rate, which shows the share of 
people with a disposable income below 60 percent of the national 
median equivalised disposable income. However, as argued by 
Darvas (2017a), this indicator essentially measures income inequal-
ity, not poverty. 
Figure 45: Relationship between mean equivalised net income (purchasing 
power standard) and the at risk of poverty rate, 2014
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Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat’s ‘At-risk-of-poverty rate by broad group of citizen-
ship (population aged 18 and over) [ilc_li31]’ and ‘Mean and median income by broad 
group of citizenship (population aged 18 and over) [ilc_di15]’ datasets. Note: The three 
markers in each case represent three groups of people according to citizenship: re-
porting country (square), other EU (circle) and non-EU (triangle). For most countries, 
non-EU citizens have the lowest income and the highest at risk of poverty rate, while 
home country citizens have the highest income and the lowest at risk of poverty rate. 
Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Croatia are omitted because of missing data.
The theoretical arguments and the cross-country empirical evi-
dence in Darvas (2017a) can be augmented by within-country data for 
the three main groups of citizens: home, other-EU and non-EU (Figure 
45). There is a very strong negative correlation between the at-risk-of-
poverty rate and mean equalised net income for these three groups 
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in most countries. The at risk of poverty rate is lowest, and mean 
equalised income is highest, for native citizens. Other-EU citizens on 
average experience higher at-risk-of-poverty rates and lower income, 
and non-EU citizens have the highest at risk of poverty rates and the 
lowest mean income.  
Income and poverty are strongly liked to work intensity, because 
labour income is the main source of income for most people, espe-
cially immigrants. Non-EU citizens aged 19-59 are more likely than 
other groups to live in households with very low work intensity 
(Figure 46). This share is alarmingly high in Belgium (44.2 percent), 
the Netherlands (31.9 percent) and Finland (31.2 percent), suggesting 
ineffective integration, while the share is quite low in Malta (6.8 per-
cent), Poland (4.6 percent) and Luxembourg (7.9 percent). 
Figure 46: Share of people living in households with very low work intensity 
aged 18-59 by citizenship in the EU countries, 2015
Source: Eurostat ‘People living in households with very low work intensity by broad 
group of citizenship (population aged 18 to 59 years)’ dataset, code: [ilc_lvhl15]. Note: 
The work intensity of a household is the ratio of the total number of months that all 
working-age household members have worked during the income reference year and 
the total number of months the same household members theoretically could have 
worked in the same period.
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Work intensity is highest among the other-EU citizens group, that 
is, EU citizens moving to another EU country. This finding is consist-
ent with the EU mobility rules, with movements of people to other EU 
countries strongly linked to work.
Housing has a crucial role in the well-being of individuals and 
excessive housing costs can contribute to poverty. The share of people 
spending more than 40 percent of their disposable income on hous-
ing is higher for non-EU citizens than other groups in most countries 
(Figure 47). The rate for non-EU citizens is especially high in Greece, 
Spain, Belgium and Ireland. Not surprisingly, this rate is lowest for 
home-country citizens in most countries. 
Figure 47: Housing cost overburden by citizenship, EU countries, 2016
Source: Eurostat. ‘Housing cost overburden rate by age, sex and broad group of citizen-
ship (total population aged 18 and over)’ dataset, code [ilc_lvho25]. Note: the housing 
cost overburden rate is the percentage of the population living in households where 
the total housing costs (‘net’ of housing allowances) represent more than 40 percent of 
disposable income.
Tenure status in light of housing overburden costs, serves as an 
important indicator of individual well-being. Clearly, foreign citizens 
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are more likely than natives to be tenants (Figure 48), which is in line 
with the housing cost overburden rate observed for non-EU citi-
zens (Figure 47). It is important, however, to take into account other 
country-specific features when examining the tenure status of foreign 
citizens, which varies significantly in different EU countries.
Figure 48: Tenure status of foreign citizens aged 20-64 as a percentage of total 
population, 2015
Source: Eurostat, ‘Income and living conditions’ dataset, code: [ilc_lvps15].
5.4 Active citizenship
Even though the acquisition of citizenship of the host country is in 
itself neither necessary nor sufficient for successful integration, it can 
provide an important push for better integration. Among EU countries, 
Spain and the UK grant citizenship to – by far – the largest numbers of 
non-EU citizens, while Germany and the UK grant citizenship to the 
largest number of other-EU citizens (Figure 49). The five EU countries 
with the largest economies granted roughly 75 percent of all EU country 
citizenships granted in 2013. This is not surprising given the size of these 
countries, but seeking the citizenship of these countries might also have 
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been incentivised because the passports of these countries allow visa-
free access to more than 150 countries (Passport Index, 2017).
Figure 49: Acquisition of citizenship by EU and non-EU residents in the EU, 2013
Source: Eurostat ‘Acquisition and loss of citizenship’ dataset, code: [migr_acqn]. Note: 
the naturalisation rate is defined by Eurostat as the ratio between the number of per-
sons who acquired the citizenship of a country during a calendar year and the stock of 
foreign residents in the same country at the beginning of the year. 
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The rate of the acquisition of citizenship might also reflect national 
legislation and whether or not the process is simple. For example, 
Hungary introduced a special programme enabling Hungarian minor-
ities living in other EU countries (mostly Romania and Slovakia) to 
obtain Hungarian citizenship, which was likely a factor leading to the 
highest naturalisation rate for other-EU citizens (panel B of Figure 49). 
For non-EU citizens, Sweden and Ireland have high naturalisation 
rates compared to the larger economies of Germany, Italy and France 
(Figure 49, panel A), though in terms of absolute numbers, Germany, 
Italy and France grant more citizenships to non-EU citizens.
There are different ways to obtain citizenship. In many countries 
the criteria are based on minimum duration of prior legal stay in the 
country, work history and lack of a criminal record.
However, there has been a notable increase in the number of 
countries offering residency and citizenship programmes that involve 
financial investment on the part of prospective citizens. Countries 
operating these programmes typically issue temporary residency 
cards, which, after qualifying periods, can be converted into perma-
nent residency and even citizenship.
About half of the EU countries now offer such invest in citizenship 
programmes (Sumption and Hooper, 2014). Some countries such 
as the Netherlands, the US and Singapore, only allow the option of 
obtaining their passports as a second passport in cases of invest-
ment in the private sector,  while in other countries, such as Malta, 
applicants can give money directly to local governments in the form 
of non-refundable fees or low interest loans (Sumption and Hooper, 
2014). A temporary or permanent residency card allows foreigners 
to stay and work in certain countries or even get tax benefits, while a 
passport also allows travel visa-free to other countries.
Among European countries, Hungary and Greece ask for the 
smallest investments. Spain, Portugal and Bulgaria also have much 
lower thresholds than Cyprus and France (Table 7). Countries differ 
substantially in terms of the residency requirements and citizenship 
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qualifying periods. Cyprus provides citizenship to investor programme 
participants immediately, with no requirement in terms of the number 
of days an investor and his or her family members should spend in the 
country, meaning that no specific residency requirements are applied. 
This might justify the relatively high minimum investment threshold.
Table 7: Minimum investment requirements for residency or citizenship, 
selected countries
Country Minimum investment 
amount
Residency 
requirements
Citizenship 
qualifying period
Bulgaria €511,292 None 5 years
Cyprus €2 million None Immediate
France €10 million N.A. 5 years
Greece €250,000 None 7 years
Hungary €250,000 None 10 years
Portugal €500,000 7 days a year 6 years
Spain €500,000 None 10 years
UK £1 million 185 days a year 6 years
US $ 500,000 (targeted), 
US $ 1 million 
(elsewhere)
180 days a year 7 years
Source: Arton Capital (https://www.artoncapital.com/); Xu, El-Ashram and Gold (2015); 
Henley and Partners Holdings (https://www.henleyglobal.com/) and Passport Index (2017).
Demand for investment in citizenship programmes varies from 
country to country and depends on a wide range of economic, politi-
cal and social factors. In the US, for example, the US Citizenship and 
Immigration Service allows entrepreneurs and their families (with 
children being under 21) to qualify  for a permanent residency (green 
card), once the necessary investment has been made and 10 perma-
nent jobs have been created for US workers21. Table 8 compares num-
bers of US Immigrant Investor visas with the numbers of residence 
21  See https://www.uscis.gov/eb-5.  
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permits issued in the UK and Portugal, and provides some information 
on the number of application quotas in Hungary (for Hungary, there is 
a lack of precise information on how many investors actually made use 
of the investment immigration programme). 
Table 8: Applications to invest in citizenship programmes in selected countries, 
2013-15
Number of permits Percent of 
population
Country (type of permit 
obtained)
2013 2014 2015 2015
Hungary (application quotas) 1000 2000 1700 0.017%
Portugal (residence permits) 494 1526 766 0.007%
UK (residence permits) 1603 2995 708 0.001%
US (Immigrant Investor visas) 7312 9128 8773 0.003%
Sources: Bruegel based on Portuguese Immigration Service (SEF), UK government Tier 
1 (investor route), Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and U.S. Department of State, 
Bureau of Consular Affairs, ‘Table II Fiscal Years 2012-2016 Classes of Immigrants 
Issued Visas at Foreign Service Posts’, https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statis-
tics/AnnualReports/FY2016AnnualReport/FY16AnnualReport-TableII.pdf. 
Active citizenship also refers to how people get involved in the local 
communities they live in and, as a consequence, their involvement at 
national level. The term refers to civic and political participation and 
is concerned with the equal rights and responsibilities of migrants, 
serving as an indicator of a migrant’s level of integration.
A substantial number of studies on this topic distinguish between 
the experiences of young and adult migrants (Kroger, 2007; Mansouri 
and Kirpitchenko, 2016), as young people represent a considerable 
proportion of migrants to the European Union (Bhose, Lepola and 
Yared, 2015). Young migrants (under 25 years old) are more exposed 
to uncertainty in terms of establishment of new ties and social net-
works and are expected to be more influenced by societal structures. 
Therefore, many European programmes focus on young migrants in 
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particular, for example the Active Citizenship: Enhancing Political 
Participation of Migrant Youth (ACCESS) project, funded by European 
Commission. The main motivation for the project was to promote the 
political involvement of young citizens, based on young immigrants 
who are politically involved at local level being more likely to have 
a sense of European citizenship (Bhose, Lepola and Yared, 2015). In 
this sense, projects such as ACCESS encourage the active political 
involvement of young migrants, providing a possibility to influence 
policymaking.
Matiniello (2005) distinguishes two forms of political involvement: 
conventional and unconventional. The latter includes participation 
in protest, strikes and demonstrations, the power of which is hugely 
dependent on collective action, while the former refers to running for 
election or voting. Unfortunately, comprehensive data is not available 
on the political involvement of immigrants.
5.5 Migration integration index
Huddleston et al (2015) developed a comprehensive indicator, the 
Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), to measure and compare 
government policies to promote the integration of immigrants. The 
index is made up of 167 indicators to create a multi-dimensional pic-
ture of immigrants’ opportunities to participate in society. It is impor-
tant to note that the index measures policies, not outcomes.
Based on Huddleston et al (2015), Figure 50 compares major 
economies’ migrant integration scores in terms of health, permanent 
residence, education, access to nationality, family reunion, labour 
market mobility, anti-discrimination measures and political participa-
tion (MIPEX index). The labour market mobility score is intended to 
indicate whether migrants enjoy equal rights and free access to jobs. 
Huddleston et al (2015) emphasise the importance of this indicator, 
pointing out that most countries continue to invest in labour mobility 
reform. The family reunion, access to nationality and permanent resi-
dence indicators deal with the criteria that need to be met for migrants 
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to reunite with their families, obtain nationality or become a per-
manent resident of the host country. The education indicator covers 
access to education and whether the needs of migrants are addressed. 
The health score is an indicator of healthcare coverage and easiness of 
administrative procedures, among other factors. The political partici-
pation score captures indicators such as the rights of migrants to take 
part in elections and the political freedoms available to them. Lastly, 
the anti-discrimination score gives information on how well protected 
immigrants are against racial or religious discrimination.
Overall, the EU scores rather poorly compared to Canada, Australia 
and the United States, especially in education (Figure 50). Canada 
leads on the anti-discrimination, labour market mobility, family reun-
ion and permanent residence indicators. The EU scores relatively high 
only on permanent residence, which reflects the development of ini-
tiatives such as invest in citizenship programmes in most EU member 
states. However, Figure 50 also shows that major improvements are 
needed in the EU in all other policy areas, in line with the findings of 
Huddleston et al (2015). 
Figure 50: Migrant integration policy scores, global comparison, 2015 
Source: Huddleston et al (2015), Migrant Integration Policy Index.
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Figure 51: Migrant integration policy scores by country, 2015
Source: Huddleston et al (2015). 
Figure 51 shows migrant integration scores for countries. The lead-
ers in Europe on the basis of their overall scores are Sweden, Portugal 
and Finland. Sweden’s labour market indicator score is the world’s 
highest and Sweden is second ranked worldwide after Australia for the 
education indicator. Figure 51 suggests great diversity within the EU, 
with central and eastern European countries ranking relatively poorly.
We note however that the Migrant Integration Policy Index, which 
primarily measures policies, sometimes contradicts the output-based 
indicators we considered earlier in this chapter. For example, Belgium 
ranks fairly high on the Migrant Integration Policy Index (fourth 
among EU countries), while Belgian immigrant results in terms of their 
labour force participation, staying on in education and other educa-
tional scores were very weak. The overall Belgian Migrant Integration 
Policy Index score is pushed up by good scores in the permanent 
residence, access to nationality and anti-discrimination categories, but 
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Belgium scores quite low on its health and education policies22.
The integration of migrants and refugees is affected by societal atti-
tudes and cultural identity in host countries, with favourable attitudes 
being shown towards to others that share cultural characteristics. The 
implications of this cultural affinity bias (Espenshade and Hempstead, 
1996) range from the decisions to grant citizenship to immigrants 
(Aalberg et al, 2011) to the integration of second and third-generation 
migrants in society (Thomson and Crul, 2017). While one would expect 
that socio-economic differences between migrants and non-migrants 
would disappear over generations, second-generation migrants still 
experience forms of racism (Hirsch, 2017) and have lower expectations 
of finding a job compared to non-migrants, which cannot be explained 
by their socio-economic status (Verhaeghe et al, 2016). Institutional 
differences, in educational systems for example, help explain differ-
ences in integration of second-generation immigrants in different 
European countries (Cruel and Vermeulen, 2003). 
Success in integrating migrants is, to some extent, related to coun-
tries’ historical experiences with migration and/or previous colonial 
links. While countries such as France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the UK have long histories of immigration and experience 
with social integration, Greece, Italy and Spain only became desti-
nation countries during the late 1990s and have only comparatively 
recently implemented integration policies. A national identity strongly 
22 On education, Huddleston et al (2015) comment that current general and targeted 
education policies are not enough to guarantee equal opportunities for immi-
grant pupils, who are concentrated in socially disadvantaged schools. The Belgian 
school systems (both in the Flemish and Walloon communities) have been very 
slowly adapting to the learning needs of their many immigrant pupils. Huddleston 
et al (2015) also point out that vast majority of immigrant pupils with low-educated 
mothers are concentrated in disadvantaged schools, much more than non-immi-
grants with low-educated mothers. In Belgium, foreign-born pupils with low-ed-
ucated mothers are twice as likely to be maths low-achievers (51 percent) than 
non-immigrants with low-educated mothers (25 percent). This gap is cut in half 
from one generation to the next (38 percent for second-generation immigrants 
with low-educated mothers), but is still very large.
132 | BRUEGEL BLUEPRINT 28
linked to religion also affects the degree of tolerance and integration in 
Greece, Italy and Spain (King and Lulle, 2016; Triandafyllidou, 2012). 
Nonetheless, France is often described as an assimilationist coun-
try, whereas Germany and the United Kingdom take what is called a 
multicultural approach. Whether integration policies are multicultur-
alist or assimilationist can be described by the national conceptions of 
identity (Medrano and Koenig, 2005; Choquet, 2017). 
Dumont et al (2016) presents several proposals for better integrat-
ing migrants. Recommendations include providing swift activation 
and integration services to migrants that are likely to receive approval 
for their stay, facilitating labour market access and promoting equal 
access to integration services. The report points out that the needs of 
refugees are significantly diverse, requiring diversity and flexibility of 
responses.
6 Financial inclusion of 
refugees
Financial inclusion is a crucial aspect of integration. In a financially 
advanced area like the European Union, it is essential to be able to 
receive transfers from the government or an employer, pay invoices 
electronically, keep savings safe or use a card for various transactions. 
Financial inclusion of labour migrants and foreign students is rela-
tively straightforward because of their granted residency rights and 
because they possess proper identification documents. However, the 
financial inclusion of asylum seekers and refugees poses major chal-
lenges until they reach a sufficient level of settlement, such as having a 
job and a relatively long-duration residency permit.
According to Hansen (2016), refugees have very different financial 
needs depending on the displacement-to-integration process, which is 
divided into four phases: 
1. Arrival: survival cash for immediate food and housing needs; 
2. Initial displacement: savings, remittances and paying for immedi-
ate service needs such as school fees or furniture; 
3. Stable/protracted displacement: broader options for savings be-
yond bank deposits, micro-consumer credit, small business loans, 
health insurance; 
4. Permanent settlement: financial services needs start to resem-
ble those of the host population, such as access to credit, pension 
schemes, business loans, remittance and payment accounts, etc.
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Refugees, especially in developed countries, face hurdles because 
many administrative procedures require a bank account in order to 
pay for various social services, rent accommodation and/or access 
educational services. Setting up a bank account is one of the first steps 
towards integration. However, a large majority of newly-arrived refuges 
do not have a valid identity document, which makes it extremely hard 
for the private sector to serve refugees according to a set procedure. 
A key concern from the perspective of financial institutions is money 
laundering. 
The literature suggests that once migrants reach phases 3 and 
4 in the integration process, their financial inclusion or not does 
not depend on cultural factors (eg distrust of banks), but rather on 
family income, language barriers and limited access to information 
(Hirschler, 2009). A key aspect in the financial inclusion of migrants is 
the sending and receiving of remittances. Fast and reliable electronic 
remittances offer the best opportunities in this regard.
6.1 Barriers and initiatives
There are contra¬dictory forces at work in relation to financial regula-
tion and finan¬cial inclusion. The continuing tightening of financial 
regulation and oversight of the financial sector (which is important 
in the fight against money-laundering and terrorist financing) works 
against the eco¬nomic integration of refugees. 
‘Know your customer’ regulations as a barrier to financial inclusion
Financial regulations, which specify the due diligence processes 
financial institutions must carry out before they provide financial 
services to customers, are generally called ‘know your customer’ 
(KYC) regulations. Such regulations are adopted worldwide, often to 
serve anti-money-laundering goals. In the EU, the 2015 Anti-Money-
Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) 
Directive ((EU) 2015/849) provides a framework for the prevention of 
the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering 
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or terrorist financing. The directive instructs member states to coordi-
nate and harmonise their AML laws. Each member state is required to 
take “appropriate” steps to identify, assess, understand and mitigate 
the risks of money laundering.
The possibility that AML/CFT requirements might hinder access 
to financial inclusion has been under discussion for several years. 
For instance, a 2008 World Bank report (Bester et al, 2008) states 
that “the pursuit of financial inclusion and the pursuit of an effective 
AML/CFT regime are complementary and not conflicting financial 
sector policy objectives”. Moreover, Bester et al (2008) point out that 
“without a sufficient measure of financial inclusion, a country‘s AML/
CFT system will thus safeguard the integrity of only a part of its finan-
cial system – the formally registered part – leaving the informal and 
unregistered components vulnerable to abuse. Measures that ensure 
that more clients use formal financial services therefore increase the 
reach and effectiveness of the AML/CFT controls”. A 2009 report by the 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP, Isern and De Koker, 
2009) states that “AML/CFT measures can negatively affect access 
to, and use of, financial services. If those measures are not carefully 
revised the inappropriate implementation of these standards—espe-
cially in emerging markets—plays a role in excluding millions of 
low-income people from formal financial services”.
There is potentially a set of direct and indirect, formal and infor-
mal barriers to financial inclusion. As Hansen (2015) points out, 
“even with a UNHCR refugee registration card, local officials and 
employers might not recognise the paperwork as valid or sufficient for 
access to formal employment or social benefits.”  
In order to overcome the current barriers to financial inclusion 
faced by refugees and other migrants, Lewis et al (2017) points to 
three actions: to adapt the delivery of financial services to the needs of 
specific groups through, for example, staff who speak their languages; 
to advance financial inclusion among young refugees and migrants; 
and to encourage digital ID schemes (Lewis et al, 2017). Hansen (2015) 
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elaborates a six-step strategy for financial service providers: conduct a 
scoping study, create a strategic plan, make contract, segment potential 
clients, adjust eligibility and appraisal criteria, and conduct a pilot test.
Additionally, there is evidence of some countries adopting 
systems with flexible account opening requirements and applying 
what can be called ‘tiered’ know your customer practices. Mexico, 
for instance, approved a four-tiered scheme for opening deposit 
accounts in August 2011, under which low-value and low-risk 
accounts benefit from eased standards. An assessment made two 
years later concluded that as a result of the measure, 9.1 million 
accounts were opened, 50 percent of which came under the lowest 
tier of regulation23. In 2013, a three-tiered KYC system was imple-
mented in Nigeria. In this case too, the restrictions implemented 
increase with the amounts transacted or deposited. The Central Bank 
of Nigeria expressed its aim of deepening financial inclusion when 
the tiered system was introduced24.
European initiatives to foster financial inclusion
A number of European initiatives have been taken to counteract 
problems related to the financial inclusion of refugees. In 2015, the 
European Parliament’s Employment and Social Affairs Committee 
recommended that financial services providers supported by the 
European Progress Microfinance Facility should “view refugees and 
asylum seekers as a target group.” In 2014, the EU published a law 
requiring banks to offer basic accounts to all legally resident cus-
tomers, including asylum seekers and refugees. The law included in 
its scope “people seeking asylum under the Geneva Convention of 28 
23 For a review of the Mexican case see a blogpost by the Consultative Group for 
Assisting the Poor (CGAP) at http://www.cgap.org/blog/bold-move-toward-sim-
plifying-amlcft-lessons-mexico. 
24 See https://www.cbn.gov.ng/out/2013/ccd/3%20tiered%20kyc%20requirements.
pdf. 
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July 1951 Relating to the Status of Refugees, the Protocol thereto of 31 
January 1967 and other relevant international treaties”25.
Similarly, there have been initiatives by EU member states to foster 
the financial inclusion of refugees. 
Germany, for example, reduced KYC requirements to allow finan-
cial services providers to serve new migrants and refugees. In 2015, the 
BaFin (the German federal financial supervisor) adopted transitional 
provisions to allow refugees to open basic accounts even if they were 
unable to comply with standard German KYC requirements. Refugees 
can instead use a document certified by the German immigration 
authority containing personal details (name, place and date of birth, 
nationality and address, photograph), as documentation to open such 
an account. 
Subsequently, on 5 July 2016, Germany adopted a regulation26 to 
determine the documents to verify identity for the purposes of creat-
ing a payments account in accordance with the German anti-money 
laundering law and the EU directive. According to German federal law, 
an asylum seeker who is not in possession of documents specified in 
the European Anti-Money Laundering Directive can present a proof 
of arrival in accordance with § 63a of the Asylum Act, which says that 
“a foreigner who has applied for asylum and who has been treated 
according to the provisions of the Asylum Act or the Residence Act but 
who has not yet applied for asylum shall immediately be issued with an 
asylum seeker certificate (proof of arrival)” (our unofficial translation 
from German). This section of the Asylum Act further specifies the 
information included in this document: a list of 21 items of personal 
25 Directive 2015/92/EU, paragraph 35.
26 Annex I mentions the following “non-exhaustive list of risk variables that obliged 
entities shall consider when determining to what extent to apply due diligence 
measures”: (i) the purpose of an account or relationship; (ii) the level of assets to 
be deposited by a customer or the size of transactions undertaken; (iii) the regular-
ity or duration of the business relationship.
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information27. Each document has a unique barcode pertaining to an 
individual.
The Belgian Financial Sector Federation (FEBELFIN) has also set 
up basic banking services for asylum seekers and refugees28. By law, 
each Belgian credit institution is obliged to offer these services to 
any consumer, though access is still conditional on verification of 
identity. The required data provided by means of written evidence 
are family name, first name, place and date of birth. Address require-
ments are less stringent for “officially recognised refugees”, who may 
indicate a temporary residence. To check the identities of asylum 
seekers or refugees, banks verify identity certificates provided by 
the Belgian authorities. Other documents are also accepted, such as 
proof of application for asylum.
Digital identity, based on information publicly available on 
the internet, can be a way of supporting financial inclusion of the 
unbanked. There have been some applications designing alternative 
ways of identifying possible clients through collection of digital data 
from various platforms, such as social media. For such approaches to 
have a real impact on financial inclusion, this type of identification 
would have to be recognised in financial regulation. However, at the 
time of writing, digital identity solutions are in a development phase 
and it is difficult to foresee their future potential.
Assessing the KYC regulations – the PwC report
In January 2016, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) published a compre-
hensive survey of existing KYC regulations across the world. From that 
report, we extracted information on EU countries’ high-level require-
ments for verification of customer identification information (question 
27 https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_asylvfg/englisch_asylvfg.htm-
l#p0538, accessed 12 December 2017.
28 Basic banking services include paying/withdrawing cash money into/from a pay-
ment account, and making deposits/transfers/withdrawals, including direct debit, 
and payments by means of an instrument such a payment card.
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9 of the survey). Name and place of birth are common requirements 
to every member state. However, there are differences in terms of the 
documents that may be accepted as evidence (Table 9).
Table 9: National KYC regulations: customer identification requirements in the EU
A) Information required
Full 
name
Date and 
place of birth
Nationality/
citizenship Address Signature
Social security 
number Profession
AT
BE
HR
CY
CZ
DK
EE
FI
FR
DE
EL
HU
IE
IT
LV
LU
MT
NL
PL
PT
RO
SK
SI
ES
SE
UK
Information required Not mentioned as required
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B) Documents accepted as evidence
Source: Bruegel based on PwC (2016).
Passport
Identity 
card
Driving 
license
Proof of 
address* Other*
AT
BE
HR Name of issuing identity 
CY Profession
CZ
DK Tax returns are also accepted as evidence
EE Face to face recognition
FI
For foreign citizens: citizenship/passport 
number
FR Profession, revenues
DE Residence permit
EL Profession 
HU Valid residence permit for foreign nationals
IE
IT
LV
LU
MT
NL Travel documents for refugees
PL
PT
RO Telephone number 
SK
SI
"Supporting evidence needs to be included", 
which exactly is not stated
ES Permission of impeachment sent by the MoJ
SE
UK
Or a government/judicial-authority issued 
document with full name and either 
residential address or date of birth
Signals documents that can be provided alternatively Not mentioned as accepted
* eg utility bill, residence permit, correspondence with local or central authorities
141 | PEOPLE ON THE MOVE: MIGRATION AND MOBILITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
The Netherlands is the only jurisdiction that accepts refugees’ 
travel documents as valid documentation. A valid residence permit 
for foreign nationals is explicitly mentioned in Hungary, Germany and 
Luxembourg. In some EU countries (Cyprus, Portugal, Greece and 
France), information about the profession should also be disclosed. 
It should also be noted that question 12 of the survey asks “in what 
circumstances are reduced/simplified due diligence arrangements avail-
able?” None of the 26 EU countries covered by the survey (Lithuania 
and Bulgaria are missing) made any direct or indirect reference to 
migrants, asylum seekers or refugees. 
6.2 Bruegel survey of financial institutions 
In order to shed light on banks’ attitudes towards the financial inte-
gration of refugees, and their assessments of whether KYC regulations 
negatively impact the ability of financial institutions in Europe to offer 
basic and more advanced financial services to refugees, we conducted 
a survey of financial institutions.
We received 14 responses from financial institutions in nine 
European countries: Austria, Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Spain and Sweden. In addition, the banking associations 
UK Finance and Finance Norway provided valuable input. While our 
respondents are not a representative sample in a statistical sense, 
it is reassuring that we received responses from countries that have 
received a very large share of the refugees that have entered Europe 
and also from countries with fewer refugees. Moreover, half the 
respondents have refugee clients and half do not, enabling us to assess 
the responses accordingly.
The survey included 15 questions. Most of the questions were either 
yes/no or numerical choice questions, but there were also some open-
ended questions.
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Part 1: Regulatory environment
There is a rather diverse experience with the issuance of national regu-
latory/supervisory authority guidelines for refugee financial inclusion 
in EU countries (Table 10). Authorities in Austria, Cyprus, Germany 
and Luxembourg have issued such guidelines, but those in Estonia, 
Italy, Spain and Sweden have not. For Greece, the two banks in our 
sample gave opposite answers. Differences were also apparent in 
relation to a number of other issues, indicating that EU directives are 
implemented differently in various EU member states. 
Table 10: National regulatory/supervisory authority guidelines on financial 
inclusion of refugees
Country Guideline issued
Austria Yes
Cyprus Yes
Estonia No
Germany Yes
Greece Yes/No
Italy No
Luxembourg Yes
Spain No
Sweden No
Source: Bruegel. Note: the following question was asked: Q1 Has your national regulato-
ry/supervisory authority issued guidelines regarding the offering of financial services to 
refugees in recent years? The two Greek banks surveyed by us gave opposite answers.
Figure 52 shows that none of the banks in our survey consider that KYC 
regulations are either somewhat loose or too loose. Instead, 46 percent 
of banks say KYC regulations strike the right balance between the need 
to offer financial services to refugees and the anti-money-laundering/
counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) goals, while 54 percent assess KYC 
regulations to be restrictive. There is a notable difference between banks 
that have refugee clients and banks that do not have refugee clients:
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• Banks with refugee clients were split equally between finding the 
AML/CFT rules ‘overly restrictive’, ‘somewhat restrictive’ and ‘the 
balance is about right’ in relation to offering financial services to 
refugees;
• None of the banks that do not have refugee clients found KYC reg-
ulations to be overly restrictive, and slightly more than half of these 
banks said the balance is about right. 
Figure 52: Restrictiveness of the ‘know your customer’ (KYC) regulations 
(percent of responses)
Source: Bruegel. Note: The following question was asked: Q2 In your opinion, or that of 
your institution, do the ‘know your customer’ (KYC) regulations of your country strike 
the right balance between the need for offering financial services to refugees and the 
anti-money-laundering (AML)/counter-terrorist financing (CFT) goals? Please select 
your answer from the options below: 1. KYC regulations are overly restrictive and se-
verely limit financial inclusion of refugees; 2. KYC regulations are somewhat restrictive 
and somewhat limit financial inclusion of refugees; 3. The balance is about right; 4. 
KYC regulations are somewhat loose and allow offering financial services to customers 
with above average risk of money-laundering or terrorist financing; 5. KYC regulations 
are too loose and allow offering financial services to customers with high risk of mon-
ey-laundering or terrorist financing.
Therefore, banks that have refugee clients tend to view KYC regu-
lations as being more restrictive than banks that do not have refugee 
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clients. We cannot exclude the hypothesis that this difference in the 
responses is related to actual experience: banks that actually deal 
with refugees might have learned that financial inclusion of refugees 
is a difficult process and KYC regulations are sometimes restrictive 
in this regard. Unfortunately, we cannot test this hypothesis from our 
survey results.
We asked an open-ended question about what changes to KYC 
regulations would be desirable29. Not surprisingly, none of the banks 
that assessed the balance between the need to offer financial services 
to refugees and the AML/CFT goals as about right (Figure 52) made 
suggestions. But most banks that assessed the regulation as either 
overly restrictive or somewhat restrictive made proposals, which we 
categorise under three main headings:
•  Identification: many banks said there were problems around the 
identification of refugees. 
 – For example, in a country receiving many refugees, the immigra-
tion authority confiscates the refugees’ identity documents and a 
very time-consuming and difficult process has been established in 
which the refugees bring copies of their identification documents 
to the financial institutions, which must then phone the immigra-
tion authority to verify the person’s refugee status and the validity 
of the copies of the identity documents. Such procedures make the 
financial inclusion of refugees burdensome and time-consuming, 
and increase the risk of identity fraud and of refugees being used 
for money laundering or terrorist finance purposes.
 – The banking institutions should have guidance and efficient tools 
to enable them to assess the validity of the documentation provid-
ed to refugees to confirm their status.
29 The following question was asked: Q3 What changes to the ‘know your customer’ 
(KYC) regulations would you welcome in order to foster financial inclusion of refu-
gees?
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 – Two related suggestions were made to simplify the process of 
identification: 
i. 1. The creation of a central pan-European registry of refugees, to 
which EU financial institutions would have online access.  
The registry should include all basic information about each 
individual: their parents’ names, place and date of birth, the sta-
tus of the application for granting a residence permit, indicate if 
identification documents have been stolen, and related infor-
mation.
ii. 2. A European ID issued to each refugee would facilitate iden-
tification; the ID should include the refugee’s key identification 
information.
•  Guidelines: Issuance of guidelines about financial inclusion of 
refugees in those countries in which the national authorities have 
not yet done so (Table 10).
•  Consistency with other regulations: Specific guidance should be 
given on how the provisions of the Payment Accounts Directive 
should be interpreted in line with the risk-based approach set out 
in AML/CTF legal framework.
Part 2: Refugees as clients
Of the 14 banks we surveyed, seven have refugee clients. Of those banks 
that do not have refugee clients, two do not deal with private customers, 
while the others either said that refugees had not approached them, or 
refugees had approached them but did not meet the criteria for an offer 
of services to be made. 
Banks in our sample were not very active in attracting refugee cli-
ents (Figure 53). Unsurprisingly, banks without refugee clients did not 
take any steps to attract refugees. Slightly more than half of the banks 
with refugee clients have not taken such steps either. 
The relatively low level of activity in attracting refugees might be 
related to the weak business prospect that refugees might offer. Almost 
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one-third of banks (both those banks that have and that do not have 
refugee clients) responded that offering financial services to refugees 
is not interesting at all, while most other banks have only little interest 
or some interest (Figure 54). 
Figure 53: Active steps to attract refugee clients (% of responses)
Source: Bruegel. Note: the following question was asked: Q5.1 Did your institution 
make active steps to approach refugee clients (for instance, visiting refugee settlement 
centres, printing flyers and brochures)?
The bulk of responding banks see no competitive advantage in 
serving refugees30. A few banks argued that their perceived advantage 
relates to their network, or to certain legal provisions that create an 
advantage for some but not all banks.
Slightly more than half of the banks with refugee clients have spe-
cific products for refugees (Figure 55). The typical specific product for 
asylum seekers and persons who have been granted refugee status is 
30 The following question was asked: Q7 Does your institution have a competitive 
advantage in serving more refugees?
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a special free of charge account for a certain period, possibly with lim-
ited transactional functions and a debit card. Persons who are granted 
refugee status can apply for all the deposit products offered by the 
bank, in line with each product’s acceptance criteria.
Figure 54: Refugees as potential clients for financial institutions (% of 
responses)
Source: Bruegel. Note: the following question was asked: Q6 On a scale from 1 to 5, 
how interesting is the offering of financial services to refugees as a business prospect 
for your institution?
The typical products that refugees can access are bank accounts, inter-
national transfers, e-banking, various savings products and debit cards. 
However, none of the banks offer any specific credit or loan facility to 
refugees, and consequently none have any specific programmes or loans 
for refugees who want to set up a small business31. Banks consider offering 
loans only after they have a sufficiently long-established relationship, with 
appropriate transactional behaviour, and only if the refugee receives a 
31 The following two questions were asked in these regards: Q10 At what point in 
your relationship with refugee clients would you consider offering certain credits to 
refugees? Q11 Are there any specific programs or loans for refugees wanting to set up 
small businesses?
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residence permit in the country in question. Under such circumstances, 
refugees can apply for loans under the same conditions as any other 
customer. 
Figure 55: Specific financial products for refugees (percent of responses)
Source: Bruegel. Note: the following question was asked: Q8 Does your institution have 
specific financial products for refugees?
The types of identification document accepted are typically dif-
ferent for asylum seekers and those granted refugee status32. Asylum 
seekers need a valid asylum certificate and proof of residence regis-
tration, while refugees who have been granted refugee status need to 
present a valid residence permit recognising their refugee status and a 
valid identification document, similarly to other customers. 
In terms of support for staff in dealing with refugees, only four 
32 The following question was asked: Q12 What identification documents do you accept 
from prospective refugee clients?
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banks provide relevant guidance or training33. These measures include:
• A branch with employees with knowledge of Arabic (only one bank);
• Internal written guidelines regarding accepting refugees as clients 
and on-going due diligence (more banks); 
• Various training courses (more banks).
Part 3: New initiatives to foster financial inclusion
In the last part of the survey, we asked about possible private-sector 
initiatives and public-private partnerships that might address the 
challenges faced by refugees to foster financial inclusion34. The key 
proposals are the following.
Private-sector initiatives:
• Offer micro-credit and other specific products that refugees need to 
be able to get started, to support self-employed persons, to contrib-
ute to job creation and to facilitate social integration.
• Employ refugees in the short-term, thereby helping them to obtain 
their first work experience in the host country. Financial institu-
tions could take the lead.
• Help refugees to obtain mobile phones and access to the internet. 
This could make it much easier to gather and share information, 
deliver services such as mobile cash and mobile banking. Phone 
companies could be especially helpful in this initiative.
• Foster the private sector’s commitment to prevent the risk of ex-
ploitation at work.
33 The following question was asked: Q13 Do you provide any guidance/training 
to your staff in order to effectively communicate with refugees who are prospective 
clients? (eg language)
34 The following questions were asked: Q14 What private sector initiatives could 
address the challenges faced by refugees to foster financial inclusion? Q15 What 
public-private partnerships could address the challenges faced by refugees to foster 
financial inclusion?
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Public-private partnerships:
• Hold consultations between banks and regulators on how to tackle 
the challenges faced by refugees and foster their financial inclu-
sion. The dialogue should include the financial intelligence unit of 
the country, in order to better consider the right balance between 
the need for financial inclusion of refugees and the KYC regulations 
in line with the AML/CTF goals.
• Establish common and robust routines that all financial institutions 
could apply in relation to refugees, which would ensure sufficient 
KYC checks, fair treatment of the customer and elimination of the 
risk of discrimination. Common routines would also reduce the 
risk of the institution being deemed non-compliant.
• A joint initiative by banks and supervisory authorities to mitigate 
the inherent risks arising from individuals from high-risk jurisdic-
tions, and to provide such individuals with access to a single ac-
count in the country of residence with limited use (eg with limita-
tions imposed on permitted transactions and amount thresholds).
• Set-up of a national central registry of refugees. The private sector 
could support the design of its rules for development and mainte-
nance. The registry could serve as a reliable source for the verifi-
cation of the refugees’ data and be the basis of a pan-European 
registry.
• Provide training by private/public schools or professional train-
ing organisations, including in languages and financial literacy. A 
public-private partnership could also finance booklets with typical 
financial words, partly to support the training efforts.
• Promote social inclusion through working activities, vocational 
training and cultural exchange by public-private partnerships, with 
assistance from social cooperatives, social enterprises and associa-
tions. These initiatives could help refugees even in terms of finan-
cial inclusion.
7 Policy implications for the EU
As we noted in the introductory chapter of this Blueprint, net immi-
gration has become a more important source of population increase 
than natural change in the EU since the early 1990s, while in 2015 and 
2016 there was even a natural decline in the EU and thus immigration 
was the sole source of population increase. In this sense, Europe has 
become an immigration area. Opinions might differ over whether 
allowing immigration was a deliberate policy choice or somewhat 
accidental. Pro-immigration policies might be put in place for eco-
nomic reasons, such as attracting the brightest talents and filling 
labour market gaps, or for political reasons, such as allowing some 
immigration from former colonies of European powers. But allowing 
immigration might have been somewhat forced by circumstances on 
EU countries too, given the difficulties of protecting the EU’s southern 
and eastern borders and the devastating recent conflicts in the EU’s 
neighbourhood, which have led to human flight from these conflict 
zones. Whatever the reasons were, the continuously growing presence 
of people with immigrant backgrounds, including the recent large 
wave of asylum seekers, pose major policy challenges for the EU and 
its member states.
We have highlighted that the reception, admission and integration 
of immigrants from outside the EU, including asylum seekers, does 
not always work properly in many EU countries. There are also many 
differences between EU countries in how they deal with and integrate 
foreigners, even though most Europeans favour a common migration 
policy. Almost 90 percent of European citizens call for more effective 
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measures to fight illegal immigration from outside the EU, which again 
highlights the need for further action.
Intra-EU mobility seems to be less of a problem from the perspec-
tive of host countries, despite the recent heightened debate about 
posted workers. There is a rather high and even increasing level of 
support for intra-EU mobility, and the emerging labour shortages in 
the main destination countries highlight the urgent need for addi-
tional labour. However, emigration from central and eastern European 
countries has been a major important reason for record-high labour 
shortages in these countries, which might hinder their economic 
development.
The purpose of this chapter is to draw out policy conclusions 
from our work. We start by summarising recent policy measures and 
debates and then offer twelve recommendations.
7.1 Measures taken to manage the refugee crisis
Arguably, the most visible immigration challenge in recent years has 
been the refugee crisis. Bringing peace to conflict zones would be the 
ultimate solution to the refugee crisis, but that’s largely outside the 
control of European nations. But the EU and its member states have 
adopted various measures to:
• Help neighbouring countries like Turkey cope with large inflows of 
refugees;
• Build partnerships with North African countries to limit illegal 
immigration and smuggling of migrants; 
• Improve the protection of EU borders, including the Mediterranean 
coast; and 
• Improve reception and integration of refugees and migrants in the 
EU.  
We review each of these in turn. 
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External actions to build partnerships with neighbouring countries and to protect 
the EU borders
The Syrian conflict and the subsequent refugee crisis is the world’s 
largest humanitarian crisis since the second world war. By September 
2017, 3.1 million Syrian refugees had fled to Turkey35. The Turkish 
government provided support to refugees, creating a $6 billion fiscal 
burden from 2011 to 2015. In 2015, Turkey asked for funding from 
other countries. In November 2015, the EU set up the EU-Turkey Joint 
Action Plan and agreed to provide €3 billion to Turkey for humani-
tarian assistance during the 2016-17 period in the framework of the 
Facility for Refugees in Turkey36. The priority areas to which funds are 
allocated are: humanitarian assistance, migration management, edu-
cation, health, municipal infrastructure and socio-economic support. 
The budget is made up of €1 billion from the EU budget and €2 billion 
in additional funding from the member states. These member states’ 
contributions are made to the EU budget and classified as external 
assigned revenue. Of the €1 billion from the EU budget, €250 million 
was mobilised in 2016, leaving €750 million aside for 2017. Member 
states contributed €630 million euros in 2016 (European Commission, 
2017). Funds from the Facility are partly channelled to the Emergency 
Social Safety Net (€348 million), which is intended to provide regular 
cash allocations to up to one million of the most vulnerable refugees in 
Turkey. Beyond the support provided to Turkey, the European Union 
has also mobilised several other financial instruments to manage 
migration flows and to assist third countries (Box 3).
The EU has adopted various other measures, in addition to finan-
cial facilities. The Migration Partnership Framework37 was introduced 
35 http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php, accessed 22nd September 2017.
36 Commission Decision C(2016) 60/03 of 10.02.2016 on the Facility for Refugees in 
Turkey amending Commission Decision C(2015) 9500 of 24 November 2015.
37 https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/factsheet_partnership_framework_on_mi-
gration.pdf.
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in June 2016 and is aimed at working closely with third countries to 
fight smugglers’ networks and support political, social and economic 
development in third countries. Actions include border manage-
ment, enhancing local security forces through Common Security and 
Defence Policy missions and operations and through the involve-
ment of other agencies (European Border and Coast Guard Agency, 
EUROPOL). These actions have been implemented in priority coun-
tries such as Ethiopia, Mali, Nigeria, Niger and Senegal. North (Egypt, 
Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan and Lebanon) and West African countries 
(Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana) have also been covered 
more recently, by measures such as the European External Investment 
Plan. In Asia, cooperation has been made with countries such as 
Bangladesh, Pakistan and Afghanistan. In its Fifth Progress Report, 
published in September 2016 (COM(2017) 471 final), the European 
Commission identified as major weaknesses the stalled formal coop-
eration with some countries on readmission and the need to increase 
internal coordination. As for priorities, it points to managing migration 
along the Central Mediterranean route; enhancing domestic border 
control and anti-smuggling and migration management capabilities 
in countries of origin and transit; regionalising CSDP missions; swift 
implementation of existing projects in Southern Libya and Niger to 
foster socio-economic resilience; efforts to stem irregular migration 
by strong policies to protect human rights and ensure dignified living 
conditions for migrants in countries of transit and work with the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on resettlement.
Box 3: EU funds for migration, asylum and integration policies
Most of the EU funds related to migration policies have been allocated 
under the Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF). Immigration and 
asylum policy falls under Heading 3 of the MFF. Under this Heading are the 
Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (€3.31 billion for 2014-20) and the 
Internal Security Fund (€3.8 billion for 2014-20). The Asylum, Migration 
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and Integration Fund is intended “to promote the efficient management of 
migration flows and the implementation, strengthening and development 
of a common Union approach to asylum and immigration”, with 88 percent 
of the funding under shared management and 12 percent under direct man-
agement, to be divided between EU actions and emergency assistance38. 
The Internal Security Fund is aimed at promoting the implementation of the 
EU Internal Security Strategy, police cooperation and the management of the 
EU’s external borders.  
The EU budget has various flexibility mechanisms that fund clearly 
identified and previously unanticipated expenses which exceed the 
expenditure ceilings set out in the MFF. The mid-term revision of the MFF 
allowed for existing resources from the remaining headings of the EU budget 
to be reallocated to migration, when needed. It established that “margins 
left available below the MFF ceilings for commitment appropriations shall 
constitute a Global MFF Margin for commitments, to be made available over 
and above the ceilings established in the MFF for years 2016 to 2020 for 
policy objectives related to growth and employment (…) and to migration 
and security”39. The mid-term review also allocated in the region of €13 
billion additional funding in 2017-20 for jobs and growth and migration and 
security40. The MFF regulation was amended to increase the ceilings of 
the Flexibility Instrument and the Emergency Aid Reserve41. The Flexibility 
Instrument is up to €600 million a year. The Flexibility Instrument was mobi-
lised to supplement financing of migration, refugees and security expendi-
ture by €530 million in 201742. 
38 https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/financing/fundings/migration-asylum-borders/
asylum-migration-integration-fund_en.       
39 Article 1 (6) of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2017/1123 of 20 June 2017 
amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1311/2013 laying down the multiannual 
financial framework for the years 2014-2020.
40 COM (2016) 603.
41 COM(2017) 473 final.
42 Decision (EU) 2017/342 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 De-
cember 2016 on the mobilisation of the Flexibility Instrument to finance immedi-
ate budgetary measures to address the on-going migration, refugee and security 
crisis (OJ L 50 of 28 February 2017).
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Table 11: EU Budget funds for migration policies in the 2014-20 Multiannual 
Financial Framework, € millions
Source: Bruegel based on European Union Official Journals: L51 of 21/02/2016, 
L69 of 13/03/2015, L320 of 4/12/2015, L48 of 24/02/2016, L52 of 28/02/2017, L51 of 
28/02/2017, and European Commission COM(2017) 400 EN. The 2018 budget was 
adopted on 22 December 2017, but at time of writing had not been published in the Of-
ficial Journal, so we refer to the Commission Communication instead. Note: The €1 bil-
lion EU budget contribution to the Refugee Facility for Turkey is to be financed through 
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Title 18: Migration and home affairs
18 02 Internal Security
Internal Security Fund 401.1 392.6 558.7 645.2 713.2 696.1 717.5
FRONTEX 82.9 106.1 120.3 238.7 238.7 281.3 292.3
Europol 81.7 92.2 92.6 97.7 97.7 113.7 116.7
18 03 Asylum and Migration 418.7 430.2 636.9 1,906.7 1,936.7 1,687.6 802.6
Asylum and Migration Fund 401.1 414.6 620.9 1,888.0 1,918.0 1,617.8 716.7
European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 14.5 15.0 15.4 18.7 18.7 69.2 85.8
European fingerprint database (Eurodac) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
18 07 Instrument for Emergency Support within the Union 148.5 198.0 199.0
(A) Direct funds for migration* 984.4 1,021.1 1,408.5 2,888.3 3,134.8 2,976.6 2,128.1
Title 19: Foreign policy instruments - selected instruments related to migration and aid to third countries
Instrument for Stability (IFS):
Crisis response and prevention 226.8 247.6 247.6 253.5 253.5 199.2 287.8
Title 21: Development and Cooperation Policy Area
Migration and asylum 46.3 41.6 41.6 57.3 57.3 405.0 51.5
Title 22: Neighbourhood and Enlargment Negotiations
 Instruments within the European Neighbourhood Instrument
Med. countries: human rights & mobility 211 193 493 144 144 173 119
Mediterranean countries: Confidence 
building, security, conflict management 80 45 345 131 131 332 262
Palestine peace process 300 287 287 290 290 310 293
Eastern Parnership countries:
human rights and mobility 247 207 207 195 195 214 230
Cross-border cooperation 170 303 303 9 9 8 12
(B) Indirect funds for migration 1,282 1,323 1,923 1,080 1,080 1,642 1,255
TOTAL (C) = (A)+(B) 2,266 2,344 3,331.6 3,968 4,214.6 4,618 3,383
TOTAL EU BUDGET (D) 137,547 141,655 158,607 151,233 151,448 153,937 156,623
SHARE (C)/D) 1.65% 1.65% 2.10% 2.62% 2.78% 3.00% 2.16%
* (A) = 18 03 + 18 02 01 + 18 02 03 + 18 02 04 + 18 07
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various budget headings: the Instrument for Stability (€20 million), Development 
Cooperation Instrument (€10 million in 2016 and €10 million in 2017), the Instrument 
for Pre-Accession (€55 million in 2016 and €595 million in 2017) and Humanitarian Aid 
(€165 million and €145 million in 2016 and 2017, respectively).
The Emergency Aid Reserve is targeted firstly at humanitarian opera-
tions for non-EU countries and can mobilise up to €300 million a year43. 
Additionally, a European Union Crisis Reserve was proposed to finance 
needs such as management of the migration crisis. This instrument is to be 
funded by decommitted appropriations from all MFF headings, estimated 
at €3 billion to €4 billion per year – part of this amount is to be used for the 
refugee crisis. The draft budget for 2017 was given an additional €1.8 million 
from special instruments and margins for spending on migration44.
The EU also has decentralised agencies working on migration and home 
affairs – these include external border management and control as carried 
out by FRONTEX (Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 and repealed by 
Regulation (EU) 2016/1624), assisting police cooperation between member 
states through Europol, and assisting in the cooperation and implementa-
tion of member states’ obligations under the Common European Asylum 
System through the European Asylum Support Office (EASO). EU agencies 
operate under indirect management, meaning the Commission delegates 
budget implementation to those agencies. The total EU contribution from the 
multiannual framework 2014-20 to FRONTEX, Europol and EASO was initially 
committed t at €626.4 million, €656.6 million and €109.3 million, respec-
tively45, which amounts have been increased substantially in EU budget 
revisions (Table 11). 
Outside of the MFF but under the EU budget, trust funds for external 
measures provide additional financing to support the EU’s migration policies. 
An example of these instruments is the Instrument for Emergency Support 
43 The exact share of this fund allocated to humanitarian aid to refugees is, to our best 
knowledge, not available.
44 COM(2016) 603.
45 COM(2013) 519 final. 
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within the Union (Council Regulation (EU) 2016/369). The emergency sup-
port within the Union is to be awarded in cases of disasters of “exceptional 
scale and impact” where “no other instrument available to Member States 
and to the Union is sufficient”. 
Other trust funds encompass the Africa Trust Fund (€1.8 billion) to help 
parts of Africa affected by migration, the EU regional trust fund in response 
to the Syrian crisis (€500 million) and the Refugee Facility for Turkey (€3 
billion). The latter Turkey facility is financed by the EU budget in part (€1 
billion), and also by external assigned revenue (ie €2 billion from member 
states and private entities). 
Lastly, the European Development Fund rests outside of the EU budget 
and provides funding from EU member states for projects related to migra-
tion, among others. The budget for the 2014-20 period is €30.5 billion. It 
is not stated how much of this amount will be granted towards migration 
specifically apart from a €2.2 billion contribution to the Africa Trust fund.
The Dublin Regulation
The large inflow of asylum seekers since 2015 has put pressure on 
member states that have received large numbers in a short period, 
and has forced a re-evaluation of the existing EU tools, particularly of 
the Dublin Regulation. 
The Dublin Convention in 1990 was the first EU legal agreement 
assigning responsibility for asylum applications to member states. 
It was replaced in 2003 by the Dublin II Regulation and updated in 
2013 by the Dublin III Regulation, in force since January 2014 (Reg 
No. 604/2013), which applied to the 28 EU countries plus Iceland, 
Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland. 
The Dublin Regulation contains the criteria for determining each 
member state’s responsibility for examining asylum applications. 
The regulation uses a hierarchy of criteria for asylum applications 
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– family unity, residence documents, irregular entry or stay, visa-
waived entry. The main principle is that the member state responsi-
ble is the one “which played the greatest part in the applicant’s entry 
to the EU”, which places a big burden on a small number of member 
states. While in theory asylum seekers cannot choose the country 
in which they make their applications, in practice many migrants 
avoid registration until they reach a country where they would 
like to obtain asylum. This is reflected in the huge number of first-
time asylum applications made in Germany, which was not the EU 
country of arrival for most refugees. These practices have been called 
‘asylum shopping’.  
An independent evaluation (Maas et al, 2015) and a May 2016 
European Commission communication (COM 2016/0270 final) 
have summarised the problems of the Dublin III Regulation as a 
lack of consistent and correct implementation in member states, the 
hierarchy of criteria set out which does not take the capacity of the 
member states into account and hence does not aim at the objective 
of a fair sharing of responsibility and significant delays in the method 
of allocating responsibility, with waiting times amounting to 10 or 11 
months before the start of the examination of claims. When assessing 
the Dublin III Regulation against what it was set up to do, the out-
come is not positive. The regulation has not curbed multiple appli-
cations or secondary movements and there has been no or very little 
redistribution of applicants between member states. 
Given the weaknesses of the Dublin system, its reform has become 
a pressing issue, with two main options about assigning the responsi-
bility for asylum seekers on the table: 
• The current criteria for the allocation of responsibility would be 
preserved, but it would be supplemented with a corrective fairness 
mechanism that would relocate and redistribute asylum seekers 
when a member state is overburdened, or 
• replacement of the ‘first point of entry’ principle with a new system 
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that allocates asylum applicants based on a “permanent distribu-
tion key reflecting the relative size, wealth and absorption capacity 
of each member state”46.This option thus would put an end to the 
current system in which the EU country of arrival is responsible for 
processing the asylum application. 
Whatever option is selected, a key issue is whether an opt-out 
from the new system will be possible, and if so, under what con-
ditions. The European Commission and the European Parliament 
proposed different options:
• According to the Commission proposal, member states can opt out 
for twelve months, provided they make a solidarity contribution of 
€250,000 per applicant to the member states that got their applica-
tions instead;
• The European Parliament rejected the €250,000 per applicant 
proposal, and proposed instead a system of conditionality between 
participating in the relocation system and the national envelopes 
for the European Structural Funds47.
Another important aspect of the ongoing negotiations is the 
treatment of asylum seekers arriving from “safe third countries”, 
which are: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav 
46 See: European Commission factsheet on the Dublin system https://ec.europa.eu/
home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-mi-
gration/background-information/docs/20160406/factsheet_-_the_dublin_system_
en.pdf. 
47 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=COMPARL&mode=XM-
L&language=EN&reference=PE599.751. 
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Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey48. 
The Commission proposed that asylum seekers arriving from these 
countries should be “inadmissible” and be returned to these countries, 
which, if implemented, would have stopped completely the arrival 
of refugees from the Balkans and Turkey.  However, the European 
Parliament rejected this proposal.
The proposals for the revisions were subject to discussions within 
various preparatory bodies, the Council and the European Parliament. 
The first trialogue between the European Commission, the Council 
and the European Parliament is scheduled for 12 December 201749, .
7.2 Intra-EU mobility and posted workers
Intra-EU mobility of labour is one of the four fundamental economic 
freedoms of the European Union. Beyond short-term business and 
leisure trips (which are completely unrestricted within the EU for EU 
citizens), under the EU’s Free Movement Directive (2004/38/EC), a 
citizen of an EU country can stay in another EU country for more than 
three months only in three cases:
1. If she/he finds a job (becomes employed or self-employed), or
2. If she/he and accompanying family have sufficient resources and 
sickness insurance and do not become a burden on the social assis-
tance system of the host member state, or
48 “A country is considered as a safe country of origin where, on the basis of the legal situ-
ation, the application of the law within a democratic system and the general political 
circumstances, it can be shown that there is generally and consistently no persecution 
as defined in Article 9 of Directive 2011/95/EU 2, no torture or inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment and no threat by reason of indiscriminate violence in 
situations of international or internal armed conflict” (Directive 2013/32/EU). The 
European Commission lists Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey to be “safe coun-
tries of origin within the meaning of Directive 2013/32/EU” (COM(2015) 452 final).
49 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/2016_133 for information on the 
undergoing legislative process. 
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3. If she/he has student status and sufficient resources to cover living 
expenses and sickness insurance.
Recently arrived jobseekers benefit from slightly more preferential 
treatment, being able to stay for up to six (and not three) months. 
Permanent residency is acquired only after a continuous period of 
five years of legal residency according to the conditions described 
above.
While in certain quarters voices have been raised in favour of 
revising the free labour mobility principle, no serious discussion has 
started.
On the contrary, a major legislative debate on revising the Posted 
Workers Directive is ongoing. President Juncker sparked the debate 
when he stated in his Political Guidelines for the next European 
Commission in 2014 that “in our union, the same work at the same 
place should be remunerated in the same manner”. In March 2016, the 
European Commission submitted its proposal, which was approved 
(with some amendments) by the European Parliament in October 
2017. Subsequently, the Council also adopted its position with some 
deviations from the parliament’s position.
The current Posted Workers Directive already requires compa-
nies posting workers to obey a large number of host-country labour 
regulations, including the host country’s rules on the minimum 
wage (including overtime rates), maximum work periods, minimum 
rest periods, minimum paid annual holidays, hiring out of workers, 
health, safety and hygiene, protection of pregnant women or those 
who have recently given birth, of children and of young people, and 
equal treatment between men and women and other provisions on 
non-discrimination.
The main points of the revision under discussion between the 
European Parliament and Council at the time of writing are:
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• Remuneration: the host country’s rules on remuneration should 
apply to posted workers. For example, if a Christmas bonus is 
guaranteed to local workers by law or collective agreement, such 
a bonus should be paid to posted workers too. The revision would 
not require ‘equal pay’; for example, it would not require the wage 
of a posted worker in a certain industry to be the same as, for ex-
ample, the average wage of local workers in that industry.
• Duration: the proposed revision would limit the duration of post-
ing to 24 months with the possibility of an extension if a company 
needs more time to complete the service it was contracted to 
provide; the Council voted for an upper limit of one year plus 
possibly six more months.
• Host-country rules: all universally applicable collective agree-
ments would become mandatory for posted workers in all eco-
nomic sectors, such as the regulations governing the right to 
strike.
• Subcontracting and temporary work agencies: all rules would 
apply to subcontractor and temporary work agencies.
As argued by Darvas (2017c), the revision of the Posted Workers 
Directive will have little impact and was largely unnecessary. Instead 
policymakers should focus on the fight against bogus self-employment, 
social security fraud and undeclared work. According to Darvas (2017c), 
the number of undeclared workers in high-wage countries is more 
than 100 times the number of posted workers from low-wage coun-
tries. Undeclared workers are at the complete mercy of their ‘employer’, 
receive no social protection and can be paid below the minimum wage. 
Undeclared work creates major social problems, undermines welfare 
states and leads to unfair competition. Undeclared work is a real prob-
lem, but there is little evidence it is being sufficiently addressed.
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7.3 Policy recommendations
Taking into account the current state of EU migration policy and the 
issues we have highlighted, we offer twelve policy recommendations 
related to public dialogue (1), refugees (2-7), integration of immigrants 
(8-11) and labour shortages in EU member states (12):
1. Address anti-migrant attitudes
Some societies are more supportive of immigration than others, which 
might be rooted in various cultural and historical factors. However, the 
public dialogue can also influence perceptions, and it is essential that 
such dialogue is based on proper and objective information. We found 
that public perceptions about the scale of immigration into the EU are 
far from reality, which could be both a cause and a consequence of 
negative attitudes toward immigration in certain segments of society. 
Most likely, the findings of academic research on the impact of immigra-
tion on the economy, labour markets and public finances, which tend to 
be positive depending on migrant characteristics and the host coun-
try’s economic and institutional factors,  is not sufficiently absorbed in 
political discussions about immigration. Information about immigrants 
should therefore be better disseminated.
Addressing the discourse on migrants in integration policies is 
important. Jensen et al (2017) argue that anti-racism in policymaking 
should not be marginalised. The authors note that integration policies 
as they stand today in Europe draw boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’, 
reinforcing ideas of a majority culture and identity grounded in ethnicity 
and nationality. King and Lulle (2016) recognise integration as a two-
way process and recommend that host countries be as much targeted as 
migrants by integration policies. In particular, they suggest targeting pol-
icies at the segments of society that are more likely to be unwelcoming of 
immigration, and fostering inter-ethnic socialisation at the micro-local 
level. Increasing the ethnic diversity of teaching staff and introducing 
mandatory dialogue between schools, parents and students is proposed 
as a solution for improving acceptance of religious and cultural diversity 
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in schools and achieving better outcomes from second-generation 
migrants.
2. Protect the EU’s borders and fight illegal immigration
Figure 11 in Chapter 2 showed that an overwhelming majority – 85-90 
percent of EU population – would like to see additional measures to 
fight illegal immigration from outside the EU. Efforts therefore have 
to be stepped up. Reducing the incentives for illegal immigration 
has long been at the heart of the EU’s immigration policy and has 
been set as a priority in the European Agenda on Migration and the 
European Agenda on Security. The fight against illegal immigration 
is done through curbing migrant smuggling, improving the control 
of external borders and improving readmission and return policies. 
The May 2015 EU Action Plan against Migrant Smuggling50, sets out a 
plan for 2015-20 involving strong cooperation at the EU level and with 
third countries of origin, international organisations and civil society. 
The plan has four pillars – enhanced police and judicial response, 
improved the gathering and sharing of information; enhanced preven-
tion of smuggling and assistance to vulnerable migrants, and rein-
forced cooperation with third countries. External border controls are 
under the responsibility of FRONTEX, the European Border and Coast 
Guard Agency. The agency was reorganised in 201651 and now coop-
erates with the European Maritime Safety Agency to carry out border 
control. The Return Directive (2008/115/EC) sets common standards 
for the return of third-country nationals – the implementation of the 
return legislation in EU countries is monitored through European 
Commission visits. In order to protect EU borders, continued coop-
eration among national, European and third-country authorities is 
essential. However, the enforcement ability of EU agencies can be 
50 COM(2015) 285 final.
51 See factsheet ‘Securing Europe’s external borders – A European border and coast 
guard’, June 2017, available at https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaf-
fairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-security/20170613_ebcg_en.pdf. 
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limited because EU agencies tend to rely heavily on member states and 
the Commission for patronage, mandate and budget (Collett, 2015).
3. Continue to build partnerships with neighbourhood countries
We recognise the efforts that have been made by the EU in its different 
partnerships with third countries, but the job cannot be regarded as 
finished while large-scale illegal border crossings continue. Better part-
nerships can help to contain refugee and other immigration inflows into 
the EU. Rowthorn (2015) emphasises the importance of supporting ref-
ugee-hosting countries in conflict regions, including the improvement 
of the conditions in their refugee camps. Mayer and Mehregani (2016) 
argue that it is necessary to work with the regions of origin, even though 
EU national asylum systems also need to be improved. Collett et al 
(2016) stress the importance of obtaining the consent of origin countries 
to the successful and safe return of ineligible or temporary migrants, and 
also the importance of their role as providers of occupational and edu-
cational information that can help host countries recognise and validate 
the skills and competences of migrants.
4. Provide additional funding for border protection, neighbourhood partnerships 
and immigrant integration
The EU should not be shy of offering further financial assistance to 
Turkey and Balkan and north-African countries, under transparent 
conditions, if that would help to contain illegal border crossings. 
Likewise, EU financial resources for border protection should be 
reconsidered. Given that immigration is a top concern of citizens, we 
recommend mobilising larger funds than what has been deployed so 
far – which altogether amounts to rather the small amount of about 
2-3 percent of the current Multiannual Financial Framework, which 
also includes spending on EU agencies not related to migration (Box 
3). In our assessment, this is a very small share given the importance 
of immigration as a major public concern. Kamarás et al (2016) also 
conclude that limited amounts of appropriations are available within 
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the current MFF to address the refugee and migration crisis. A previ-
ous independent assessment of the use of EU funds for asylum and 
migration concluded that overall the implementation of the funds has 
been efficient (Hausemer et al, 2015). Since there are limited options 
to reallocate funds within the current MFF, ad-hoc instruments out-
side the MFF should be deployed, possibly with contributions from 
member states. For the upcoming negotiations on the next MFF, we 
recommend giving a much more prominent place to migration and 
border control than under the current MFF.
5. Ensure the consistent implementation of the EU’s asylum rules 
The EU’s widely different asylum application acceptance rates, with 
some countries accepting only 10-20 percent of applications while 
others accept 80-90 percent, is only partially explained by the different 
composition of flows of asylum seekers in terms of their countries of 
citizenship and their age and gender (Leerkes, 2015). A more impor-
tant reason is different implementation of the EU’s asylum rules. This 
is a major problem. Applications should be assessed thoroughly and 
those who do not meet the conditions for humanitarian help should 
not be permitted to enter the EU. But the different implementation of 
EU asylum rules might lead to the rejection of applications of those 
genuinely in need of humanitarian help. Therefore, consistent imple-
mentation of asylum rules is essential. EU institutions and member 
states should work out clear guidelines for the evaluation of asylum 
applications, and ensure their consistent implementation.
6. Share the burden of refugees between EU countries
An improved Common European Refugee Policy is essential for provid-
ing border control, security and harmonised management of refugees, 
which member states otherwise cannot effectively provide. But even if 
the policy is improved, the burden will continue to be distributed among 
EU members unevenly, especially if the first-point-of-entry rule is strictly 
enforced. In line with Article 78(3)  of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
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the European Union saying that “In the event of one or more Member 
States being confronted with an emergency situation characterised by a 
sudden inflow of nationals of third countries, the Council, on a proposal 
from the Commission, may adopt provisional measures for the benefit 
of the member State(s) concerned”, financial support to first-entry coun-
tries to overcome unequal burdens is inevitable. In our view there might 
not be a need to create a new EU fund for this reason; rather, it should be 
enough to step up the use of the various existing EU funds (see Box 3). 
Relocation of refugees from  overburdened countries should be a 
preferred strategy. The composition of people  to be relocated in terms of 
their country of origin and socio-economic characteristics should be the 
same as those who are not relocated, for example, overburdened coun-
tries should not aim to keep the highly-educated and relocate only the 
low-educated refugees. However, we share the view of Bordignon and 
Moriconi (2017), who argue that the EU’s requirement to relocate refu-
gees to countries with high political and ideological resistance against 
accepting them is not viable. Instead, asking for financial compensation 
is more sustainable than relocating refugees to these countries. 
The key question is the form of the financial compensation. In our 
view, the European Commission’s original proposal for a lump-sum soli-
darity fee is more reasonable that the European Parliament’s modification 
which would make access to European Structural Funds conditional on 
participation in the relocation system. We regard the two issues (refugee 
relocation and Structural Funds) as completely separate and therefore 
advise against overlapping them. Structural Funds have a stated purpose 
and in our view these payments should be curtailed only if expenditures 
do not effectively serve the purpose or if the importance of the purpose 
diminishes because of the emergence of other priorities. The distribu-
tion of Structural Funds is very uneven within the EU, and non-partici-
pating countries would be impacted differently by a partial or even full 
suspension of EU Structural Funds payments. By contrast, a lump-sum 
payment made by a country each time it rejects the relocation of a refugee 
to its territory would impact each non-participating EU country equally. 
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Furthermore, the lump-sum solidarity fee could be immediately redi-
rected to countries which are forced to host more refugees because of the 
rejection of the relocation system by other countries, while the non-used 
portion of Structural Funds cannot be reallocated in such a way. 
7. Improve refugee identification by issuing a European ID to each refugee and 
creating a pan-European registry of refugees, linked to national central registries
The identification of refugees poses immense challenges. Identification 
would be greatly facilitated by the issuing of a European ID to each 
refugee and the introduction of a pan-European registry for refugees, as 
our survey presented in chapter 6 showed. The ID should include the 
refugee’s personal information, including biometric information such as 
a fingerprint. The pan-European registry should be accessible online for 
relevant institutions. The pan-European registry would also allow mon-
itoring the movements of asylum seekers and refugees within the EU 
and thereby prevent multiple asylum applications by the same person 
in different EU countries. The issuing of such IDs and the establishment 
of the accompanying system would involve significant costs. However, 
since immigration is a top concern for EU citizens, an up-to-date registry 
on refugees would be essential. 
8. Learn from the best practices in terms of integration of immigrants
We found major differences between EU countries in terms of the 
integration of second-generation immigrants. For example, in Sweden 
and the United Kingdom, second-generation immigrants perform sim-
ilarly to natives in terms of labour market participation, education and 
other indicators of integration. But in most other EU countries, such as 
Belgium and Italy, second-generation immigrants significantly under-
perform compared to natives. This suggests that the effectiveness of 
integration varies significantly in different EU countries.
There are significant differences in welcome and integration 
policies in EU countries. Underlying this are differences in cultural 
attitudes and societal perceptions of the contribution of immigrants. 
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Based on these perceptions, countries might promote early integration 
(as in Denmark or Germany) and prevent segregation (Sweden), or 
not. Models such as that in Italy, for instance, where the relocation of 
refugees throughout the country is decided by the central government 
and integration policies are left to local communities, accentuate dif-
ferences in treatment (Bordignon and Moriconi, 2017). Waiting times 
in asylum decision-making and in the relocation process are also very 
long in a number of countries, and should be reduced.
The private sector could also put in place useful initiatives, as our 
survey in chapter 6 suggests. For example, companies could volunteer 
to employ refugees short-term in order to give them their first work 
experience in the host country. Public authorities could foster such 
initiatives by setting up a system in which companies can indicate 
their voluntary commitments.
Another important proposal from our survey relates to the organisa-
tion of training programmes. For example, tailored introductory pro-
grammes could help to overcome lack of information and poor access 
to informal networks (as also suggested by Aiyar et al, 2016). Strøm et al 
(2017) find that language distance partly explains differences between 
immigrants and natives’ wages and access to the labour market. 
Language courses tailored to communities with different linguistic 
distances to the host countries would facilitate social and labour market 
integration, as would fast-track professional training and exams when 
the refugees’ qualifications are not directly accepted in the host country. 
Cooperation with social enterprises and associations on certain 
working activities, vocational training and cultural exchange would 
also facilitate social inclusion. Papademetriou and Benton (2016) 
recommend that governments engage employers and social partners 
in integration efforts as part of a forward-looking strategy.
Monitoring integration over the long-term is another important 
recommendation (Bordignon and Moriconi, 2017). Our proposal of a 
European ID for refugees and a pan-European registry would greatly 
facilitate such monitoring.
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9. Combat educational and spatial segregation
Combating educational and spatial segregation is a priority for integra-
tion of migrants and refugees. Early childhood education is crucial for 
disadvantaged families, a category that many migrant children belong 
to. Heckman (2012) highlights that in disadvantaged families the high-
est rate of return in early childhood development comes from invest-
ing as early as possible, because skills beget skills in a complementary 
and dynamic way. Language courses and professional training to foster 
the acceptance of qualifications are indispensable for recently arrived 
adult migrants. Enabling young immigrants and second generation 
migrants to access higher education would greatly foster their integra-
tion, as our findings in chapter 5 demonstrate.
The European Commission (2015) has suggested the use of 
European Structural and Investment Funds to support desegregation 
measures (eg inclusion of children in the mainstream school system 
through school-bus services, relocation of marginalised families to 
mixed neighbourhoods underpinned by provision of social hous-
ing and soft measures such as community development, mediation, 
and social assistance). Bolt (2009) reviews desegregation policies in 
European countries and finds that housing diversification is the most 
common, but there is still a significant gap between the rhetoric and 
the implementation of desegregation policies.
10. Ensure the EU strategy for integration is well articulated with national govern-
ments and other institutions
While integration policy remains a national competence, in June 
2016 the European Commission published an Action Plan on 
Integration (COM (2016) 377 final) with the aim of coordinat-
ing a common policy for assisting EU member states to integrate 
third-country nationals. In our view, this plan includes several useful 
initiatives and should be more prominently implemented in member 
states. The proposed actions were framed under a two-way process 
of integration. It should allow third-country nationals to embrace the 
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EU’s fundamental values and to learn the language of the host coun-
try. But it should also offer them meaningful opportunities to partic-
ipate in the economy and society of the host country. The proposals 
are made under five headings (pre-departure and pre-arrival meas-
ures; education; labour market integration and access to vocational 
training; access to basic services; and active participation and social 
inclusion) and would be implemented through policy coordination 
and funding. Other than that, the Commission proposes several 
other measures:
• To start pre-departure and pre-arrival measures with an emphasis 
on priority third countries and engaging member states to strength-
en cooperation with these countries and measures; 
• To provide education support, online language assessment and 
learning for newly arrived third country nationals, especially 
refugees; 
• To promote labour market integration and access to vocational 
training through support for early recognition of academic qualifi-
cations of third-country nationals including refugees; 
• To use the Asylum Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) to 
launch projects that ‘fast track’ the insertion of refugees into the 
labour market;
• To improve housing, health and social infrastructure with the help 
of EU funds and the European Investment Bank and to facilitate 
refugees’ access to such basic services. 
Veloso Leão et al (2017) write that ensuring coordination between 
different policy areas, governance levels and member states is one of the 
main challenges in the implementation of the EU action plan. The authors 
hence suggest an evaluation of the impact of the functioning European 
tools for policy coordination, eg the European Integration Network and 
the AMIF, on policy actions and outcomes in member states. 
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11. Review financial regulation to promote the financial inclusion of refugees
There are contradictory forces at work with regard to financial regulation 
and financial inclusion. The continuing tightening of financial regula-
tion and oversight of the financial sector (which is important in the fight 
against money laundering and terrorist financing) is working against 
the economic integration of refugees. Our survey of banks (chapter 6) 
showed that the majority of banks with refugee clients regard the know-
your-customer (KYC) regulations in the EU as either somewhat or overly 
restrictive, rather than striking the right balance between the need to 
offer financial services to refugees and the anti-money laundering and 
counter-terrorist financing goals. National authorities should review 
the implementation of their specific KYC rules and those countries that 
have not done so far should provide clear guidelines about the financial 
inclusion of refugees (about half of EU countries have not yet provided 
guidance). Consistency with other regulations, such as the Payment 
Accounts Directive should also be reviewed.
The European ID for refugees and the pan-European registry, to 
which financial institutions would have access, would also foster finan-
cial inclusion. And financial institutions themselves could also take fur-
ther steps, for example by establishing special units with employees who 
speak different languages, producing internal written guidelines and 
offering training to staff on the financial inclusion of refugees. Financial 
institutions could also volunteer to organise training for refugees, set up 
dedicated websites and issue booklets to promote the financial inclu-
sion of refugees. 
12. Address labour shortages
Business surveys indicate that labour shortages are at historically highs 
in most central and eastern European and north-west EU countries 
(Figure 24 in chapter 4). In general, labour shortages could be over-
come by immigration (either from other EU countries or from non-EU 
countries), increased supply of domestic workers and by robotisation. 
Robotisation is at best a long-term prospect and not all tasks can be 
174 | BRUEGEL BLUEPRINT 28
performed by robots, while there is often resistance to immigration 
from outside the EU. Emigration from central and eastern Europe to 
north-western EU countries reduces labour shortages in the later and 
increases them in the former. 
Measures in both regions should include:
• Steps to foster greater labour-force participation;
• A careful examination of public sector efficiency. The resulting re-
duction in public sector employment would free up more workers for 
the private sector;
• Training programmes targeting the professions and skills suffering 
from the greatest shortages should be prioritised;
• When labour shortages affect relatively low-paid jobs, such as in 
the construction sector (as business surveys indicate), increasing 
the progressivity of personal income tax and social security contri-
butions (by cutting rates applied to low earners and increasing the 
rates applied to high earners) would facilitate a net income increase 
for low earners in a budget neutral way. Figure 56 shows that the 
tax wedge (the share of all taxes and social security contributions in 
labour costs) of single earners at 67 percent of the average wage is 
not much lower than the tax wedge of single earners at 167 percent of 
the average wage in several countries. Even in countries with a larger 
gap, there could be scope for further increases in progressiveness. 
Furthermore, a lower total tax and social security burden on low-in-
come earners would facilitate a reduction in the black economy.
In central and eastern European countries, higher net wages through-
out the wage distribution could slow emigration and speed up return 
migration. Cutting labour taxes and social security contributions while 
increasing other taxes (in a fiscally-neutral way) might facilitate net 
wage increases without increasing the overall wage bill for companies 
and undermining fiscal sustainability. Wealth and inheritance taxes 
are important candidates to counterbalance the labour tax reduction; 
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such tax adjustments would also foster more inclusive growth, as 
argued by Darvas and Wolff (2016).
Figure 56: Tax wedge, 2016 (percent of total labour cost)
Source: OECD Tax wedge data, https://data.oecd.org/tax/tax-wedge.htm. Note: Tax wedge 
is defined as the ratio between the amount of taxes and social security contributions paid 
after an employee (both by the employee and the employer) and the corresponding total 
labour cost for the employer. This indicator is measured in percentage of labour cost.
Among OECD countries, the tax wedge for low-wage earners is 
highest in Hungary, but there is room for manoeuvre to reduce the tax 
wedge in all other central and eastern European countries (Figure 56). 
For five of the six central and eastern European counties for which data 
is available, the tax wedge of low-wage earners is even higher than in 
the highly-indebted Greece and Spain, and in all central and eastern 
European countries it is much higher than in Switzerland, the country 
with the lowest tax wedge in Europe52.
52 For example, by reducing the tax wedge of low-wage earners to the Swiss level, the net 
wage of low-wage earners (who earn 67 percent of the average wage) could be increased 
by 56 percent in Hungary, 39 percent in Latvia, 32-35 percent in the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Slovenia and 25 percent in Poland, without influencing the gross labour 
cost faced by companies. Certainly, such a large reduction in the tax wedge would neces-
sitate a major recalibration of the tax system by increasing other taxes.
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